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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Role of Coherence in the Study of Discomse 
People produce and process discourse with remarkable ease. One of the major tasks 
for the students of discourse is to specify what exactly goes on during the production 
and processing of discourse. Coherence is an important notion here: To understand a 
discourse means among other things to build a coherent representation of that 
discourse. This study focuses on one of the relations that establish coherence in a 
discourse, namely the global contrastive coherence relation, i.e. a relation between two 
discourse units that consist of at least one sentence and that can be conjoined with the 
conjunction but. This definition presupposes that global contrastive coherence relations 
constitute a natural class. Whether this assumption is correct is one of the issues to be 
addressed in this study. 
Discourse differs in many respects from an arbitrary sequence of sentences. A theory of 
discourse must give an account of these differences. The following list, by no means an 
exhaustive one, mentions some of those differences. The items on the list are closely 
related. 
The interpretation of discourse involves making inferences of information that does 
not show up in the semantic analyses of the separate sentences. For example, in order 
to interpret the sequence Erica came in. John left a reader must infer a relation 
between the two sentences of the sequence (which might be a causal one). Thus one 
can say that the meaning of a discourse is more than the sum of the interpretations of 
the individual sentences in the discourse. 
Second, the sentences of a discourse are generally interpreted with respect to a 
context. This context can resolve ambiguities or vaguenesses that occur in the sentences 
of a discourse if these are taken in isolation. An example of this is pronominal 
reference. In a sentence the reference of pronouns can remain unspecified. In a 
discourse such references are fixed. In this sense one can say that the meaning of a 
discourse is more restricted than the sum of the interpretations of the individual 
sentences in the discourse. 
Third, discourses contain operative markers. These markers function to indicate the 
way in which the reader/listener must treat the informational content of the sentences 
in the discourse. They might, for instance, refer to the argumentative structure of the 
discourse. An example is even (cf. Carón, 1985): In (1) even indicates 1) that other 
people than John have come and 2) that John's coming is something of particular 
interest. Whereas the former information can be treated in terms of presuppositions, 
the latter refers directly to the argumentative structure of the discourse in which the 
sentence occurs. 
(1) · Even John has come. 
Operative markers contribute to the meaning of the discourse, rather than to the 
meaning (the propositional content) of the individual sentences. It follows that the 
contributions that these elements add to the meaning of the discourse cannot be 
accounted for in terms of the meaning of the individual sentences in the text. 
Fourth, discourses usually have a (more or less) complex argumentative structure. In 
this structure elements occur of various argumentative statuses. Thus there are 
elements of a higher level in the hierarchy (such as the titles of chapters in a book) 
and low-level elements (such as justifications for some claim). The place of an 
individual sentence of the discourse in the argumentative hierarchy cannot be con-
structed merely on the basis of the meaning of that sentence. 
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Observations like these keep us from considering the interpretation of a discourse as 
a simple function of the interpretations of the individual sentences in the discourse. 
They also show that discourse generally has a highly complex informational structure, 
which is the product of the interaction of many components of the human mind. As a 
consequence the study of discourse is a multidisciplinary enterprise, worked on by 
scholars from such varying disciplines as rhetoric, (formal) semantics, psycholinguistics, 
artificial intelligence, discourse analysis, and text linguistics. 
All of the differences mentioned above relate in one way or another to the fact that a 
discourse is only adequate if its representation is coherent, both at a local and a global 
level.1 One of the main objectives for the study of discourse is to account for this 
property of discourse. 
In general one can say that there are two respects in which a discourse can be 
coherent. The first has been called referential or topic continuity (cf. Garnham, 
Oakhill, and Johnson-Laird, 1982; Givón, 1983). A discourse displays referential 
continuity through repeated reference to the same set of entities. The conditions under 
which referential continuity can occur, and especially those cases in which apparent 
discontinuous reference does not lead to incoherence, have been studied in artificial 
intelligence, psycholinguistics and linguistics. 
The second source of coherence is the relation that can exist between two or more 
discourse units. In the simple case this relation exists between two or more subsequent 
sentences. In the more complicated case the relation exists between higher level units, 
such as paragraphs or complete chapters. Following Hobbs (1983, 1985) such relations 
will be referred to as coherence relations. Note that, contrary to what the name 
suggests, coherence relations do not include cases of referential coherence. 
A theory of discourse production and interpretation must address such issues as: What 
types of relations can exist between the units of a discourse? What is the nature of the 
discourse units that are related via a coherence relation? Under what conditions does a 
sequence of discourse units result in a coherent discourse fragment? What is the 
relation between a coherence relation and the linguistic expressions in the discourse? 
There is a large body of literature on coherence relations (and related concepts), 
stemming from very diverse frameworks (cf., for instance, De Beaugrande, 1980; Van 
Dijk, 1977a, 1980; Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Biasci and Pritsche, 1979; Grimes, 
1975; Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Hobbs, 1983, 1985; Longacre, 1983; Mann and 
Thompson, 1986, 1987). It is somewhat surprising to find that the issues mentioned 
before are hardly ever treated in detail. 
1.2 The Contrast Relation as a Coherence Relation 
In this study one of the coherence relations, the global contrastive coherence relation, 
is the object of research. The contrastive coherence relation is of special interest, since 
it can be argued that it always functions as what Halliday and Hasan (1976) call an 
internal relation. Contrary to such relations as addition and causality there is no extra-
textual counterpart of the contrastive coherence relation: A contrastive coherence 
relation cannot exist without someone observing or expressing the contrast. In this 
respect contrastive coherence relations resemble such relations as comparisons. Their 
1
 There are other differences between discourses and arbitrary sequences of sentences. A 
se' i'^ f identical sentences is completely coherent, yet it is not an acceptable text, since it is not 
informative. Another difference is that discourses, unlike arbitrary sets of sentences, can be 
categorized in genres (such as informative, argumentative, narrative). 
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main function is not to describe facts in reality, but to organize man's knowledge about 
reality.2 Consequently, contrastive coherence relations mainly have a rhetorical or 
argumentative function (as will be argued extensively in subsequent chapters). This 
property of contrastive coherence relations is reflected in the fact that the difference 
between and and but (the latter being the prototypical marker of the contrastive 
coherence relation) cannot be accounted for in truth functional terms. Thus, the 
existence of this type of element has been one of the problems for a completely truth 
conditional account of the semantics of natural language (cf. Chapter 2 and the 
references cited there). 
The most detailed accounts of the contrastive coherence relation stem from linguistic 
studies of sentence coordination. These accounts, then, are the starting point for the 
present discussion. What these accounts have in common is that they investigate the 
semantic and syntactic properties of contrastive (or adversative) conjunctions in 
relation to the more general problem of coordination. As such these studies are studies 
of the properties of the local contrastive coherence relation. Moreover, these studies 
are generally restricted to the properties of bui-coordinations, which are compared to 
the properties of, for instance, a/ui-coordinations. 
However, the contrastive coherence relation is also found at a more global level, viz. 
when it relates higher order discourse units, and it can be expressed in other ways than 
by means of but. This raises such questions as: Are the linguistic analyses of but-
coordinations that are available in the literature adequate characterizations of the local 
contrastive coherence relation? Do these analyses apply to contrastive coherence 
relations that are expressed in other ways than by means of but! Can the analyses be 
extrapolated in such a way that they apply to global contrastive coherence relations? In 
this study a linguistic analysis of contrastive coherence relations is developed that aims 
at an answer to these questions. 
A related issue is how the global contrastive coherence relation is interpreted. What 
is the effect of the use of a global contrastive coherence relation on the interpretation 
of a discourse? How does the linguistic marking of the global contrastive coherence 
relation affect the interpretation of the discourse? Do global contrastive coherence 
relations differ from local contrastive coherence relations in this respect? It will be 
argued that questions like these relate directly to questions about the argumentative 
structure of the discourse. The potential to account for the argumentative properties of 
these relations is therefore one of the criteria for the adequacy of their linguistic 
description. 
Coherence relations can be expressed linguistically in many ways. The contrastive 
coherence relation is no exception to this rule. Some examples are given in the 
following list: 
(2) Some realizations of the contrastive coherence relation 
- coordinating and subordinating conjunctions {but, and, or, although, while) 
- adverbials and adverbial phrases (yet, however, on the one hand...on the other hand, 
clause final it is true) 
- prepositions (despite, without) 
- negation 
- adjectives (other, comparatives) 
- verbal modes (in particular the irrealis) 
2
 Cf. Ogden (1932) on the ontological status of the notion contrast or opposition. 
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- complete sentences (there is another side to the picture) 
- figures of speech (litotes, antithesis, oxymoron, irony) 
- (the orthographic correlates of) intonation 
- (certain) combinations of these 
Apart from these possibilities the contrastive coherence relation can remain implicit.3 
Some of the realizations mentioned in (2), such as but, although and yet, explicitly mark 
the contrastive coherence relation (i.e. the contrastive interpretation is obligatory), 
whereas others, like and and while can also occur in non-contrastive contexts. 
Such variations in marking the same coherence relation lead Mann and Thompson 
(1986) to the claim that the linguistic marking of a coherence relation is irrelevant for 
its interpretation. In their opinion the major function of a conjunction is to restrict the 
set of possible relations that can exist between the related discourse parts. They claim 
that a coherence relation (or, in their terminology, a relational proposition) can only 
be characterized functionally. This gives their analysis a certain circularity: Readers can 
only know that they are dealing with a PROBLEM-SOLUTION relation by interpret­
ing one text part as a PROBLEM and the other as a SOLUTION. It is unclear how 
the latter two can be identified without reference to the coherence relation. 
In this thesis an alternative position is defended. The linguistic properties of the 
contrastive coherence relation are investigated. It is argued that contrastive coherence 
relations, whatever their surface linguistic realizations may be, share an underlying 
representation. Thus the intuition is accounted for that this varied set of linguistic 
realizations involves the same coherence relation. However, it will be shown that there 
are also systematic differences between various types of contrastive coherence relations, 
and that these differences depend, among other things, on the way in which the 
contrastive coherence relation is expressed linguistically. The latter is in conflict with 
the Mann and Thompson view. 
The potential to account for both the similarities and the dissimilarities between 
different types of contrastive coherence relations is an additional criterion for the 
analysis to be presented. The impact of this criterion on the analysis may be clear from 
the following example. In linguistic studies of the semantics of coordination several 
types of bwi-coordinations are usually distinguished. In some analyses (see Lakoff 
(1971) and Section 2.1) these differences have been accounted for by the hypothesis 
that there are two lexical items but, each corresponding to a different type of contras­
tive coherence relation. Such an analysis is in conflict with the criterion just mentioned: 
It may account for the differences between various types of contrastive coherence 
relations, but it cannot account for the similarities. One such similarity is the fact that 
all the types of contrastive coherence relations under consideration can be expressed by 
means of a ftuf-coordination. 
It is, of course, not claimed that the analysis of contrastive coherence relations 
defended in this thesis satisfies these two criteria completely: For example, the relation 
between the linguistic and the argumentative structure of a discourse has proven to be 
so complex that it is as yet but little understood. Nevertheless it is hoped that the 
analysis may contribute to a deeper insight into the linguistic and argumentative 
properties of contrastive coherence relations. 
3
 One may ask whether contrastive coherence relations can remain completely implicit, i.e., 
whether, for instance, intonation does not always indicate the contrastive interpretation. Since 
the present thesis deals with written language, this question is left for future research. 
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1.3 Some A Priori Delimitations: the Notion 'Global Contrastive Coherence Relation' 
List (2) shows that the contrastive coherence relation can be expressed in many ways. 
It would be far too ambitious an enterprise to analyze all these different ways of 
expressing the contrastive coherence relation. Therefore the object of research has 
been restricted along the following lines. 
Global coherence relations exist between major discourse parts, such as paragraphs. 
A paragraph consists of at least one sentence (or, more precisely, one syntactically 
independent clause). As a consequence only those contrastive coherence relations will 
be investigated in which discourse units are related that consist of at least one 
sentence. A second restriction is that only those global contrastive coherence relations 
are investigated in which the discourse units can be related by the conjunction but. The 
motivation for this restriction is that the main focus of the linguistic literature on 
contrastive coherence relations, which is the basis for the present analysis, is on this 
conjunction. Alternative ways of expressing the contrastive coherence relations will only 
be discussed superficially. 
Therefore, in this study the notion 'global contrastive coherence relation' is defined 
as a relation between two discourse units that consist of at least one sentence and that 
can be conjoined with the conjunction but. 
This definition incorporates a delimitation of the phenomena to be discussed. There 
are some constructions in which it is intuitively clear that the notion 'contrast' is 
involved, and that nevertheless will not be discussed in this thesis. Examples are given 
in (3)-(7). 
(3) The former queen of the Netherlands had a greater appeal than the present 
one. 
(4) Reagan: troublemaker or troubleshooter? 
(5) The train is late, today. 
(6) (Context: After three warnings that he should clean up and go to bed 
mother gets angry and drags John out of the room.) 
John: But I nearly finished my game. 
(7) Although John is small, he plays basketball. 
Comparisons like (3) and disjunctions like (4) presuppose some sort of contrast. Thus, 
in example (3) the appeal of the former queen is contrasted with that of the present 
queen and in disjunction (4) two possible evaluations of president Reagan are con-
trasted. Nevertheless these types of utterances will not be investigated in this study, 
because they do not allow for a paraphrase with but. 
(5) presupposes a contrast between what is expected to be the case and what is 
actually found to be the case. As in the two previous cases no paraphrase with but is 
possible. Moreover, the first part of the contrastive coherence relation is not expressed 
in the discourse, which is a second reason why it does not belong to the object of 
investigation in this study: The contrastive coherence relation does not exist between 
two discourse units. 
A somewhat different case is (6). This obviously is a feirf-construction. Yet this type 
of example will not be discussed, as the contrastive coherence relation does not exist 
between two linguistically realized discourse units: It exists between a discourse unit 
and a non-verbal context. 
The contrastive coherence relation in example (7) consists between two discourse 
units and can be paraphrased by means of but. However, the first clause is a subor-
dinate clause, i.e. it is not syntactically independent. These constructions do not occur 
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as global contrastive coherence relations and therefore fall beyond the scope of this 
study. 
The examples show that the delimitation incorporated in the definition of global 
contrastive coherence relations may prove to be arbitrary. Coherence relations are 
basically conceptual relations, i.e. deep structure relations that underlie the surface 
realizations of these relations in a discourse. In this study the global contrastive 
coherence relation is defined in terms of surface realizations. In the worst case it may 
turn out that there is no systematic relationship between the deep and surface forms of 
the relations or that the definition of global contrastive coherence relations does not 
describe a natural class of relations. This thesis may be considered to be an argument 
against this worst case. 
The definition of the global contrastive coherence relation incorporates yet another 
kind of restriction on the topics to be discussed. The linguistic literature on sentential 
contrastive coherence relations pays much attention to the syntactic and semantic 
properties of the conjuncte in the contrastive coherence relation. This will not be the 
case in the present study. The global contrastive coherence relation is defined as a 
relation between discourse units. These discourse units consist of at least one sentence. 
The properties of the conjuncts in a contrastive coherence relation at a level below 
that of the sentence are therefore not of primary interest to this study. Syntactically the 
conjuncts consist of sentences and semantically they consist of propositions. With 
respect to the analysis to be given it is assumed that a complete syntactic and semantic 
analysis of the component parts of a conjunct in a global contrastive coherence relation 
is available. 
In this thesis the notion 'contrast' is used to refer to syntagmatic relations between 
discourse units. The aim of the thesis is to give an account of the circumstances under 
which two discourse units can be related coherently via this relation. There is a related, 
but different use of the notion 'contrast' in many works on lexical semantics (cf. Lyons, 
1977, p. 270-290 and the references cited there), where it is used to describe certain 
meaning relations between predicates, like gradeable and non-gradeable antonymy, 
contrariness, subcontrariness, contradiction, and binary opposition. These are paradig-
matic relations between predicates and therefore not of primary interest to this study. 
It may turn out, however, that the paradigmatic contrast relations play a crucial role in 
the syntagmatic contrastive coherence relation. In fact, Abraham (1975, 1979) and Lang 
(1977, 1984) make specific claims to that effect to describe a set of í>Mí-coordinations. 
These proposals will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.4 Research Questions and Method of Investigation 
The first main research question in this study is: What are the linguistic properties of 
the global contrastive coherence relation? An answer to this question involves answers 
to such questions as: Are the linguistic analyses of but-coordinations adequate charac-
terizations of the local contrastive coherence relation? Do these analyses apply to 
contrastive coherence relations that are expressed in other ways than by means of bui? 
Can they be extrapolated in such a way that they apply to global contrastive coherence 
relations? 
The other main question in this study is: How are the global contrastive coherence 
relations interpreted? This question relates to such questions as: What is the effect of 
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the use of a global contrastive coherence relation on the interpretation of a discourse? 
How does the linguistic marking of the global contrastive coherence relation affect the 
interpretation of the discourse? Do global contrastive coherence relations differ from 
local contrastive coherence relations in this respect? How does the interpretation of a 
global contrastive coherence relation relate to the argumentative structure of the 
discourse? What is the relationship between the linguistic analysis of the global 
contrastive coherence relation and the argumentative structure of the discourse? 
The linguistic properties of the global contrastive coherence relation are investigated 
on the basis of the linguistic analysis of sentential contrastive coherence relations. 
Therefore, some of these proposals are reviewed first. Then an analysis is presented of 
local contrastive coherence relations. The analysis states that the interpretation of a 
contrastive coherence relation involves the derivation of a particular underlying 
structure. Thus the relationships between different types of contrastive coherence 
relations are accounted for. These types of contrastive coherence relations are distin-
guished by the way in which this underlying structure is derived and by the effect that 
this derivation has on the representation of the discourse. It is argued that the 
linguistic realization of the contrastive coherence relation affects this process. 
The analysis makes several assumptions about the argumentative structure of local 
contrastive coherence relations. These assumptions were investigated in two experi-
ments on the interpretation of local contrastive coherence relations. 
In several experiments the effect of linguistic marking on the interpretation of 
different types of global contrastive coherence relations was investigated. Furthermore, 
in a text analysis of a corpus of newspaper articles several properties of global contras-
tive coherence relations in natural texts have been investigated. The results of the 
experiments and of the text analysis are the basis for a discussion of the question 
whether the linguistic analysis of local contrastive coherence relations also applies to 
global contrastive coherence relations. 
This survey indicates that there is a strong emphasis on the relations between different 
types of contrastive coherence relations in this research. It is suggested that these 
relationships may be accounted for by assuming that one structure underlies all 
contrastive coherence relations. Such an assumption involves an appeal to abstract 
structures. For example, it will be assumed that the interpretation of a sentence like 
(8) involves deriving a structure that is reflected in the paraphrase (9) (given the 
context /5 John the right man for the job?). 
(8) John is qualified, but irresponsible. 
(9) There is an argument in favor of appointing John, and there is an argument 
against appointing John. 
In this view the structure underlying (8) is only abstractly related to the surface form of 
that sentence. But this raises the issue of how abstract the underlying structures can be, 
as there seems to be no upper bound to what can be assumed as an abstract structure: 
One can always hypothesize a more abstract structure in such a way that the structures 
underlying different types of contrastive coherence relations are in fact related. 
To a certain extent this is necessarily so. Interpreting contrastive coherence relations 
is heavily context dependent, as will be argued in Chapter 2. For example, one can 
contrast John L· tall with Bill is short or with Bill L· tall, too, depending on the context. 
In fact, it seems that for almost every pair of syntactically correct conjuncts one can 
construct a context in which the two conjuncts contrast in one way or another. More-
over, language users play with the principles governing the interpretation of contrastive 
coherence relations, as in the commercial slogan Op een dag drink je geen bier meer, 
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maar drink je Grolsch (One day you will not drink beer anymore, but you will drink 
Grolsch). Here one of the restrictions on the use of but is violated, as the two conjuncts 
do not contrast: Grokch belongs to the class of brands of beer. As a result the slogan 
will be interpreted as "Grolsch is not just an ordinary sort of beer". Phenomena like 
these seem to ask for a theory of contrastive coherence relations that is very flexible in 
the way it deals with the contrasted parts. Yet a flexibility that is too great will make 
the theory vacuous. To avoid this danger it is necessary to specify explicitly the ways in 
which the abstract structure is related to the surface realizations. 
The possibility of playing with the principles governing the interpretation of contrastive 
coherence relations raises another methodological issue: It seems wrong to base a 
linguistic theory on such cases. For instance, it would be misleading to reject the 
assumption that an adequate use of but requires a contrast between the conjuncts by 
pointing at examples like the Grolsch slogan. Such a position would not allow for an 
account of the pun in the example: That pun is caused by the fact that the restrictions 
on the normal use of but have been violated. It therefore seems a wise strategy to 
avoid such meta-linguistic or rhetorical uses of language in the development of a 
linguistic theory. To that end the texts that are used in the experiments described in 
later chapters and in the text analysis of natural texts are all argumentative or 
informative texts, and the use of the contrastive coherence relation in these texts is 
'normal'. It goes without saying that in the end meta-linguistic cases of language use 
serve as a touchstone for the adequacy of an interpretive theory: A theory of the 
interpretation of contrastive coherence relations must provide an insight into such 
word-plays by pinpointing the rules and principles that were violated. 
1.5 Overview 
In the second chapter several proposals for the analysis of ÒMf-coordinations will be 
discussed in the light of the aforementioned criteria for an analysis of the contrast 
relation as a coherence relation (cf. Section 1.2). 
The third chapter is the core of the book. It presents an analysis of the similarities 
and dissimilarities of a number of different types of contrastive coherence relations. 
In the fourth chapter two experiments are reported that involve local contrastive 
coherence relations. In the first of these, several predictions of the theory regarding the 
influence of structural factors on the interpretation of local contrastive coherence 
relations were put to the proof. The second experiment mainly had an inventory 
character: Here the interplay of the content of the conjuncts and structural factors was 
investigated. 
The fifth chapter presents a series of five experiments in which the influence of 
several structural factors on the interpretation of global contrastive coherence relations 
was investigated. 
The sixth chapter is a report of the findings of an analysis of newspaper articles. In 
this analysis much attention is paid to a number of properties of natural texts contain-
ing global contrastive coherence relations that can be considered relevant to the 
present theory. It aims at making an inventory of these properties, and at testing the 
predictions of the theory in another form. 
The last chapter summarizes the findings of this study and gives some concluding 
remarks on the relation between these findings and the study of discourse in general. 
2 THE GLOBAL CONTRASTIVE COHERENCE RELATION AND THE 
STUDY OF ät/T-COORDINATIONS 
The linguistic literature on bu/-coordinations is the starting point for the present 
discussion. The reason for this is that in this literature the most detailed accounts are 
presented of the properties of this prototypical marker of the contrastive coherence 
relation. Therefore, some proposals for the analysis of but will be discussed. The 
discussion does not claim to be exhaustive. For a more complete survey, see Jaspers (in 
preparation). 
The proposals are discussed in the light of two criteria. In the ideal case an analysis 
of but is compatible with a unified account of all types of contrastive coherence 
relations. This criterion follows from the consideration that an adequate theory of 
contrast relations as coherence relations must make explicit what it is that different 
types of contrastive coherence relations have in common. As a consequence the 
analysis must allow both for cases in which the contrastive coherence relation is 
marked by means of but and for cases in which the contrastive coherence relation is 
marked differently or remains implicit. Another consequence is that the analysis must 
allow for cases in which the contrastive coherence relation does not relate two 
discourse units, but a discourse unit with contextual information (as in example (6) of 
Chapter 1). 
In this study the consequences of this criterion are investigated for a restricted set of 
contrastive coherence relations. It is an empirical question, not answered in this study, 
whether the analysis can be generalized to all contrastive coherence relations. 
A second criterion is that the analysis of ¿mf-coordinations must explain how the use 
of contrastive coherence relations in general and fw/-coordinations in particular affects 
the argumentative structure of a discourse. 
Much of the literature on fcui-coordinations is devoted to a type of contrastive coheren-
ce relation that does not fall within the scope of this study, since there are reasons to 
assume that it cannot occur as a global contrastive coherence relation. Pusch (1975) 
discusses the ambiguity of the bu/-coordination in (I):1 
(1) John didn't steal the bike, but bought it. 
The two readings can be made explicit by translating (1) into German: German has 
different types of conjunctions for the two readings (the same goes for languages like 
Spanish and Hebrew). 
(2)a John hat das Fahrrad nicht gestolen, sondern gekauft. 
(2)b John hat das Fahrrad nicht gestolen, aber gekauft. 
In the first reading (corresponding to (2a)) (1) can be paraphrased as "the proposition 
'John stole the bike' is not true, the proposition 'John bought the bike' is true". (1) will 
have this reading in a context like the following:2 
1
 The ambiguity is also discussed by other authors. See, for instance, Abraham (1975, 
1979), Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), Dascal and Katriel (1977), Lang (1977, 1984), Marconi 
and Bertinetto (1984). 
2
 Here and elsewhere in this thesis the participants in a dialogue are indicated by capitals: 
A stands for speaker 1, В stands for speaker 2, etc. Speaker 1 is referred to by masculine 
pronouns and speaker 2 is referred to by feminine pronouns. 
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(l)a' A: John stole the bike. 
B: John didn't steal the bike, but he bought it. 
With her answer speaker В rejects (part of) an utterance of a partner in the conversa­
tion. 
In the second reading (corresponding to (2b)) (1) can be paraphrased as "the 
proposition 'John stole the bike' is not true, but that does not mean that John does not 
have a bike, because the proposition 'John bought the bike' is true". This reading of 
(1) will occur in a context like the following. 
(l)b' A: Did John get the bike? Peter told me that he didn't steal it. 
B: John didn't steal the bike, but he bought it. 
With her reply speaker В concedes the truth of (part of) the utterance of speaker A, 
but she rejects a possible conclusion that could be made on the basis of this conces­
sion. 
The sondem-type of but is henceforth called but
s
, as opposed to the aber-type of but 
or butA. Apart from its different lexicalization, buts has other characteristic properties. 
First, but
s
 requires an explicit, syntactically realized negation in the first conjunct. 
That is why not realhtic in (3) cannot be replaced by unrealistic. ButA is not subject to 
such a restriction, cf. (4). 
(3)a The story was not realistic, but made up. 
(3)b * The story was unrealistic, but made up. 
(4)a The story was not realistic, but it certainly made sense. 
(4)b The story was unrealistic, but it certainly made sense. 
Second, the second conjunct of a buf
s
-construction must have a correlate in the first 
conjunct that falls within the scope of the negation. The complexity of this conjunct can 
vary:3 
(5)a John is not wise, but mad. 
(5)b John didn't lose his spectacles, but forgot them. 
(5)c John didn't run off with another woman, but his wife left him. 
In òuiA-coordinations the form of the second conjunct is not at all restricted by the 
form of the first conjunct (cf. (6)). 
(6) John behaves like a fool, but didn't we all go through that phase? 
From this it follows that the relationship between the two conjuncts in the buts-
coordination is much more restricted than in bu/A-coordinations. 
Third, the utterance John L· not X, buts Y is one speech act. Both parts of the 
sentence are usually uttered by one and the same speaker. As Pusch (1975) puts it, 
such a sentence has the pragmatic function of rebuttal. As a consequence, buts cannot 
be the beginning of an utterance. This makes the dialogue in (7) impossible. No such 
restriction holds for /?uiA, and therefore (8) is a possible dialogue. 
3
 The notion scope is understood in a rather informal sense. Lang (1984) distinguishes 
between scope and focus (p. 240): Scope is the domain of an operator at the semantic level, 
whereas focus is a major factor in determining the theme-rheme-structure of sentences. In this 
more precise sense of the word the relevant notion is focus and not scope. 
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(7) A: Peter hat das Fahrrad nicht gestolen. 
В: Sondern (er hat es) gekauft. 
(8) A: Peter hat das Fahrrad nicht gestolen. 
В: Aber er hat es (doch sicher) gekauft.4 
It is especially the third property that argues against an analysis of but
s
 as a possible 
global contrastive coherence relation. As was stated above, global contrastive cohe­
rence relations are taken to be relations between two discourse units, each made up of 
at least one sentence. Since but
s
 can never be at the beginning of a discourse unit, it 
can never function to indicate a global contrastive coherence relation. For this reason 
it falls beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
This does not mean however that there are no relations between the two types of 
¿>u/-coordinations: There are so many languages in which the difference between the 
two types is not lexically expressed that the absence of such a relationshop is highly 
implausible. The only implication that is intended is that this relationship is not 
investigated in this study.5 
There are relations between discourse units that bear some resemblance to buts-\ike 
constructions. 
(9) He is not rich. He is poor. 
The relation between the two sentences of this sequence is, intuitively, that of rebuttal.6 
This relation can be made explicit by adding on the contrary to the second sentence. At 
first sight it seems that this is a true global relation, since it involves two discourse 
units, each consisting of one sentence. In fact, (10) might be taken as an argument for 
the claim that this is truly an example of a global relation, and not merely a 'hidden' 
compound sentence: In (10) the two sentences between which the rebuttal relation 
exists are separated by an intermediate sentence. 
(10) He is not rich. You must not say that. He is poor. 
However, the intermediate sentence has a very special status, one that can be des-
cribed as an interjection: It relates to the speech act status of the first sentence. That is 
why it can be replaced by such 'real' interjections like you silly. It cannot be replaced 
by a series of arguments in favor of, for instance, the truth of the first sentence. 
(10)' He is not rich. He drives a Mini, his wife told me that the bills aren't paid 
and last month I heard he went on Welfare. He is poor. 
In this text the relation between the first and the final sentence is not that of rebuttal: 
* There is a context in which (7) can be acceptable, viz. when A and В are together trying 
to convince a third participant in the conversation. In this case B's contribution complements 
A's contribution and it seems reasonable to assume that in this reading A and В together 
perform one speech act. 
1
 Cf. Lang (1984, p. 251-262) for a detailed analysis of the relationship. 
6
 Mann and Thompson (1986) give a similar example to demonstrate the relation thesis-
antithesis. 
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The final sentence cannot be introduced by on the contrary. That is why the type of 
relation that occurs in (9) and (10) is radically different from 'genuine' global contras-
tive coherence relations. Sequences like (9) and (10) form one, sometimes complex, 
speech act, that is, they must be uttered by one and the same speaker: The relation 
cannot exist between contextual information (e.g. supplied by another speaker) and the 
information uttered by the speaker. This is a property that this coastruction shares with 
bufs-coordinations. 
For this reason these constructions will be disregarded in the rest of this study. 
Zl Lakoff(1971) 
Lakoff takes the meaning of the conjunction and to be part of the meaning of the 
conjunction but. Thus she accounts for the fact that truth-conditionally and and but 
cannot be distinguished. She distinguishes between two types of and-conjunctions, the 
symmetrical and in John has a Cadillac and Pete has a Ford and the asymmetrical one 
in John took arsenic and fell ill (with and meaning "and then"). The former type of and 
is symmetric, because the order of the two conjuncts can be changed without changing 
the meaning of the entire construction. The latter type is asymmetric, since no such 
change in the order of the conjuncts is possible without changing the meaning of the 
entire construction. Because of her distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
and and because she assumes that the meaning of and is part of the meaning of but, 
Lakoff also distinguishes between a symmetrical but and an asymmetrical but. 
Examples of these are given in (11) and (12). 
(11) John is small, but Pete is tall. 
(12) John is small, but he plays basketball. 
Lakoff calls (11) an example of a semantic opposition, and (12) an example of a denial 
of expectation. Since the publication of Lakoff s analysis these names have been used 
widely. That is why this terminology is maintained throughout this thesis, although it 
will become clear below that the contrast in semantic oppositions is often not semantic 
and that it is not always an expectation that is denied by a denial of expectation. 
Lakoff specifies several semantic restrictions on these uses of but. Some of them are of 
a very general nature, holding for all conjunctions. An example of such a restriction is 
that the conjuncts must share a common topic. (Two conjuncts have a common topic 
when there is a certain amount of semantic overlap between the conjuncts.) It is 
needed to exclude such cases as John plays basketball and in 1963 Kennedy was killed. 
Another restriction is that, despite the need of a common topic, the conjuncts cannot 
be completely identical. A restriction that holds for and and but, but not for if, is that 
the second conjunct cannot specify an implication of the first conjunct. For this reason 
a sentence like it snows and it L· winter sounds odd. 
Other restrictions apply more specifically to the two types of ¿Mi-coordinations. 
Semantic opposition but has four distinguishing properties. The first one is that the two 
conjuncts express propositions that differ from each other in the value of one variable 
(in (11) "John" vs. "Pete") and in the fact that the predicate of the one proposition is 
negated in the other ("being tall" vs. "being small"). 
The second property of semantic opposition but is that there is no logical implica-
tion relation between the two propositions: Nothing follows with respect to the truth of 
one proposition from the truth of the other proposition. 
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A third property is that the ¿»//-coordination can be paraphrased with a while-
construction or an omf-constmction. 
A final property of semantic opposition bui is that the order of the conjuncts can be 
exchanged freely (symmetry).7 
Denial of expectation but can be charactarized as follows. The first conjunct is an 
assertion that carries a presupposition. The second conjunct contrasts with this presup-
position. That is, p-but-q will be understood as "p and therefore one expects -q, but 
q". The presupposition involved concerns an expectation and not a firmly established 
rule, which can be seen from the contradiction of "p and therefore -•q, but q".8 
Two other properties of denial of expectation but are that it can be paraphrased 
with an oftAoug/i-construction and that the two conjuncts are irreversible (asymmetry). 
Lakoff admits that there are cases of òui-coordination that are not captured by her 
description. An example is (13). 
(13) George likes Peking Duck, but (then) all linguists like Chinese food. 
In this example what is expressed by the first conjunct is an instance of what is 
expressed by the second conjunct. This is evidently not a semantic opposition: No 
paraphrase with and is available, the predicates of the conjuncts are not lexical 
opposites, and the order of the conjuncts cannot be reversed. Nor is it a denial of 
expectation: A paraphrase with although is not possible, and the example does not 
involve an expectation like "generally, when George likes Peking Duck, then no 
linguist likes Chinese food". In these cases but seems to react to the speech act status 
of the first conjunct, as may be clear from the following paraphrase: 
(13)' I say that George likes Peking Duck, but I really don't have to say this, 
because all linguists like Chinese food. 
Lakoff observes the relationship with examples like (14), in which the second conjunct 
expresses a rhetorical question: 
(14) George likes Peking Duck, but what linguist wouldn't? 
The question in the second conjunct can be paraphrased by every linguist does, which is 
a generalization of the information in the first conjunct, as in (13). 
Evaluation of the proposal. Many authors have commented on Lakoff s proposal (cf., for 
instance, Dascal and Katriel (1977), Abraham (1979), Marconi and Bertinetto (1984), 
and Lang (1977, 1984)). These comments can be summarized as follows. 
Lakoffs analysis is stated in purely semantic terms. The relations between the 
conjuncts are described as a contrast between the proposition expressed by the second 
conjunct and either the proposition expressed by the first conjunct or a presupposition 
of the first conjunct. This leads to three severe problems. The analysis is partly 
incorrect, partly incomplete, and partly superfluous. 
7
 From what follows it will be clear that the interchangeability of the conjuncts is restricted 
as far as the informational structure of the message is concerned. 
* Lakoff uses the notion presupposition in a very idiosyncratic sense, since it is usually 
taken to mean that sentence S presupposes Ρ if both S and the denial of S entail P. This use of 
the notion presupposition is clearly not applicable to the denial of expectation-constructions. 
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Incorrectness. Lakoff claims that in a semantic opposition there is a semantic contrast 
between the predicates in the conjuncts. Given the usual definitions of semantic 
contrast (two predicates Ρ and Q contrast semantically if the complex proposition "P(a) 
& Q(a)" forms a contradiction), this would mean that (15) is not a semantic op­
position: The predicates "be tall" and "be fat" do not contrast semantically. 
(15) John is tall, but Charlie is fat. 
Such a classification of this type of bu/-coordination runs counter to intuition, as (15) 
has all the other properties of a 'genuine' semantic opposition like (11): The two 
propositions differ only in the value of a variable in the two predicates, there is no 
logical implication relation between the predicates, the coordination can be para­
phrased with either while or and and the order of the conjuncts can be exchanged 
without changing the meaning of the entire construction completely. Therefore it seems 
desirable to consider (15) as a semantic opposition. However, if (15) is a semantic 
opposition, then Lakoffs claim that the relevant contrast between the conjuncts in a 
semantic opposition is a semantic contrast cannot be correct. 
A second indication of the incorrectness of a purely semantic analysis is example (6) 
from the introduction, repeated here as (16): 
(16) (Context: After three warnings that he should clean up and go to bed mother gets 
angry and drags John out of the room:) 
John: But I nearly finished my game. 
A purely semantic analysis cannot account for buf-constructions such as (16), since 
there is no linguistically expressed first conjunct and, a fortiori, no semantic representa­
tion of a first conjunct. Therefore, the contrastive coherence relation does not always 
exist between the semantic representations of two conjuncts. 
Another argument against a purely semantic analysis of òuf-coordinations is given by 
the sentence pair (17): 
(17)a I pressed the button, but the alarm went off. 
(17)b I pressed the button, but the alarm didn't go off. 
For each of these sentences one can imagine contexts that result in acceptability. This 
immediately shows that the relation between the two conjuncts cannot be purely 
semantic: If the contrast that exists between the two conjuncts in e.g. (17)a were part 
of the semantic representation of (17)a, then it would be impossible for (17)b to 
contain a semantic contrast (when the predicates Ρ and Q form a semantic contrast, 
then by definition the predicates Ρ and -Q do not form a semantic contrast). 
According to Lakoffs analysis (17)b should therefore be unacceptable. This is, 
however, not the case, since there are acceptable readings for each of these sentences. 
Thus the assumption that the relevant contrast is semantic must be wrong. 
Incompleteness. As Lakoff notes herself, there are feuf-coordinations that cannot be 
analyzed as either denials of expectation or semantic oppositions. Examples were given 
in (13), (16) and (17). One way out is to assume a performative analysis underlying 
(13), as Lakoff does. However, that type of analysis has become very unpopular in 
linguistics: It cannot account for indirect speech acts and it leads to an abundance of 
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abstract structure that is not independently motivated.9 Moreover, a performative 
analysis can account neither for (16), nor for the difference between (17)a and (17)b. 
Dascal and Katriel (1977) mention another incompleteness problem of the analysis, 
for which the performative analysis again will not do. Consider example (18). 
(18) (Context: A and В are discussing an economic problem and conclude that they 
must consult an expert in the field.) 
A: John is an economist 
B: John is not an economist, but a businessman.10 
B's reply is not a semantic opposition. Since Lakoffs analysis lacks any other cate­
gories, it should be a denial of expectation. The presupposition involved must therefore 
be something like "one expects that someone who is not an economist is not a 
businessman". This, however, is certainly not intended by B. Her answer can be 
paraphrased by "John is not an economist. One expects that someone who isn't an 
economist is not the economic expert we need. But John is a businessman and 
therefore he is the economic expert we need." The notion presupposition, in the sense 
in which Lakoff uses it, does not suffice to express this relation between the two 
conjuncts. In this study constructions like (18), in which one conjunct is an argument in 
favor of a certain conclusion, and the second conjunct is an argument against that 
conclusion are treated as a separate group of buf-coordinations. Henceforth they are 
called concessive oppositions, as opposed to semantic oppositions. 
Superfluousness. According to Lakoff there are two lemmata but in the lexicon, a 
symmetrical one and an asymmetrical one. Lang (1984, p. 80-84) argues strongly 
against the distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical variants of conjunctions. 
He states that 
There are no 'symmetrical' and 'asymmetrical' connectors such that and, or, but, 
for each have two meanings. The interpretation of conjoined structures referred to 
by this distinction are to be explained by the interplay of the factual relations 
between the entities represented in the conjunct-meanings and the way these 
relations are couched in overt linguistic structures, but they are not features of 
the meanings of the connectors, (p. 84) 
Thus, to take an example of asymmetric on^-coordination, the fact that John took 
arsenic and fell ill is an asymmetrical coordination follows from our knowledge of the 
world that one of the consequences of taking arsenic is falling ill. 
To conclude, the distinction that Lakoff makes between semantic oppositions on the 
one hand and denials of expectation on the other is one that must be accounted for in 
every theory of contrastive coherence relations: In semantic oppositions the contrastive 
coherence relation is more or less overtly present, whereas in denials of expectation 
the contrastive coherence relation exists between the information in the second 
' Levinson (1983), par. 5.4-5.5, enumerates the arguments against such analyses. To give 
only one example of these arguments: In a performative analysis a sentence of the type the 
world is flat is analyzed as having a deep structure I say to you that the world is flat. However, 
the two have different truth conditions: The former is false, whereas the latter may be true. 
This difference is incompatible with the performative analysis. 
10
 B's reply is ambiguous: It has a ftKfA-reading and a ÒMis-reading. In the latter case, B's 
reply is a rebuttal of A's contribution. In (18) the fcMfA-reading is intended. 
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conjunct and information inferred from the first conjunct. 
The analysis given by Lakoff to account for this difference cannot be accepted. The 
semantic terms in which she states her description do not suffice for three reasons. 
First, the analysis cannot account for the influence of context on the interpretation of 
contrastive coherence relations. Second, the analysis does not account for several other 
types of contrastive coherence relations. Third, Lakoff s distinction between two types 
of but is undesirable. It seems, then, that in view of the two evaluation criteria Lakoff s 
analysis does not suffice: There is no uniform account of all contrastive coherence 
relations, nor is there any indication that the analysis can deal with the argumentative 
properties of the contrastive coherence relation. 
2 2 Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) 
In a series of publications, Ducrot and his associates have expressed their views on the 
argumentative properties of discourse (cf., e.g., Ducrot, 1980, 1982, 1983; Ducrot et al., 
1980). The analysis of but in Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) reflects this argumentative 
interest. According to that analysis, to utter A butA В (in which A and В are two 
sentences) implies the following. 
1. A is presented as an argument in favor of a possible conclusion С and В is 
presented as an argument against that conclusion, i.e. as an argument in favor of -^C. 
2. В has a greater argumentative force than A. As a result, the entire expression A 
butA В has an argumentative tendency towards - C (pag. 28). 
In case В is equal to -~C one can add words like yet or nevertheless to the second 
conjunct. These are the cases that Lakoff refers to as denial of expectation. Note that 
if В is not equal to -C, then the fcuf-coordination is a concessive opposition. 
Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) spend much time discussing ¿u/A-coordinations in 
which the first conjunct contains a negation, i.e. constructions like (2b), repeated here. 
(2)b John hat das Fahrrad nicht gestolen, aber gekauft. 
In languages that do not distinguish lexically between buts and ¿ш/
А
, these Neg A', butA 
В cases superficially resemble but
s
 cases very much. Anscombre and Ducrot present a 
number of arguments for the claim that, despite superficial resemblances, these really 
are two different classes of bwi-coordinations. 
In their discussion of the differences between these two classes they note the 
following interesting example (in the English version (20) the gist of the French 
example has been maintained at the cost of literal content): 
(19) Il faudrait que Guy vienne tous les jours. Hélas! J'ai bien peur qu'il vienne 
aujourd'hui, mais pas demain. 
(20) If only Guy would come every day. Alas! I am afraid that he will come 
today, but not tomorrow. 
Anscombre and Ducrot note that there is a discrepancy between the syntactic and 
semantic dependency relations in the ftirt-coordination of (19)-(20). The French version 
clearly shows that the first conjunct of the mair-coordination is syntactically dependent 
on the predicate J'ai bien peur que: The verb in that conjunct is in the subjunctive 
mode, as is normally the case with complements of the predicate avoir peur que. Yet 
there is no semantic dependency relation between the first conjunct and the predicate: 
The context clearly suggests that the speaker of (19)-(20) is only sad about Jean's 
absence tomorrow, and not about Jean's presence today. 
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Evaluation of the proposal. Anscombre and Ducrot do not specify the relation between 
the explicit information given by the conjunct and the implicit proposition, the con-
clusion, other than by stating that the conjunct is an argument for that conclusion. Nor 
do they account for the properties of semantic oppositions. These are two major 
drawbacks of their analysis. 
On the other hand, their analysis makes it possible in principle to account for the 
cases for which Lakoff did not have an explanation, viz. cases like (18). In that 
example the contrastive coherence relation is only indirectly related to the explicit 
information in the conjuncts: The first conjunct is an argument in favor of a given 
conclusion and the second conjunct is an argument against that conclusion. Such a 
pattern, highly problematic in Lakoffs semantic analysis, fits in nicely with the 
argumentative analysis of Anscombre and Ducrot. The same holds for examples like 
(13), in which the argumentation occurs at the pragmatic level: My saying that George 
likes Peking Duck is an argument for the relevance of that remark, whereas my saying 
that all linguists like Chinese food constitutes an argument against the relevance of 
that remark. 
It seems, then, that the proposal of Anscombre and Ducrot fulfills at least one 
evaluation criterion for an analysis of contrastive coherence relations: The authors 
discuss the relation with the argumentative properties of contrastive coherence rela-
tions. However, since the authors do not give any formal mechanism for deriving the 
argumentative structure of a discourse, a precise evaluation of their proposal is 
somewhat difficult. 
Example (19) is of particular interest, as it pleads against an analysis of fc«r-coor-
dinations which is purely compositional. In a compositional theory of meaning the 
meaning of a complex formula is taken to be a function of the meanings of the 
component parts. Example (19) shows that the meaning of the complement oî J'ai bien 
peur que is not in any straightforward manner computable from the meaning of the 
component parts of the moü-coordination. The same point is stressed by Lang (1977, 
1984). 
2 3 Dascal and Katriel (1977) 
Dascal and Katriel (1977) divide the meaning of an utterance into several layers, 
folded around the nucleus (the propositional content) like the scales of an onion, and 
hierarchically ordered according to the degree of relatedness to the propositional 
content. Closest to the nucleus are the semantic presuppositions, followed by illocution-
aiy force, modality, felicity conditions, and, finally, conversational implicatures. The use 
of but is restricted by the following principle: "when a [P-but-Q] sentence is uttered as 
a reaction to an utterance U, the meaning layer of U rejected by the utterance of the 
[P-but-Q] sentence is either more 'external' than or as 'external' as the meaning layer 
accepted by it" (p. 165). The principle is intended to account for such phenomena as 
the difference between (21)a and (21)b. 
(21) A: The piano we bought in Vienna is out of tune. 
a B: Yes, but we didn't buy it in Vienna. 
b B: ? Yes, but it isn't out of tune. 
(21)a is acceptable, because the accepted part (the propositional content) is more 
internal than the rejected part (the presupposition). In (21)b the situation is reversed, 
and therefore it is unacceptable. 
Evaluation of the proposal. Because the analysis is speaker oriented, it seems to account 
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for the argumentative properties of ÒMi-coordinations. Furthermore, it tries to give a 
linguistic content to the notion 'argumentative force', by relating it to such notions as 
propositional content, presupposition, implicature, speech act, etc. It has, however, 
several drawbacks. The major point is that the analysis can only account for a restric-
ted set of the distributional properties of ftM/-coordinations. For one thing, it presup-
poses that all fcui-coordinations are reactions to assertions or commands of a partner in 
the conversation. The analysis will not hold for situations in which buf-coordinations 
are answers to questions like (22): 
(22) A: Should I take my umbrella with me? 
B: It looks cloudy, but according to the weather forecast it won't rain. 
It is not at all clear in B's answer what part of A's contribution is accepted and what 
part is rejected. Another problem is that the analysis does not account for the 'asy-
mmetry' of fcuf-coordinations (which is quite straightforwardly analyzed by Anscombre 
and Ducrot): B's answer in (22)' has, intuitively, a very different impact from the 
answer in (22). 
(22)' B: According to the weather forecast it won't rain, but it looks cloudy.11 
Furthermore, the analysis does not distinguish between different types of í>«íA-coordina-
tions, such as denials of expectation and semantic oppositions. A final problem with the 
analysis is that there are counterexamples to the principle of /mi-interpretation: 
(23) A: Why did he react so strangely? 
B: I can imagine that you ask this, but he didn't react strangely. 
In this example a sincerity condition is accepted, whereas a presupposition is denied. 
B's answer should be unacceptable according to the principle, whereas it seems to be 
completely acceptable. These comments on the proposal show that it is of a limited 
interest to the present study. Dascal and Katriel nevertheless present several intriguing 
examples that any adequate account of ÒMi-coordination should be able to deal with. 
2.4 Abraham (1975, 1979)a 
Abraham (1975, 1979) gives an account of the semantics of but in terms of a number 
of semantic axioms, not specific for a particular conjunction or coherence relation. He 
postulates two rules, the second being a special case of the first one: 
(24) N(x,y) = «Usix.-y) 
(25) N(x,y) = ^Εχί5ΐ(ζ))[υ5(χ,ζ) & Us(y^z)] 
N is the relation that underlies but, χ and y are events described by the conjuncts, 
Us(a,b) is a basic predicate standing for "the event a is usually followed by the event 
b", and -4Z is the negation operation standing for the negation of the grammatical 
predicate in the sentence describing the event a. The first rule states that in a coor­
dination of two events χ and y by means of the conjunction but the event χ is usually 
11
 The asymmetrical properties of oui-coordinations wil] be discussed extensively in the 
following chapters. 
12
 The discussion is based on the formulations and defintions in Abraham (1979). 
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followed by the event -y. The second rule states that there is a third proposition, 
represented by z, and that the event χ is usually followed by z, whereas the event y is 
usually followed by -z. Abraham calls (25) a special case of (24). The first rule is 
intended to account for denials of expectation, the second for cases in which there is 
no direct relation between the two conjunct meanings, as in concessive oppositions. 
In the next chapter the opposite position will be defended, viz. that (24) is a special 
case of (25). 
Abraham does not believe in a dichotomy semantic opposition-denial of expectation 
(as proposed by Lakoff). As a consequence, he analyses semantic oppositions by means 
of one of the two rales, (24) or (25). An example of semantic opposition for which (25) 
is claimed to be appropriate is (26): In the given context the first part of B's answer 
supports an answer "yes" to the question, the second part supports an answer "no". 
(26) A: Are John and Bill both poor? 
B: John is poor, but Bill is rich. 
The semantic opposition is in this case a disjunction of two propositions that are 
connected in the context. 
Abraham grants, however, that there is a linguistically relevant difference between 
the two types: Whereas semantic oppositions can easily be paraphrased by means of 
while, this paraphrase is much more difficult with denials of expectation. 
(27) John is poor, while Bill is rich. 
(28) ?? While John is a Republican, he voted for Humphrey. 
According to Abraham there are two causes for the unacceptability of (28). First, there 
is a restriction on the use of while to the effect that the conjuncts of the related 
sentences should have referentially distinct subjects. If in (28) the subject of the second 
sentence is replaced by, for instance, Bill (as in (29)), the acceptability of the result is 
much improved. 
(29) ? While John is a Republican, Bill voted for Humphrey. 
(29) does, however, remain more or less deviant. Here the second cause for the 
unacceptability of (28) comes in: The number of inferential steps needed to relate the 
conjuncts in (28)-(29) is much larger than in (27). For instance, one has to infer that 
voting for Humphrey is voting for the Democrats and that voting for the Democrats 
and voting for the Republicans are incompatible. Should this information be easily 
available, i.e. be mentioned in the context, then (29) is completely acceptable. Thus 
there are no principled reasons to maintain the dichotomy semantic opposition-denial 
of expectation: The former is a subtype of the latter. Again, in the next chapter a 
somewhat different position will be defended, namely that at the relevant level of 
interpretation denials of expectation have a structure similar to that of semantic 
oppositions. 
Abraham distinguishes yet another type of ftuf-coordination, the one found in texts like 
(30) and (31). 
(30) Schmidt becomes federal chancellor, but (in compensation for that) Scheel is 
made federal president. 
(31) He is small, but (nevertheless) well built. 
Abraham's reason for distinguishing this third type is that in some languages, such as 
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German and Russian, this relation can be realized by a separate conjunction (German: 
dafür). In Abraham's view fcMiD-constructions sometimes — but not always — have an 
additional feature in their semantic analysis, compared to fcMrA-constructions: They 
express preference and dominance relations between the conjuncts. Thus (31) — but 
not (30) - receives an analysis like (32). 
(32) Us(x,-y) & PREF(y,x) & DOM(y,x)13 
Evaluation of the proposal. The analysis aims at describing the relation between several 
types of buf-coordinations (such as denials of expectation, semantic oppositions and 
concessive oppositions), thus explaining why in so many languages the different 
contrastive coherence relations can be expressed by means of one and the same 
conjunction. Furthermore, it explicitly makes a connection between the semantic 
properties of one type of fcui-coordination (butD) and the argumentative properties of 
these constructions. Such a connection is one of the major aims of the present study. It 
seems, then, that the proposal satisfies both criteria for the analysis of bui-coordina-
tions. 
There are, however, several severe problems with the proposal. First, the status of 
the t/i-predicate is unclear. What is the exact nature of the relation described by this 
predicate? In a note (p. 98) Abraham suggests that it could be a relation of Gricean 
conversational implicature. Below it will be argued that this cannot be the case (cf. the 
discussion in Section 2.7). A second problem is the definition of the i/s-predicate. 
Us(a,b) is defined as "the event a is usually followed by the event b". In this definition 
an appeal is made to a temporal ordering of the conjunct meanings. However, this 
cannot be correct, as it covers only a subset of the cases of ftuf-coordinations, viz. those 
in which the conjuncts express events. Thus the t/j-predicate as it is defined does not 
suffice for denials of expectation of the type given in (33) (in which the conjuncts 
express states rather than events) and for most, if not all, concessive oppositions. 
(33) John is fond of meat, but he is a vegetarian. 
A third problem is the status of the PREF- and DOM-predicates, accounting for cases 
like (31). One may wonder whether one should define these predicates at the level of 
semantic representation. It is unclear, for instance, under what circumstances butD 
expresses the PREF- or DOM-relation: It seems that the DOM-relation applies only to 
cases which have previously been called concessive oppositions (like (31)) and not to 
cases of what, according to Lakoff, are semantic oppositions (like (30)). If this observa-
tion is correct, then it constitutes an argument against Abraham's unification of 
semantic oppositions on the one hand and denials of expectation and concessive 
oppositions on the other. If the three types of contrastive coherence relations really 
constitute one class of constructions, then it is a strange and unexplained coincidence 
that the DOM-relation applies to a subclass which can be defined on the basis of 
13
 The predicates PREF and DOM indicate the preference and dominance relations 
between the conjuncts. PREF(x,y) must be defined either as PLUS(x) & MIN(y) (strong 
version) or as (PLUS(x) & -~PLUS(y)) ν (^МІЩх) & MIN(y)) (weak version). Here, 
PLUS(a) means "the event a is of a positive character" and MIN(a) means "the event 
a is of a negative character". DOMfcy) is defined as (SIMULfay) = χ) ά 
(^(SIMUL(x,y) « y), in which S¡MUL(a,b) means "the events a and b are realized at 
the same time" and a = b means "the events a and b are almost equivalent". The 
definition of DOM(x,y) is to be read as "SIMUL(x,y) is almost equivalent to x, but is 
far from equivalent to y". 
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independent criteria. 
Abraham restricts the DOM/PREF-relations to buiD-type constructions. The results 
of the experiments that are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 show that at least the DOM-
relation (or a slightly modified version of it) holds for other ¿mf-type constructions as 
well. This suggests that the distinction between butD and bitfA is not as strict as 
Abraham suggests. 
2 5 Marconi and Bertinetto (1984) 
In their analysis Marconi and Bertinetto try to relate the distribution of ftu/-construc-
tions in contemporary Italian to the diachronic genesis of ma from Latin magL·. Thus 
they claim that at least two types of ma-constructions should be distinguished, а 
quantitative and a corrective one. A particularly interesting and original feature of 
their analysis is the claim that 'contrast' is not a condition of use for every ma-con­
struction. Marconi and Bertinetto present (34) as an argument in favor of this claim. 
(34) Little Red Riding-hood was picking flowers in the forest. But suddenly the 
wolf appeared. 
According to Marconi and Bertinetto it is counterintuitive to assume that the sentences 
in this example express some sort of contrast: Such a contrast would exist at a level 
that is very indirectly related to the information in the conjuncts, such as the setting of 
the described scene, i.e. the first conjunct describes peace and quiet, the second 
describes danger and change of situation. As an alternative to the 'contrast analysis', 
Marconi and Bertinetto formulate a hierarchy condition to account for these uses of 
but. This hierarchy condition states that the information in the second conjunct is more 
dominant than the information in the first conjunct (or, alternatively, that the attention 
of the hearer should be focused on the information in the second conjunct). This 
condition also applies to cases like he L· tall, but aho handsome (with but meaning 
something like "more than that"). 
The authors admit that the hierarchy analysis will not suffice for every fcui-construc-
tion: It cannot, for example, explain why (35) is acceptable and (36) is unacceptable. 
(35) John is a nice guy, but he teases his sister. 
(36) ?? John is a tall guy, but he teases his sister. 
The explanation for the deviance of (36) is that there is no contrast between the two 
conjuncts. This fact cannot be accounted for in a hierarchy analysis. The authors 
conclude that the two analyses are complementary, the hierarchy condition holding for 
the quantitative use of but, the contrast condition holding for the corrective use of 
but}*. They also state that there is not a clear distinction between these two uses. 
Evaluation of the proposal. Marconi and Bertinetto present a feature that will be 
central in this study, namely a dominance relation between the two conjuncts related 
by but. However, the assumption that this is a basic condition for some, but not all 
types of fcuf-constructions is problematic. With such an assumption the authors 
abandon the search for a uniform analysis of all bur-constructions. 
14
 Marconi and Bertinetto call the hierchical use of ma (but) quantitative, because they 
relate it to the quantitative meaning of Latin maps 'mp, magis (quam p) q ("p, but, more than 
p, q"). This quantitative use of maps is opposed to the corrective use, which is found in non ρ, 
maps q ("not p, but rather q"). 
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Another problem is that the notion 'hierarchy' remains very vague in Marconi and 
Bertinetto's account: A ¿>uf-coordination is subject to the hierarchy condition if the 
meaning of the second conjunct is more dominant than the first conjunct (or, alterna-
tively, if the reader's attention is drawn to the second conjunct). In this study the 
position is defended that the hierarchy relation is the outcome of the interaction of a 
number of factors, viz. the contrast condition on the appropriate use of but, the way 
the discourse representation is built and the use of ¿uf-constructions within an ar-
gumentative structure. Furthermore a more or less formal account of the notion 
'contrast' is presented, thus eliminating the problem that Marconi and Bertinetto have 
with the notion 'hierarchy'. 
Yet another severe problem of the analysis, hinted at by the authors, is that there is 
no way in which the hierarchy analysis can account for some of the semantic restric-
tions that exist between conjunct meanings. Among these are the restrictions on 
semantic non-inclusion of the conjunct meanings: 
(37) ?? Dodo is an animal, but he is also a cat. 
The strangeness of (37) must be accounted for by an appeal to the lack of contrast 
between the two conjunct meanings. This is not possible in the analysis of Marconi and 
Bertinetto, since (37) is an example of the quantitative use of but (with but meaning 
"but more than that"). These cases are accounted for by the hierarchy condition and 
there is nothing in the hierarchy condition that forbids the coordination of two con-
juncts, one of which includes the other. 
It seems, then, that the contrast condition must account for some of the properties 
of the quantitative uses of but. But if that is the case, then the hierarchy condition is 
not the defining property of the class of quantitative buf-coordinations. In other words, 
it is highly improbable that cases dealt with by the hierarchy condition and cases dealt 
with by the contrast condition form natural classes. 
It may be concluded that it is much more appealing to take contrast as a condition 
applying to all buf-coordinations. This implies that in (34) the contrast exists on a very 
abstract level. According to Marconi and Bertinetto such an analysis is unattractive. In 
the next chapter an analysis of contrastive coherence relations is presented in which 
the difference between several types of contrastive coherence relations is described as 
the reflection of the degree of directness with which the contrast is expressed. In such 
an analysis it is very plausible that there are cases in which the contrast is expressed 
very implicitly, an example of which would be (34). 
2 6 Lang {19T7, 1984) 
Lang looks at the process of coordination as the production of a so-called common 
integrator (CI), a conceptual entity that represents the meaning of the coordinate 
structure. Several properties of coordinate structures are accounted for in terms of the 
way in which the common integrator is deduced, a process to which the conjunct 
meanings and the conjunction contribute significantly. Some of these properties are 
discussed here. 
A first property of coordinations is that the conjunct meanings cannot be identical. 
Hence the unacceptability of (38). 
(38) ?? John likes pears and John likes pears. 
The explanation for this phenomenon probably lies in the uninformativeness of the 
resulting structure (which means a violation of the Gricean maxims "Be brief' and "Be 
relevant"). Lang gives a more formal account of the deviance: The process of deducing 
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the common integrator does not lead anywhere because all the (mutual) parts of the 
two conjunct meanings are explicitly present in the conjuncts. Uninformativeness of the 
result occurs also if each of the conjuncts includes the other, i.e. if one of the conjuncts 
is an entailment of the other (S entails E if and only if in each case in which S is true 
E is also true). 
(39)a ?? John likes cars and Toyotas. 
(39)b ?? It snows, but it is winter." 
Another restriction on conjunct meanings is that they cannot be contradictory: 
(40) ?? John is tall, but he is not tall 
(40) is a violation of a very general rule: There is no world conceivable in which one 
and the same entity has both the property A and the property -A. 
There is a strong tendency to re-interpret these unacceptable sentences in such a way 
that the violation of the restriction disappears. Thus, the conjuncts in (38) can be re-
interpreted in such a way that they are no longer non-distinct. An acceptable inter-
pretation would be something like (38)': 
(38)' John, my neighbor, likes pears and John, William's friend, likes pears. 
Similarly, informative interpretations can be found for a sentence like (39)b if one 
considers a situation in which there is some sort of violated expectation. Thus, from a 
European point of view it is summer when it snows in Argentina. Should it occur that 
there is a snowstorm in Buenos Aires in December, then (39)b is completely accep-
table. Example (40) is also perfectly acceptable, if one gives the two occurrences of tall 
different interpretations (literal and metaphorical, for example). 
That the interpretion of a coordinate structure involves the deduction of a common 
integrator has an interesting consequence: The interpretation of either one of the 
conjuncts in a coordinate structure depends heavily on the interpretation of the other. 
This is one respect in which the meaning of the coordination is not in any straightfor-
ward way compositionally determined by the meaning of its component parts. If, for 
example, a conjunct that is ambiguous or vague in isolation is coordinated with an 
unambiguous or clear conjunct, then the result will be a loss of ambiguity/vagueness. 
Thus, in (41)a vbiting relatives (which in isolation can mean either "to visit relatives" or 
"relatives who make a visit") can only mean "to visit relatives", due to the interpreta-
tion of the first conjunct. The second conjunct of (41)b is in isolation neutral with 
respect to its argumentative tendency: It is neither a positive nor a negative argument. 
In coordination with a clear positive argument it receives a non-vague, positive inter-
pretation.16 
(41)a Sue likes going to the movies and John likes visiting relatives. 
(41)b John is amiable and he wears bow-ties. 
u
 There is a reading in which (39)b is perfectly acceptable, namely the one in which but is 
read as but then. This reading is not intended here. 
16
 Chapter 4 discusses the results of an experiment that investigated the interpretation of 
but- and ond-coordinations with positive, negative and neutral arguments. 
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Phenomena such as these lead Lang to one of the central claims in his book: As the 
conjunction adds a meaning aspect to the common integrator, the common integrator 
cannot be deduced compositionally from the conjunct meanings. This makes the 
semantics of coordination in natural language different from the semantics of com-
pound expressions in logic. As a consequence Lang assumes that conjunctions have an 
operational meaning, i.e. they are instructions for the process of building the common 
integrator. 
Let CM1 and CM2 stand for the meaning of the first conjunct and the second conjunct, 
respectively. The operational meaning of but can then be described as: "Take the 
entities represented in CMi, CM2 [...] as simultaneously valid within the domain defined 
by [the common integrator], and this in view of the fact that conjoining the entities 
represented by CM, and CM2 in this way stands in opposition to joining the entities 
represented by CM! to entities representable by a CM/, which is possible as well, and 
even preferable" (p. 78). 
Thus, when two sentences $! and S2 are conjoined by means of the conjunction but, 
one can say that but is appropriately used if there is a S2' that is a more plausible 
continuation of S! than S2. 
The operational meaning of and is described as: "Take the entities represented in 
CM,, CM2, .... CM,, [...] as simultaneously valid within the domain defined by [the 
common integrator]" (p. 77). It is clear, then, that Lang considers the meaning of and 
to be part of the meaning of but. The difference between but and and is that but 
requires a contrast of some sort. 
The degree to which the process of deducing the common integrator (CI) is governed 
by the semantic content of the conjuncts may vary. If the conjunct meanings are 
conceptually related to each other, as in (42), less situational information and/or 
factual knowledge is involved in the process, whereas in (43) the deduction proceeds 
more indirectly, i.e. it is less fully determined by the conjunct meanings. 
(42) Elsa eats an apple and I eat a pear 
CI: "Elsa" and "I" are instances of "persons eating fruit" 
(43) Elsa eats apples and John drives a Mercedes 
CI1: "Elsa eats apples" and "John drives a Mercedes" are instances of 
"things that I don't like" 
CI2: "Elsa eats apples" and "John drives a Mercedes" are instances of 
"habits of my neighbors" 
It seems, then, that the source of the contrast can either be semantic (i.e. the contrast 
is determined by the conjunct meanings) or determined by the context. An example of 
semantic contrast is given in (44). 
(44) The number is odd, but divisible. 
Lang claims that the contrast between the two conjuncts is semantic, since there is 
another possible continuation of the first conjunct that is more plausible, given the 
semantic relations holding for the predicates in the domain of discussion, namely the 
number L· indivisible. This continuation is more plausible because the set of indivisible 
numbers is a proper subset of the set of odd numbers (the relation between the two 
sets can be given in terms of a meaning postulate: INDIVISIBLE => ODD ), whereas 
there is only a partial overlap of the set of odd and the set of divisible numbers (the 
relation between these two sets cannot be described in terms of a meaning postulate). 
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If the contrast is of a semantic nature then the relation between the predicates in 
the conjuncts is that of subcontrariness. This relation can be explained by means of the 
'square of oppositions' (Rescher, 1969, p. 123-125). 
(45) 
even 
divisible 
indivisible 
odd 
Given the set of natural numbers, the relation between even and odd and between 
divùible and indivmble is that of contradiction: Given a particular value for the natural 
number x, then if the sentence the number χ ù even is true, the sentence the number χ 
L· odd is must be false. The relation between even and divisible (or between indivisible 
and odd) is that of subalternation: If the sentence the number χ is even is true, then the 
sentence the number χ L· divmble must be true. The relation between even and in­
divisible is that of contrariness: If the sentence the number χ is even is true, then the 
sentence the number χ L· indivbible must be false, although both may be false. Divbible 
and odd are subcontrary predicates: If a proposition containing one of them is false, 
then a proposition containing the other must be true, although both may be true. That 
divisible and odd are subcontraries may be clear from the fact that there are natural 
numbers that are divisible and odd, such as 9, numbers that are divisible and not odd, 
such as 4, and numbers that are not divisible and odd, such as 7, but that there are no 
numbers that are neither divisible nor odd. 
Another source for the contrast can be the context. An example of this is the answer of 
В in (46): The semantic analysis of the conjunct meanings does not give any indication 
of the existence of a contrast between them, as the relation between square and odd is 
not that of subcontrariness (there are even numbers that are not squares). 
(46) A: Find an example of an even, square number. Does χ meet these require­
ments? 
B: The number is square, but odd. 
Lang does not accept Lakoff s distinction between semantic opposition and denial of 
expectation as basic, although he admits that there are linguistically interesting 
different properties. One of Lang's arguments against Lakoff s analysis runs as follows. 
Lang interprets Lakoffs analysis of denials of expectation in such a way that he 
assumes that denials of expectation require a contextually determined presupposition 
("on the basis of the first conjunct meaning one expects a certain state of affairs to be 
true"), and should therefore never show a semantically given contrast. Lang argues that 
(44) is in conflict with this prediction: Here the contrast is semantically given, whereas 
it is clearly a denial of expectation.17 
17
 A premiss of Lang's argument is that contrasts have their source either in the content of 
the conjuncts or in an expectation based on the first conjunct. It seems to me that this premiss 
is incorrect. For instance, it seems perfectly alright to describe the interpretation of (44) as 
"the fact that the number is odd raises the expectation that the number is indivisible (since 
some odd numbers are indivisible and since odd numbers are not divisible by even numbers), 
but in reality it is divisible". The fact that the expectation is raised by the content of the 
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In Lang's view what semantic oppositions and denials of expectation have in common 
can be described as follows. For every sentence S there is a set of propositions that are 
compatible with the proposition expressed by S. Some of the propositions in this set 
are semantically closer to S than others. The closer a proposition is to S, the more 
likely it is as a continuation of S. The restriction on the use of but is the existence of 
an S' that would be a more likely continuation of S^ but that is rejected in favor of S2. 
This holds both for denials of expectation and semantic oppositions. For denials of 
expectation this was shown by examples like (44) and (46), for semantic oppositions 
Lang gives the example (47). 
(47)a ?? John is big, but Bill is big. 
(47)b John is big, but Bill is small. 
(47)b is less deviant than (47)a, because in (47)a the second sentence is semantically 
'closer' to the first sentence. If the evaluation 'more/less close' and, correspondingly, 
'more/less likely as a continuation' cannot be given on the basis of the semantic inter-
conjunct relations then the information in the context will be the basis for the evalua-
tion. 
Lang concludes his analysis of feuf-coordinations with the following tentative 
interpretive strategies. 
(48) If in a structure 5, but S2 there is an inherent semantic source for putting the 
conjunct-meanings into contrast with each other, then the interpretation of 
this coordinate structure will preferentially be one that is based on the inter-
conjunct relations. 
(49) The less homogeneous the conjuncts of a structure S, but S2 regarding their 
syntactic shape and semantic content, the higher the probability that the 
contrast involved will originate from outside the conjunct-meanings, and the 
more complicated the inferential chain mediating between the conjuncts in 
order to form the contrast. 
The first of these principles can be restated as "if the contrast can be semantically 
based then do so", or, alternatively, "make as few inferences as possible to find the 
contrast". An implication of the second principle is that the process of inferencing is 
triggered by a lack of homogeneneity of the related conjuncts. Both principles are 
hypotheses on the processing of language and can be tested empirically. 
Evaluation of the proposal. In regard of the criteria mentioned in Chapter 1, two 
features of Lang's analysis have special appeal, viz. the treatment of but as an opera-
tional instruction and the formal account of the notion 'contrast'. As to the former, a 
natural language conjunction differs from a logical connective because it has a meaning 
of its own. The meaning of a logical connective is defined by its truth-functional 
properties, but the meaning of a natural language conjunction is defined by the 
operations that are to be carried out on the conjunct meanings (cf. Lang, 1984, p. 154). 
This operational approach puts the analysis of natural language conjunctions on a par 
with the analysis of such argumentative elements as even (cf. Section 1.1): Their 
properties are described in terms of the effect they have on the representation of the 
discourse that is developing. Intuitively this is a promising approach for the analysis of 
the argumentative properties of natural language expressions. Therefore it seems that 
Lang's analysis satisfies the second criterion for the analysis of ¿mi-coordinations. 
conjuncts seems to be irrelevant to the type of the contrast relation. 
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The second attractive feature of the analysis is the formal account of the notion 
'contrast': Two predicates show the relevant contrast if they are subcontraiy. In this 
respect Lang differs from most other authors on the subject, who in general do not 
provide an explicit definition of this notion. However, subcontrariness is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition for a bui-coordination. It is not a sufficient condi-
tion as there are cases in which two subcontrary predicates are conjoined by and, as in 
(50). 
(50) The number is odd and divisible. 
Nor is it a necessary condition, because, as Lang himself notes, there are many 
instances of ÒMf-coordinations in which the relevant contrast is derived from a contex-
tual source and not from two subcontrary predicates in the two conjuncts (cf. (46)). It 
seems therefore that subcontrariness is only relevant for a limited subset of the but-
coordinations and that it is an instance of a more general condition on the adequate 
use of but.1' 
Lang's formulation of this more general condition (which boils down to the rule: 
"There is a S' which is preferable as a continuation of S^ but rejected in favor of S2") 
lacks the formality of the subcontrariness condition. If 'preferable' is interpreted in 
terms of semantic distance, as Lang does, then this is a very problematic condition, 
because of its 'relativity': Frequently there is a S' which is 'closer to' S, than S2, but the 
corresponding bui-coordination is not acceptable. For example, S2 in (47)a is less close 
to S, than John is big, and therefore (47)a must be acceptable, which it is not (in a 
context in which the two predicates have the same meaning). Clearly, what is missing is 
an appeal to 'contrast' in the condition for the appropriate use of but. 
The analysis is problematic in other ways as well. It only gives an account of denials 
of expectation and semantic oppositions. It cannot deal with concessive oppositions like 
John is small, but he took karate-lessons. In these cases there is no sentence S' that is 
preferable as a continuation of S,, compared to Sj. In a concessive opposition the 
relation between S2 and S, is very indirect. The mediating link in these cases is an 
implicit proposition Ρ ("John is dangerous"). The relations involved are: Si is an 
argument in favor of Ρ and S2 is an argument against Ρ (or vice versa). That the 
analysis does not apply to all types of ¿uf-coordinations is in conflict with the first 
criterion for any such analysis. 
There is another problem involving this criterion. Lang gives two conditions for the 
acceptability of òui-coordinations: The semantically based contrasts require subcontrary 
predicates, the pragmatically based contrasts require more plausible continuations. If 
the analysis is to satisfy the uniformity criterion, then these conditions must somehow 
be related. It is, however, unclear what this relationship is like: It does not seem to be 
the case, for instance, that the semantic condition is simply a strict version of the 
pragmatic condition. If they are unrelated, then the analysis does not allow a uniform 
description of contrastive coherence relations. 
A final point to stress is that in Lang's analysis semantic oppositions are treated as 
oui-coordinations with a pragmatically based contrast. That is, in semantic oppositions 
the contrast is only indirectly related to the conjunct meanings. This seems counter-
intuitive, since it does not account for the fact that in semantic oppositions the 
conjunction but can be replaced by and, without losing the contrastive interpretation. 
" A possibility not discussed by Lang, but presumably worth pursuing is that subcontrari-
ness as a condition for the appropriate use of but must not be defined as a semantic restriction 
on the predicates, but as a pragmatic restriction: Two predicates or propositions are con-
joinable by means of but if, in the given context, the relation between the two propositions is 
that of subcontrariness. 
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No other type of contrastive coherence relation allows that replacement. This suggests 
that in semantic oppositions the contrast is realized more or less explicitly. 
In a recent analysis of buf-coordinations, Lang states that the general schema for the 
semantic interpretation of the adversative construction is as in (51) (cf. Lang, 1988): 
(51) Int(S') = Int(57) & Int(52), where S, - q, S2 - c(q) 
Int(x) is a function that projects a sentence χ on its interpretation, S' is the buf-sen-
tence, S¡ and S2 represent the conjuncts, and g and c(q) represent contrary propositions 
that can be derived from the conjunct interpretations and the context. On the basis of 
this general schema several types of fcuf-coordinations are distinguished. The types 
differ in the syntactic and semantic properties of the conjuncts and their relation to the 
context. 
This proposal, in its current form, cannot be correct. It cannot be the case that S, in 
conjunction with the context leads to g and S2 in conjunction with the context leads to 
c(g), for that would imply that the resulting representation, containing both g and c(g), 
is inconsistent. Somehow the derivation of these implied propositions must be 
restricted. In Chapter 3 some suggestions concerning the form of these restrictions are 
made. 
2 7 General Remarks and Summary 
The linguistic literature on coordinated sentences deals with one or more of the 
following subjects (a more or less similar list is given by Lang (1984, p. 73): 
(a) What are the (syntactic) restrictions on the form of the coordinated conjuncts? 
(b) What is the contribution of the conjunction to the interpretation of the entire 
coordinated structure? 
(c) What is the contribution of the interpretation of the conjuncts to the interpreta-
tion of the entire coordinated structure and what is the relation between the inter-
pretations of the conjuncts? 
(d) What is the interpretation of the entire coordinated structure? 
(a) Syntactic approaches to coordination. These approaches are not discussed here. 
From the analysis presented in the next chapter it follows that at the relevant level of 
description the conjuncts represent propositions, irrespective of the syntactic structure 
of the conjuncts. Furthermore, since the main concern here is with global contrastive 
coherence relations (which were defined in Chapter 1 as relations between two 
discourse units, each consisting of at least one sentence) it follows that, from a 
syntactic point of view, the conjuncts to be discussed here are sentences or concate-
nations of sentences. 
(b) Contribution of the conjunction. Not all of the literature on this subject is relevant 
to the present discussion. Very often the interest in coordinations that resemble the 
contrast relation originates in the problems that the conjunction but presents for a 
truth-conditional theory of meaning. These problems are severe: The differences 
between the meanings of the two conjunctions and and but seem to be clearly seman-
tic. Therefore one would expect that an adequate theory of meaning, truth-conditional 
or not, is able to describe these differences. However, they cannot be given in terms of 
truth conditions: The conjunctions are truth-conditionally indistinguishable. Therefore 
alternative ways must be found to accommodate the theory (cf. Wilson, 1975). One of 
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the solutions that have been proposed is that, apart from truth-conditional meaning 
aspects, there are also non-truth-conditional meaning aspects, and that the contrastive 
meaning aspect of but is one such aspect (Grice, 1975). 
In the literature on the truth-conditional properties of conjunctions the source of the 
interest in bui-coordinations is the question whether natural language conjunctions can 
be reduced to logical connectives. Since it is now more or less agreed upon by 
everyone that no such reduction is possible (cf., for instance, Van Dijk, 1977a, 1979), 
these approaches are of little interest to the present discussion. An important dif-
ference between logical connectives on the one hand and natural language conjunctions 
on the other is that the logical connectives do not have an independent meaning: Their 
meaning is completely defined by the truth values of the conjuncts on which the 
connectives operate. By contrast, natural language conjunctions have an independent 
meaning, and can therefore not be described in terms of the meaning of the conjuncts. 
Examples like (41) show that often it is the other way around, in that the meaning of 
the conjuncts is partly determined by the context in which it occurs (which includes the 
conjunction). 
For this reason it has been suggested that natural language conjunctions have a 
procedural meaning: In those approaches conjunctions represent instructions to 
perform certain operations on the representations that correspond to the meaning of 
the conjuncts. Steedman (1977) gives an example: 
(52) If you want to know the right time, then ask a policeman. 
The meaning of this construction is not that the entire construction is true, unless the 
antecedent is true and the consequent false, since this is not the way these construc-
tions are used in natural language. Rather it is an instruction what to do if you want to 
know the right time: The meaning is the procedure that is to be executed in case the 
condition in the antecedent is fulfilled. 
In the discussion of Lang's proposal it appeared that Lang adheres to a description 
of the meaning of conjunctions as procedural. This is an interesting feature of his 
analysis, since it seems to offer possibilities to account for the argumentative properties 
of natural language (which is one of the criteria for an adequate account of contrastive 
coherence relation interpretation). For instance, it is intuitively clear that the meaning 
of an evaluative element like even must also be described in procedural terms: "treat 
the information that is modified by even as remarkable".19 Deriving the argumentative 
structure of a discourse subsumes among other things the storage of the information 
given by the sentences in the discourse and the inferences based on those sentences in 
a hierarchical structure that represents the opinion of the author of the text. This 
opinion is warranted by arguments and modified by counterarguments. Obviously this 
process involves procedural as well as descriptive information. 
(c) Relations between conjunct meanings. In all of the proposals discussed above restric-
tions are formulated on the use of but. Usually these restrictions are stated in terms of 
the conjunct meanings. In general there are two types of restrictions, semantic and 
pragmatic. Lakoff, Abraham and Lang formulate semantic restrictions on the use of 
but, Anscombre and Ducrot, Dascal and Katriel, Marconi and Bertinetto and Lang 
formulate pragmatic restrictions. The discussion made it clear that there are no simple 
semantic restrictions that apply to all types of ftuf-coordinations. Thus, Lakoff s analysis 
was critized because of its semanticism: Her analysis of, for example, semantic opposi-
19
 A truth-conditional account of these elements will not do, since John went to BmsseL· and 
Even John went to BmsseL· are truth-conditionally indistinguishable. Cf. Wilson (1975) for 
similar remarks regarding yet. 
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tions does not apply to a construction like Bill « tall, but John is smart, and it was 
argued that this result is counterintuitive. The conclusion was that the interpretation of 
òuf-coordinations is heavily context dependent. This seems to rule out all semantic 
approaches to the buf-distribution. 
However, an analysis that formulates only pragmatic restrictions does not do justice 
to the cases in which the required contrast between the conjuncts is derived from the 
conjunct meanings. Lang's analysis seems to overcome this difficulty by formulating two 
conditions for the adequate use of but: a semantic one and a pragmatic one. The 
semantic condition requires that there be a relation of subcontrariness between the 
predicates in the conjuncts. The pragmatic condition dictates that there be a sentence 
that is more plausible as a continuation of the first conjunct than the second conjunct. 
Several objections were raised against this solution. First, there is no relation between 
the two conditions. Second, the semantic oppositions are now subject to the pragmatic 
condition, which seems counterintuitive. Third, the pragmatic condition is vacuous, 
because it applies too often, whereas it does not apply at all to concessive oppositions. 
The subcontrariness condition is at most a derived property of bitf-coordinations: In 
a sentence of the type (53) the predicates involved in the fcui-coordination are similar 
to the ones in example (44). Despite the fact that the predicates are subalternates and 
not subcontraries, the 6uf-coordination is completely acceptable. 
(S3) (Context: A pupil has just made the generalization that all odd numbers are 
divisible.) 
Teacher: What about seven? Seven is indivisible, but it is odd. 
The pupil assumes that all odd numbers are divisible and therefore, by modus ponens, 
that all indivisible numbers are even. Thus he entertains the view that even and 
divmble are subcontraiy predicates: If a sentence containing one of them is false, then 
a sentence containing the other must be true (although both may be true). So for this 
pupil a sentence like The number L· even, but divbible would be perfectly in accordance 
with the subcontrariness condition. Examples like these suggest that the restrictions on 
the use of but should not be formulated in terms of semantic relationships between the 
conjuncts. 
Several authors claim that the interpretion of a denial of expectation involves an 
appeal to some sort of expectancy relation between the two conjuncts: On the basis of 
the first conjunct one expects a certain state of affairs to be true and that truth is 
denied in the second conjunct. One may wonder exactly what kind of expectation is 
involved here. Some authors, like Abraham (1979), make use of a 'usuality' predicate. 
However, it is not entirely clear what the basis for the expectation is. The discussion of 
Lakoffs proposal made it clear that the relation between the conjuncts cannot be 
presuppositional. Nor can it be maintained that, in interpreting P-but-Q, there is a 
certain expectation shared by every writer/reader so that on the basis of Ρ one expects 
-Q. The examples in (17) given above plead against such an assumption: If there is an 
expectation that if one presses the button, the alarm goes off, then there can be no 
expectation that if one presses the button the alarm does not go off. Both examples 
were nevertheless considered possible and both examples are of the denial of expecta­
tion type. 
For the same reason the relation between the two conjuncts cannot be described as 
a Gricean implicature: It cannot be the case that both "one expects x" and "one 
expects -·χ" are deduced by means of Gricean maxims on the basis of one and the 
same sentence. 
The example shows that it is necessary to assume that the inferential chain between 
the two conjuncts can be constructed ad hoc, and thus is not an expectation in the usual 
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sense. This shows once more that the interpretation of contrastive coherence relations 
is heavily context dependent. An adequate account should be able to deal with this 
'constructivist' aspect of contrastive coherence relations. 
(d) Meaning of the coordinate structure. The survey made it dear that the interpretation 
of the conjunct meanings is not independent of the occurrence of the conjuncts in a 
coordinate structure: Structurally ambiguous or argumentatively vague sentences can 
get an unambigous, clear interpretation because of the context. The disambiguation is 
affected both by the conjunction and by the meaning of the other conjunct. In this 
respect natural language coordination differs from compound expressions in logic. A 
consequence is that there is no simple truth functional algorithm to calculate the 
meaning of natural language coordinations. To express this idea Lang introduced the 
the concept 'common integrator' as the representation of the meaning of the coor-
dinate structure, and he attributes a procedural meaning to conjunctions. 
One of the primary functions of discourses, as opposed to sentences, is to argue for a 
particular point of view of the writer of the discourse. It is therefore a test case for 
every analysis of òuf-coordinations that it must fit an adequate theory of argumenta-
tion. 
Some authors (Anscombre and Ducrot, Dascal and Katriel, Abraham) discuss the 
argumentative properties of ¿wf-coordinations. The relation between the linguistic 
analysis of contrastive coherence relations and their argumentative function will also be 
discussed in some detail in the next chapters. 
From the discussion in this chapter one can conclude that a proper analysis of contras-
tive coherence relations must account for the following properties. 
1. Conjunctions have an operational meaning. 
2. The interpretation of a contrastive coherence relation cannot be described as a 
simple function of the interpretation of the conjuncts. 
3. Contrastive coherence relations display a systematic argumentative behavior. 
4. The interpretation of contrastive coherence relations is to a high degree determined 
by the context in which the contrastive coherence relation occurs. 
5. There are similarities and differences between the following types of contrastive 
coherence relations. 
Semantic opposition: A relation between two conjuncts each having different subjects, 
to which properties are attributed that are mutually exclusive in the given context. 
Denial of expectation: On the basis of the first conjunct one expects a certain state of 
affairs to be true, which is denied by the second conjunct. 
Concessive opposition: The first conjunct gives an argument in favor of a certain 
conclusion, the second conjunct gives an argument against this conclusion. 
To these three one might add the negative concession (Neg Ρ, butA Q), which is very 
frequently discussed in the literature, because of its surface similarity to but
s
-type 
constructions. An example of this construction is (1), repeated here for convenience. 
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(1) John didn't steal the bike, but bought it. 
Yet another type of bui-coordination is the one found in examples like (13), repeated 
here: 
(13) George likes Peking Duck, but (then) all linguists like Chinese food. 
This type of contrastive coherence relation might be called conversational but. 
Abraham suggests the existence of yet another class of buf-coordinations, which in 
German are expressed by means of dafür. 
In the following chapter an analysis of contrastive coherence relations will be presented 
that aims at doing justice to the properties mentioned here. 
3 SOME ASPECTS OF AN INTERPRETIVE THEORY OF CONTRAS-
TIVE COHERENCE RELATIONS 
It is well-known that not all of the information in a discourse contributes to its 
propositional content. A distinction can be made between propositional or referential 
information on the one hand and operative or argumentative information on the other. 
The latter mainly functions as an instruction to guide the interpretation process in such 
a manner that the result is a coherent representation. It is assumed in this thesis that 
coherence relations play an important role in this process. 
In this chapter an analysis is presented that specifies the role of contrastive coher-
ence relations. The contrastive coherence relation is considered to be an operation on 
(representations of) discourse segments. Its applicability can be marked in various ways, 
i.e. there are several linguistic markers that signal the same relation. Thus, the 
contrastive coherence relation is characterized functionally (in terms of the effect of 
the relation on the discourse representation), rather than formally (for instance in 
terms of linguistic expressions). One of the goals of the research is to specify the 
characteristics of this functionally defined group of constructions. 
The linguistic literature on the function of contrastive coherence relations has never 
given an adequate characterization of these relations as a single group. Apart from the 
studies on the properties of specific contrastive markers such as but (discussed in the 
previous chapter), there are many attempts to give an account of the interpropositional 
relations that are found in discourse (cf. Fahnestock, 1983; Grimes, 1975; Halliday and 
Hasan, 1976; Hobbs, 1983, 1985; Longacre, 1983; Mann and Thompson, 1986, 1987). A 
common feature of most of these classifications is that they stress the difference 
between constructions like the following: 
(1) John chose a steak, but Pete chose chicken. 
(2) Rockefeller is rich, but he drives a Mini. 
Halliday and Hasan (1976) describe the first as an example of the "contrast" relation, 
and the second as an "adversative" relation, whereas Fahnestock (1983) uses "contrast" 
and "concession" to describe the difference. Mann and Thompson (1986) speak of a 
"thesis-antithesis" relation versus a "concession", although it is not entirely clear 
whether they would classify the first sentence as an example of the thesis-antithesis-
relation: They reserve this label for a relation in which 
two conceptions are contrasted, the speaker committing to one and decommitting 
from the other (p. 66) 
and there is no overt speaker commitment in the first sentence. Since their classifica-
tion lacks any other labels, it is most likely that they would consider the first sentence 
to be a thesis-antithesis-relation. 
That there is some sort of resemblance between the two types of constructions is 
often stressed in the literature. In both types a contrast of some sort is intended, and 
both relations can be expressed by means of the conjunction but. The analysis presen-
ted here intends to account for both this resemblance and the differences. The analysis 
crucially depends on the notion discourse perspectives, which will be discussed first. 
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3.1 Discourse perspectives 
The reader or hearer of a discourse has to reconstruct both a linear and a hierarchical 
information structure. For instance, in an argumentative text there is usually a stand­
point that is defended by the speaker or writer. This defense is often carried out in a 
subtle manner: Authorities are cited, feelings are evoked, logical arguments are 
adduced, possible counterarguments from a reader are anticipated and rebutted, the 
speaker's commitment to the truth of a proposition is modified, etc. If it is possible to 
link the information in an argumentative text in a hierarchical structure to the main 
standpoint of the speaker, then a condition is satisfied to say that the discourse is 
coherent. 
It is argued in this chapter that some of the processes that establish these links 
crucially depend upon the introduction of information inside perspectives, or points of 
view. Information introduced within a perspective differs from information that is not 
embedded in a perspective. Thus it is obvious that there is a difference in commitment 
between stating that χ and quoting someone who has stated that x, but what the exact 
nature of the difference is, is unclear: For instance, if the quoted person is an 
established authority, the difference becomes smaller. As yet there is no complete 
theory about the interpretation of perspectivized information and of its relation to the 
speaker's standpoint. 
A perspective is understood here as a cognitive device that places an amount of 
information within Tjoundaries'. These boundaries can be signalled by different types of 
elements: 
1. These elements may have to do with the responsibility for the truth of the 
utterance. Prototypical examples of such are predicates from verbs of saying, and other 
so-called world creating predicates. 
2. They may have to do with logico-semantic properties of the utterance. Prototypi­
cal examples are modals, negation, etc. 
3. They may have to do with the packaging of the content of the utterance. 
Examples are temporal and locational phrases (ira 1929, in France) and emphatic topic 
such as John in the colloquial sentence John, he L· running (i.e. an element on a list of 
possible candidates, see Dahl, 1974). That the latter are cases of perspectivation can be 
shown by paraphrases like As to John, he « running, indicating that the prepositional 
information "he is running" is to be interpreted with respect to "John". Chafe (1976), 
when discussing the Chinese topic device, notes that: 
What the topics appear to do is to limit the applicability of the main predication 
to a certain restricted domain. [...] Typically, it would seem, the topic sets a 
spatial, temporal, or individual framework within which the main predication 
holds. In English we can do something similar with certain temporal adverbs: 
Tuesday I went to the dentist (p. 50-51). 
Chafe's description fits topicalized elements in general: They are elements that create a 
perspective under which the main predication holds. 
The examples discussed so far are cases in which the perspective is introduced 
explicitly, but there are also cases where the perspective is introduced implicitly. The 
principal motivation for this assumption is that it provides one with a way to distinguish 
facts like "3 is a prime number" from opinions like "Rome is a beautiful city". The 
relevant distinction between facts and opinions seems to be that facts are true irrespec­
tive of who is speaking (hence the oddness of examples like I find 3 a prime number. In 
my opinion 3 is a prime number), whereas opinions have a restricted truth. 
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From this description it may be clear that the notion 'perspective' is given a wider 
interpretation than in literary theory, where it is linked up with the characters involved 
in a story. 'Perspective', as used here, differs also from the notion of 'intensionality' as 
used in semantics and logic, although the two are not totally unrelated. The relation-
ship is discussed in Section 3.8. There is also a relationship with the two types of 
perspective that are discussed by Kuno (1987), direct discourse perspective and 
empathy perspective. The direct discourse perspective is indicated by the use of so-
called logophoric elements, i.e. elements that indicate a speaker or an addressee. Kuno 
uses the notion of logophoricity to account for such differences as that between (3)a 
and (3)b. 
(3)a * Speaking of John,, the article was written by Ann and himself,. 
(3)b According to John,, the article was written by Ann and himself,. 
The two sentences have an identical constituent structure, yet only (3)b is acceptable. 
According to Kuno this is so because only in (3)b is himself part of a clause represent-
ing John's words. From this description it may be clear that Kuno's direct discourse 
perspective is close to that of the use in literary theory. Empathy is described as "the 
speaker's identification, which may vaiy in degree, with a person/thing that participates 
in the event or state that he describes in a sentence" (Kuno, 1987, p. 206). The 
speaker's empathy can be indicated through a variety of means, such as the grammati-
cal function of the constituent (by default the speaker's empathy is closer to the 
grammatical subject of the sentence than to a non-subject) or the speaker's phrasing 
(given two elements, one of which is referentially dependent of the other, the speaker's 
empathy is closer to the independent element). Kuno argues that many unacceptability 
judgments that are traditionally analyzed as having a grammatical cause can and should 
be analyzed as caused by conflicting empathy attributions. For instance, the unaccep-
tability of (4) is caused by the conflict between attributing the empathy to the gram-
matical subject (John's brother) and attributing the empathy to the referentially 
independent element (John). 
(4) ?? Then John's brother was hit by him. 
As in the case of direct discourse perspective, empathy perspective is linked up to the 
characters in a discourse, and has thus a more restricted sense than the use of the 
notion 'perspective' in this thesis. 
"Perspective" is a notion of which the formal characteristics are difficult to describe. In 
this chapter a few criteria to distinguish perspective indicating elements, such as the 
"lie-test" (Erteschik-Shir and Lappin, 1979), will be used. 
3.2 On the Formal Characteristics of Perspectives 
Perspective indicating elements (Pi's) select the perspectives with respect to which the 
subsequent information is to be interpreted. If no adequate perspective is present then 
the PI is taken to be an instruction for the creation of a perspective. The subsequent 
sentences are interpreted with respect to the current perspective until a new perspec-
tive is selected. 
One may wonder whether, apart from this characterization of PI in functional terms, 
a more formal characterization is also possible, for example, in syntactic terms. Clark 
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and Clark (1977, p. 33-34) discuss two notions, 'frame' and 'insert', that are related to 
the notion perspective. 
When speakers place a particular phrase at the beginning of a sentence they are 
deliberately trying to orient their listeners toward a particular area of knowledge -
to give them a point of departure for the sentence. Speakers then use the rest of 
the sentence progressively to narrow down what they are trying to say. For this 
reason the first phrase can be called a frame, and the remainder of the sentence 
an insert for that frame. 
This is a syntactic definition of these notions. Nevertheless 'frame' cannot be identified 
with PI, since a perspective is only in a rather abstract way related to the syntactic 
surface structure of utterances of natural texts. Thus, although it is very often the case 
that a PI introduces the sentence it modifies, examples like (5)-(7), demonstrate that 
this is not always the case. 
(5) John probably went to the supermarket. 
(6) John may have gone to the supermarket. 
(7) Peter will, according to John, go to London. 
From the paraphrases (5)', (6)', and (7)' it is clear that probably, may, and according to 
John share the characteristic properties of perspective indicating elements: They restrict 
the validity or truth of the proposition they modify. Nevertheless these expressions are 
not captured by the definition of the notion 'frame'. 
(5)' It is probably the case that John went to the supermarket. 
(6)' It may be the case that John went to the supermarket. 
(7)' According to John it is the case that Peter goes to London. 
Moreover, given the Clarkian definition of frame and insert it is impossible to describe 
the difference between (8) and (9) (with capitals indicating stress). 
(8) John went to the supermarket. 
(9) JOHN went to the SUPERmarket. 
(9) can, and (8) cannot, be paraphrased as "As for John, he went to the supermarket". 
There is no obvious syntactic difference between the two occurrences of John. The 
relation between John and the rest of the sentence is either in both (8) and (9) or in 
neither (8) nor (9) that of frame-insert. This does not account for the intuition that the 
relevant difference between (8) and (9) is that in (9) John is used to give the reader/-
listener a 'point of departure' for the interpretation of the rest of the sentence, i.e. as a 
frame (or PI). The conclusion is that the relation between perspectives and surface 
structure can be rather abstract. 
The problems with a syntactic characterization of the notion perspective are also 
demonstrated by the difference between (10)a and (10)b. 
(10)a John prepared a paper for today's lecture. 
(10)b For today's lecture John prepared a paper. 
The difference between the two sentences is that for today's lecture is not part of the 
foregrounded information in (10)b. This is shown by the fact that (11) is hardly 
possible as a reaction to (10)b, whereas it is completely natural as a reaction to (10)a. 
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(11) That's not true. He prepared it for tomorrow's lecture. 
In this respect (10)b is similar to the verbs of saying: A sequence like (12) is hardly 
acceptable with 'normal' intonation (viz. primary stress on paper in B's answer and 
rising pitch). 
(12) A: John just told me that he has prepared a paper. 
?? B: That's not true. He wrote that he has prepared a paper. 
These intuitions are explained if one assumes that For today's lecture in (10)b and John 
just told me in (12)A have a different function than for today's lecture in (10)a, viz. to 
select a perspective with respect to which the remainder of the sentence is to be 
interpreted, and that elements with such a function cannot be the target of negation, 
because they do not belong to the contents of a perspective. Since for today's lecture in 
(10)a is part of the content of the speaker's perspective, it can be the target of 
negation.' 
The point of the example is that the two sentences in (10) do not seem to differ in 
thematic structure, whereas one of them contains a PI and the other does not. This 
suggests the complexity of characterizing perspectives syntactically. 
A somewhat eclectic alternative is that there is no simple formal characterization of 
the elements that function as a PI, but that Pi's nevertheless are always marked 
somehow in surface structure, in such a way that they are recognizable as indicators of 
a perspective. Marking as a PI may be done by means of stress, by syntactic position 
(at the beginning of the sentence), by semantic content (phrases like according to John), 
or by a combination of these three. Furthermore one might hypothesize that a PI 
occupies the sentence initial position, unless it is unambiguously recognizable as PI: In 
that case it can occupy all sentence-adverbial positions. 
Sentences like (10)a and (10)b may serve as evidence for these principles: On the 
basis of its semantic content for today's lecture is not unambiguously recognizable as a 
PI. Therefore, it serves as a PI in (10)b due to its syntactic position, but its position 
cannot vary freely, which is why the phrase does not serve as a PI in (10)a. However, 
these issues will not be pursued here any further, and they are left for future research. 
The fact that there is no simple syntactic characterization of notions like perspective 
and PI does not imply that these notions cannot be defined. PI, for instance, can be 
defined functionally, namely as an element that selects the appropriate perspective in 
the discourse representation to store the incoming information. 
In the following sections an analysis of ¿»«/-coordinations is presented in which the 
notion perspective is used. It is argued that the conjunction but plays a crucial role in 
establishing links between perspectives. The nature of these links and the effect they 
have on the representation of the discourse are discussed in some detail. 
1
 Cf. Erteschik-Shir and Lappin (1979) and Giora (1983) on the 'lie-test' as a tool for 
detecting foregrounded information. Note that (10)a has an alternative reading, viz. one in 
which it is synonymous with (10)b. This reading is strongly favored by putting primary stress on 
paper and by de-stressing for today's lecture, i.e., by reading (10)a with an intonation contour 
similar to that of (10)b. In this alternative reading (11) is hardly possible as a continuation of 
(10)a. Similarly, a sentence like (i), which is a possible reaction to (10)b, is a perfectly 
acceptable reaction to this reading of (10)a. 
(i) That's not true. He intends to improvise. 
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3.3 Percolation and cancellation 
A speaker who makes an assertion is generally understood or expected to justify his or 
her assertion or in some way stand up for it, i.e. argue for it. This determines the 
interpretation of all the information given in the discourse. Assertions are supported by 
arguments, and potential counterarguments are invalidated. This is a complex process 
of extreme subtlety. For instance, if a speaker does not want to commit himself too 
strongly to a specific assertion, he may use the strategy of embedding it in a perspec­
tive that is selected by a perspective indicating element like say or think, thus subtly 
arguing in a less committing way. An example is (13). 
(13) A: What do you think of today's match? 
B: John says that the Rangers will win. 
There is a strong preference to take B's answer to mean more than what is literally 
said. It can be taken to mean, for instance, that В too thinks that the Rangers will win 
(although this interpretation will not be as strong as it would have been if В had 
asserted that the Rangers will win). Apparently information given inside a perspective 
can find its way up into the speaker's perspective, a process that henceforth will be 
called (upward) percolation (cf. Jaspers, Spooren, Noordman and Vonk, 1987; see Wilks 
and Bien, 1983, for a related use of this notion). 
In a proposal for the analysis of so-called intensionality phenomena within the 
framework of discourse semantics (see Section 3.8), Seuren (1985, p. 409) discusses a 
related notion, viz. the principle of ambition, which dictates that presupposed informa­
tion tends to be incremented to the highest possible discourse domain (discourse 
domains correspond roughly with perspectives). The principle has a functional basis: 
the less subdomains differ from [the highest domain], the more economical the 
cognitive processing (p. 447). 
But note also the difference with the notion 'percolation': The principle of ambition 
accounts for the projection of 'old' (presupposed) information, i.e. information that has 
to be present in the representation on pain of incoherence. Thus the principle is 
Seuren's solution to the so-called projection problem of presuppositions.2 Percolation 
also affects 'new' information. In example (13), for instance, the percolated proposition 
is "the Rangers will win", which evidently is part of the new information that B's reply 
expresses. 
The converse of percolation is cancellation. It is the process of explicitly rejecting 
information that would otherwise be added to a higher perspective. Some examples 
are: 
(14) John says that The Beatles haven't split up. He must be crazy. 
(15) John says that the Beatles haven't split up, but that's not true. 
2
 The problem can be formulated as: What are the circumstances under which the 
presuppositions of a clause become the presuppositions of the (possibly complex) sentence in 
which the clause occurs? For a survey of the problem and some of its solutions, see Levinson 
(1983) and Seuren (in press). A solution similar to that of Seuren has been formulated by 
Fauconnier (1985). 
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Cancellation prevents the construction of inconsistent discourse representations: For 
instance, in (14) John's statement cannot be accepted by the hearer because it is in 
conflict with his knowledge of the world. 
Cancellation of information can only occur between perspectives and not within a 
single perspective. This property of cancellation follows from a general constraint on 
perspectives that they be consistent: A perspective in which both a proposition and its 
negation are taken to be true is, by definition, inconsistent.3 
Another typical property of cancellation is that it occurs between sentences. This is a 
consequence of the circumstance that perspectives tend to coincide with sentences, and 
perspective boundaries with sentence boundaries:4 Previously it has been noted that 
cancellation occurs between perspectives. Cancellation therefore involves perspective 
shifts. Shifts from one perspective to another, or from one perspective to the speaker's, 
must be marked in one way or another. Perspective indicating elements usually 
introduce new sentences (see the previous section on the relation between Pi's and 
syntactic structure). As a consequence cancellation occurs typically between sentences. 
Two examples of perspective shift marking may serve to demonstrate this point. The 
simplest marking is, of course, the use of a PI referring to a different perspective, as in 
(16). 
(16) John said that Bill was ill. Pete says that that's not true. 
In this case there is a change from John's perspective to that of Pete, marked by the PI 
Pete says. 
Another type of perspective shift marking is the use of coordinating conjunctions, 
like but and for (in this case the shift is typically a shift into the speaker's perspective, 
unless another perspective is explicitly introduced; cf. Jaspers, Spooren, Noordman and 
Vonk, 1987; Spooren and Jaspers, 1988). 
(17) John hopes it will rain, but the forecast is bad. 
(18) John said that Mary was going to stay at home, for she was ill. 
It is extremely difficult to interpret (17) and (18) in such a way that the second clause 
is given from John's perspective. Again, the perspective shift occurs between sentences. 
Since cancellation involves perspective shifts, it follows that cancellation generally 
occurs between sentences. 
The class of cancelling devices in natural language is large. Some members are 
sentences or embedding constructions like the ones in (19) (capitals indicate contrastive 
stress). 
(19)a That is complete nonsense. 
3
 This restriction must be modified somehow, allowing for 'background' inconsistencies, like 
the belief that light consists of both particles and waves, the conflict between human parentage 
and man's descent from apes, or the truthfulness with which one can assert that the sun is 
setting. 
4
 The subsequent discussion will be about 'unembedded' perspectives, i.e. perspectives that 
either correspond to the speaker's reality or are only one level down. No attention will be paid 
to cases like John says that Pete believes that..., etc., in which there is a shift from John's 
perspective to that of Pete. An obvious difference between this type of perspective-shift and 
the one discussed in the text is that Pete's perspective is introduced as dependent on John's 
perspective, which is not the case with unembedded perspectives. 
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(19)b He's NOT coming. 
(19)c It's not true that he is coming. 
(19)d Peter is going to ENGLAND (in response to "Peter is going to France"). 
Other members are contrastive elements like but and on the contrary. A property of 
cancellation is that not only explicit information is cancelled, but also information that 
is inferentially related to it. For instance, if (19)b is a reaction to (20) and if it is 
known that only when my father comes will we go to the theatre, then not only the 
explicit information ("My father is coming") is cancelled, but also the implication 
"We're going to the theatre". 
(20) My father is coming. 
3.4 The Argumentative Structure of Discourse: BUT and the Cancellation of Information 
Consider examples (21) and (22). 
(21) Smith informs me that Burns employs thousands of workers, but according 
to Roberts Burns employs 100 men. 
(22) Burns employs thousands of workers, but he's a crook. 
In (21) the information that is cancelled by but is that "Burns employs thousands of 
workers". In (22) the cancelled information is not that "Burns employs thousands of 
workers", but a proposition that is inferentially related to this one, for instance that 
"Bums is a man of dignity". An evident problem for the interpretation of an example 
like (21) or (22) is therefore how to determine exactly what information is to be 
cancelled. The solution to this problem that is defended here makes explicit a frequent-
ly mentioned feature of fcni-coordination, viz. that but presupposes some sort of 
contrast (see for instance Lakoff, 1971; Halliday and Hasan, 1976). This solution takes 
the form of the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I 
By interpreting ¿>u/-coordinations (more generally: contrastive coherence relations) 
the hearer will construct structures of the following type: 
(23) PJA] & P2hA] 
The claim is that (23) is the general pattern underlying all contrastive coherence 
relations and that all the differences and similarities between different types of 
contrastive coherence relations can be stated in terms of (23). In (23) P, and P2 
represent two Pi's referring to different perspectives. A and A represent contradictory 
propositions. Thus the hypothesis states that a hearer will construct conjunctions of 
propositions that are presented from certain perspectives. The notion 'contrast' is made 
explicit in this scheme by the use of two non-identical Pi's (Pl and P2) and by the use 
of two contradictory propositions (A and -A). 
If cancellation markers occur, there is a conflict between the contents of two perspec-
tives. Logically, this is not necessarily a problem: A discourse in which two perspectives 
are mentioned that contain conflicting information can be perfectly consistent, as is 
exemplified by (24). 
(24) John says that I'm right and Peter says that I'm wrong. 
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In the case of a contrastive coherence relation the percolation process causes a 
problem: As indicated in structure (23) it is assumed that interpreting a contrastive 
coherence relation involves denving a structure with two perspectives containing 
contradictory propositions, A and -A. If both propositions were to percolate to the 
perspective that corresponds to the speaker's reality, then the result would be an 
inconsistent representation. 
Theoretically there are four solutions to this problem: 
(25) 
1. The information related to the first conjunct percolates. 
2. The information related to the second conjunct percolates. 
3. Neither one of the conflicting informational units percolate, and the resulting 
interpretation is uncertainty. 
4. Both the information related to the first conjunct and the information related to 
the second conjunct percolate. 
Note that 4. is only a theoretical possibility: It will never occur, since the information 
related to the two conjuncts is contradictory, so that percolation of both propositions 
would lead to an inconsistent perspective. 
With respect to (25) the following hypothesis will be investigated: 
Hypothesis II 
If a fcui-coordination is used, the information related to the second conjunct 
stands a better chance of percolating to the higher perspective than the informa-
tion related to the first conjunct (i.e. (25).2). In this respect òuf-coordinations 
differ from amZ-coordinations, in which neither one of the conflicting information-
al units percolate (i.e. (25).3).s 
Hypothesis II is supported by the following observations: 
(26) A: This year we will spend our holiday in the Mediterranean. What region shall 
we go to? 
B: The Costa Brava is famous for its nightlife, but Greece is a treasure of 
classical art. 
(a) ?? So we should go to the Costa Brava. 
(b) So we should go to Greece. 
(c) ? So I don't know where to go to. 
(27) A: This year we will spend our holiday in the Mediterranean. What region shall 
we go to? 
B: The Costa Brava is famous for its nightlife, and Greece is a treasure of 
classical art. 
(a) ? So we should go to the Costa Brava. 
(b) ? So we should go to Greece. 
(c) So I don't know where to go to. 
3
 The first possibility of (25) will be discussed briefly later on. Note the relationship 
between Hypothesis II and the DOM-operator introduced in Abraham (1975). But see Section 
2.4 for some problems with this operator. 
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The explicit information given in the conjuncts in (26) and (27) per se does not suffice 
for an adequate answer to the question of speaker A. Given that the discourses are 
coherent, the answer of speaker В involves the making of inferences. It is assumed that 
the conjuncts receive the following interpretations (with A/ resp. A2' representing (some of) the inferences based on the conjuncts): 
(28) 
Conjunct 1 
As to the Costa Brava, it is famous for its nightlife. 
A,': "We should go to the Costa Brava". 
Conjunct 2 
As to Greece, it is a treasure of classical art. 
A2': "We should go to Greece". 
In (26) continuation (b) seems to be the most appropriate. According to the present 
analysis this is so because the inference related to the second conjunct (Л/) percolates 
to the speaker perspective, cancelling the inference related to the first conjunct (A,'). 
The information in the context accords with the interpretation of the biii-coordination. 
The other continuations are in conflict with it. In (27) only continuation (c) is 
appropriate, which indicates that this fits the normal interpretation of the α/uí-coordina-
tion. 
Note that Hypothesis II relates only to the information involved directly in the 
potential inconsistency. This could mean that the explicit information presented in a 
perspective remains unchallenged. See example (29). 
(29) A: Who will be the new Prime Minister? 
B: The Times states that Margaret Thatcher is the toughest candidate, but 
according to the Observer Mr. Kinnock is more popular with the working 
classes. 
In (29) the first conjunct of B's answer, The Times states that Margaret Thatcher is the 
toughest candidate, is an argument in favor of the claim "Margaret Thatcher will be the 
new Prime Minister" and the second conjunct, According to the Observer Mr. Kinnock is 
more popular with the working class, is an argument in favor of the claim "Mr. Kinnock 
will be the new Prime Minister". This is represented as a conjunction of two proposi-
tions that are each embedded under a perspective. The perspectives correspond to 
"The Times states" and "According to the Observer", respectively. The first perspective 
contains the propositions "Margaret Thatcher is the toughest candidate" and "Margaret 
Thatcher will be the new Prime Minister". The second perspective contains the 
propositions "Mr. Kinnock is more popular with the working class" and "Mr. Kinnock 
will be the new Prime Minister". Cancelling affects only the conflicting claims 
("Margaret Thatcher will be the new Prime Minister" and "Mr. Kinnock will be the 
new Prime Minister"). It does not affect the explicit information functioning as 
arguments ("Margaret Thatcher is the toughest candidate" and "Mr. Kinnock is more 
popular with the working class"). Therefore the perspective corresponding to speaker В 
will contain the latter two propositions, whatever the result of cancelling may be. 
The analysis predicts that the writer's opinion -- if overtly present -- is expressed in the 
second conjunct: Discourses are used to vindicate the author's claims, and since it is 
hypothesized that the information in the second conjunct percolates to the speaker's 
perspective, a conjunct expressing the writer's opinion has to be the conjunct intro-
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duced by but. However, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this prediction. A 
very famous one can be found in Marcus Antonius' speech in Shakespeare's Julius 
Caesar (Act III, scene ii): 
(30) He was my friend, faithful and just to me: 
But Brutus says he was ambitious; 
And Brutus is an honorable man. 
In this example a bur-coordination with the speaker's opinion in the first conjunct is 
contrasted with Brutus' opinion in the second conjunct. According to the present 
analysis the information related to the second conjunct (i.e. the negative interpretation 
of Caesar's character) percolates to the speaker perspective. This would result in an 
inconsistent representation, since the first conjunct explicitly states the positive 
interpretation of Caesar's character held by the speaker. The only way to give (30) an 
acceptable interpretation is to assume that the contrast does not involve Caesar's 
character, but Brutus': Brutus is talking nonsense. This sarcastic interpretation of (30) 
is taken to be strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis II. 
The sarcastic interpretation is absent in ftuf-coordinations like (31). 
(31) I'd say we should go to Paris by bus, but Peter says we should take the train. 
This is caused by the use of the PI in the first conjunct (I'd say). It has the effect of 
explicitly weakening the claim in the first conjunct. Nevertheless, the sentence is not so 
much understood to be a statement on how to travel to Paris, as on the expertise of 
the speaker regarding the subject matter (a natural continuation of (31) would be and 
Peter L· an experienced traveller). Note that this informational surplus is absent if the 
order of the conjuncts is reversed: (32) has the straightforward interpretation that Peter 
is wrong. 
(32) Peter says we should take the train to Paris, but I'd say we should go by bus. 
Moreover, replacing but by and in (31) results in uncertainty, as is predicted by the 
analysis. 
(33) I'd say we should go to Paris by bus and Peter says we should take the train. 
A natural continuation of (33) would be Please help me out.... These observations 
indicate that the informational surplus in (31) originates from the dominance of the 
second conjunct in a ftuf-coordination, and from the conflict between this dominance 
and the explicit information given about the speaker perspective. 
Hypothesis Π will henceforth be referred to as the Asymmetry Hypothesis. It is the pivot 
of this thesis. Quantitative and qualitative evidence relating to this hypothesis will be 
discussed extensively in subsequent chapters. 
P. Seuren brought to my attention that the Asymmetry Hypothesis can be formulated 
as: The PI related to the second conjunct cannot be weaker than the PI related to the 
first conjunct. In this formulation the constraint echoes the scalarity of intensional 
predicates noted by Seuren (1985, p. 417-422) on the basis of such examples as (34)a 
and b. 
(34)a John believes that he owns a house, and he hopes that it is valuable. 
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(34)b ?? John hopes that he owns a house, and he believes that it is valuable. 
In Seuren's framework this difference is accounted as a consequence of the hierarchy 
of (sub)domains (which correspond roughly with perspectives): 
[...] a definite [term] occurring in an embedded sentential structure can map onto 
an address in its own subdomain or in a subdomain of a higher order, but never 
in a subdomain of a lower order (p. 417). 
Believe is higher on the scale of intensionality than hope. Therefore a house in (34)a is 
a possible target for pronominalization, whereas it is not in (34)b. 
Apparent counterexamples to the scalarity, like example (35) or, for that matter, 
(30) and (33), are different because in for instance (35) there is an interpretational 
surplus: The example is not so much about John's health as about Sue's well-informed-
ness. Note that (35) is odd with and instead of but. 
(35) Harry is ill, but Sue thinks that he isn't. 
One of the four possible solutions in list (25) to the inconsistency problem has not 
been discussed so far, viz. the first possibility (information related to the first conjunct 
percolates). Such cases can be found in subordinating contrastive sentences. Consider 
example (36). 
(36) A: Are you strong enough to carry this suitcase? 
B: Sure, 
(i) although it is big, it doesn't weigh much. 
(ii) ? it doesn't weigh much, although it's big. 
(iii) ?? it is big, although it doesn't weigh much. 
(iv) * although it doesn't weigh much, it is big. 
In a subordinating construction there is a foreground-background distinction, which 
seems to be determined by two factors: the order of the conjuncts (Van Dijk, 1977a; 
Giora, 1983) and the syntactic status of the conjunct. As to the former, foreground 
information tends to occur in sentence final position (the second conjunct), and 
background information in sentence initial position (the first conjunct). With respect to 
the latter, the subordinating conjunct tends to introduce foreground information, the 
subordinated conjunct tends to introduce background information. These two factors 
can account for the intuitions regarding example (36). Answer (i) is completely 
acceptable, as the choice В makes (indicated by Sure) is in accordance with the fact 
that the argument supporting this choice is both in the subordinating conjunct and 
sentence final. Answer (ii) is somewhat deviant, since here the argument that supports 
B's choice, although in the subordinating conjunct, is in sentence initial position. 
Answer (iii) is worse than (ii). In this case the argument supporting B's choice is in 
sentence final position, but it is the subordinated conjunct. Answer (iv), finally, is 
completely unacceptable, since the relevant argument is both in the subordinated 
conjunct and in sentence initial position. Empirical evidence for these intuitions is 
presented by McClure and Geva (1983). The two relevant examples are (ii) and (iii): 
Their relative acceptability and unacceptability, respectively, are caused by the fact that 
the information related to the first conjunct percolates to the higher perspective. 
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3.5 Different Types of BUT-coordmation 
It is obvious that an adequate theory of the interpretation of contrastive coherence 
relations should be able to account for the differences between different types of but-
coordinations. At the end of Chapter 2 the following types of bui-coordinations were 
distinguished. 
Semantic opposition is a relation between two conjuncts with two contrasting pairs. In 
the standard case each conjunct has a different subject. Properties are attributed to the 
subjects that are mutually exclusive in the given context. An example of a semantic 
opposition, previously given in Chapter 2, is (37). 
(37) John is small, but Pete is tall. 
Denial of expectation is a relation where on the basis of the first conjuncts one expects 
a certain state of affairs to be true, which is then denied by the second conjunct. (38) is 
an example of a denial of expectation. 
(38) John is small, but he plays basketball. 
Finally, concessive opposition (of which negative concessives are a sub-type) is a relation 
in which the first conjunct gives an argument in favor of a certain conclusion, and the 
second conjunct gives an argument against that conclusion. Cf. (39). 
(39) John is small, but he took karate-lessons. 
In this thesis the view is defended that the differences between these types are gradient 
ones, and that they relate to the degree of abstraction with which the underlying 
structure (23) is related to the surface realization of the contrastive coherence relation. 
5.5.7 On the structure of semantic opposition relations. 
In (40) an inventory is presented of some of the configurations in which semantic 
opposition relations can occur. 
(40) 
a JOHN writes a BOOK, but CHARLES writes an АІШСЬЕ. 
ΝΡ,-Ινρ V-NPj] but NP^tvp V-NP2] 
b On MONDAYS John works on his BOOK, but on TUESDAYS he works on 
his ARTICLE. 
ΡΡ,-ΝΡ-tvp V-NP2] but ΡΡ,-ΝΡ-Ινρ V-NP2] 
с On MONDAYS John works on his book at HOME, but on TUESDAYS he 
works on his book in his OFFICE. 
ΡΡ,-ΝΡ-VP-PPj but PP
r
NP-VP-PP2 
The capitals indicate stressed elements. (40)a is a case in which the contrasts exist 
between sentence parts that are part of the thematic or case role structure of the 
sentence in which they occur. (40)b presents à case in which one of the contrasts is 
between elements with a thematic role and the other between elements that function as 
adverbial phrases. (40)c is an example where both contrasts exist between elements 
that function as adverbial phrases. 
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One element that obviously is common to all these structures is that there are two 
pairs of contrasting elements in the two conjuncts.' The pairs of contrasting elements 
are indicated by identical subscripts in (40). In, for example, (40)b there are two 
contrasting pairs, the first consisting of a prepositional phrase from each conjunct, and 
the second consisting of a noun phrase from each conjunct. Note that there can be no 
absolute restriction that the pairs consist of elements from the same syntactic category: 
(41) 
a PPj-NP-tvp V-AP2] but ΝΡ,-U V-AP2] 
In France the people are Roman Catholic, but the Brits are Anglican. 
b ΝΡ,-ΥΡ-ΡΡΐ but ΝΡ,-VP-AdvPj 
John eats in the morning, but Charles eats late. 
What is required is that the contrasted elements have a comparable semantic content. 
In (41)a for instance the phrase the Brits is interpreted as "people in Britain", which is 
comparable to "people in France" in the first conjunct. Similarly, the phrase late in the 
second conjunct of (41)b is synonymous to "in the evening", which is comparable to the 
phrase in the morning in the first conjunct. Moreover, if the elements of a contrasting 
pair have an equal syntactic structure, but a different semantic/pragmatic function the 
result is not acceptable. Cf. example (42). 
(42) ?? John hates Cecile because she betrayed him, but Emily has hated her since 
the day they met. 
It seems, then, that the relevant restrictions are of a semantic/pragmatic nature and 
that there is no one-to-one correspondence between syntactic form and seman­
tic/pragmatic function. This raises the question of how to formulate the restrictions on 
semantic opposition relations. 
A second property that the semantic opposition structures have in common is that the 
contrasting parts bear contrastive stress. Stressed elements are traditionally analyzed as 
new information, whereas the remainder of the sentence is supposed to give old 
information. Thus there is a difference between the following sentences, which can be 
described in terms of such notions as old and new information: 
(43) Fred WALKS. (In response to: What does Fred do?) 
6
 There may be more than two contrasting pairs. A relevant example is (i) (Chafe, 1976, p. 
35, gives a similar example). 
(i) On MONDAYS John works on his BOOK at HOME, but on TUESDAYS he works on 
his ARTICLE in his OFFICE. 
PP^NP-Iv, V-NPJ-РРз but ΡΡ,-ΝΡ-tv, V-NPJ-PP3 
7
 As Bing (1983) notes, there is much confusion about the notion 'contrastive stress'. In a 
pre-theoretical sense it is used for those stress patterns that come along with contrastive 
meaning. In a more technical sense it is used for those stress patterns that are deviations from 
the normal stress patterns. The two uses do not correlate perfectly. Thus there are cases in 
which there is contrastive meaning, but with regular stress patterns. An example is He didn't 
give the parcel to BILL, but to JOHN. There are also cases with deviating stress patterns and no 
contrastive meaning. Cf. John hit George and then Sarah hit HIM. The stress on HIM is 
irregular: It is an anaphoric pronoun, i.e. a pronoun referring to old information, and as a rule 
old information does not receive stress. 
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(44) FRED walks. (In response to: Who walks?) 
In (43) it is asserted of the element "Fred" (denoted by the linguistic expression Fred) 
that it has the property of walking. In (44) it is the property "walk" of which it is 
asserted that the entity denoted by Fred has it (cf. Bosch, 1983, Chapter 3). 
In a semantic opposition this straightforward relation between stressed and new 
information on the one hand and destressed and old information on the other breaks 
down. 
(45) A: Who is the best candidate, Charlie or Bob? 
B: CHARLIE is exPERienced, but BOB ISn't. 
In B's reply only the predicates и experienced and ¿ш (experienced) give new informa­
tion. Charlie and Bob clearly are present in the context. It seems, then, that the pair 
Charlie/Bob truly has contrastive stress, in whatever use of the phrase (cf. the previous 
note). 
The question is raised, again, of how to formulate this prosodie aspect of semantic 
opposition relations. 
It seems to me that there is every reason to assume that discourse perspectives play a 
crucial role in all of these cases. That role is obvious in examples like (46) and (47), 
where the first pair of contrasting elements consists of perspective indicating elements. 
(46) JOHN says that Cecile's a BORE, but CHARLES says that she's ADORA­
BLE. 
(47) In the FILM Cecile's a BORE, but in REALITY she's ADORABLE. 
As was argued in Section 3.1, it is assumed here that in examples like (40)a or (45)B 
the conjuncts also contain a perspective indicating element. 
It may seem counter-intuitive to analyze a phrase like JOHN in (40)a as a PI. 
Intuitively Pi's function as the background against which the foreground information is 
interpreted. Contrastively stressed elements are traditionally analyzed as new informa­
tion, as the focus of the utterance, whereas the remainder of the utterance counts as 
background information. According to Chafe (1976) focal information points the 
attention of the addressee to one of a set of possible candidates. It seems dubious, 
however, whether (48)B can be put on a par with cases like (49), which are undoubted­
ly cases of focal information: 
(48) A: Which one of the two should we employ, Bob or Bill? 
B: BILL has the QUALIFICATIONS, but BOB is EXPERIENCED. 
(49)a It is BILL who has the qualifications. 
(49)b The one who has the qualifications is BILL· 
In the sentences of (49) it is presupposed that someone has the qualifications and what 
is new is that that someone is Bill. In (48)B, however, there is no such presupposition: 
The first conjunct, for instance, does not presuppose that someone has the qualifica­
tions, but it asserts of Bill that he has the qualifications. That is, (50), but not (51) is a 
possible paraphrase of (48)B (in the context of (48)A). 
(50) As for Bill, he has the qualifications, but as for Bob, he is experienced. 
(51) It is BILL who has the qualifications, but it is BOB who is experienced. 
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Paraphrase (50) suggests a relationship with the topic-comment structure, which is a 
way of packaging linguistic information in such a manner that the most prominent 
referent of the sentence is highlighted. This resemblance explains why Dahl (1974) 
considers phrases like BILL and BOB in (48)B to be emphatic topics rather than focal 
elements. The same is indicated by applying the 'lie-test' to (48)B: (52) is an 
appropriate continuation of the dialogue in (48), but (53) is not. Apparently, is 
experienced is a possible target for negation in (48), but Bill is not. This is explained if 
one assumes that Bill indicates the topic rather than the focus of the utterance. 
(52) A: That's not true. Bill is INexperienced. 
(53) A: That's not true. SARAH is experienced. 
Note that a consequence of this approach is that in some cases, viz. the ones in which 
elements of the thematic structure function as Pi's, the contradictory information 
embedded in the two perspectives involves properties rather than complete proposi-
tions. In, for example, (40)a it is the property of writing a book that is contrasted with 
the property of writing an article. By contrast, in (40)b-c the conflicting information 
embedded in the two perspectives involves complete propositions. 
This consequence predicts that cases like (41)a, repeated here, in which only the 
second conjunct contains a PI that functions in the thematic structure are of a special 
type: In the second conjunct it is a property ("being Anglican"), rather than a complete 
proposition, that is embedded in the perspective corresponding to The Brits. Therefore 
the relevant information in the first conjunct must also be a property and not a 
complete proposition. This prediction is borne out by the unacceptability of cases like 
(54), compared to (41)a. 
(41)a In France the people are Roman Catholic, but the Brits are Anglican. 
(54) ?? In France the president is Roman Catholic, but the Brits are Anglican. 
The difference between (41) and (54) is that in (41)a the subject of the first conjunct 
does not have an uniquely identifiable referent (in several languages it is translated as 
the equivalent of the indefinite personal pronoun one, for instance French on, German 
man, Dutch men, zé), and thus the clause people are Roman Catholic is not a complete 
proposition. In (54), on the other hand, the subject of the first conjunct does have an 
uniquely identifiable referent. In this case the proposition "the president is Roman 
Catholic", embedded under the perspective indicated by In France, is contrasted with 
the property "one is Anglican", embedded under the perspective indicating element the 
Brits. This is in conflict with scheme (23), because this scheme implies that A and -A 
are equivalent, which is not the case in (54). 
A further consequence of the present proposal is that it predicts a difference between 
the examples (55) and (56) with respect to the elements that function as Pi's: In (55) 
the phrase On Monday functions as PI, in (56) Charles has that function. 
(55) On MONDAY CHARLES went to the baker, but on FRIDAY BOB went. 
(56) CHARLES went to the baker on MONDAY, but BOB went on FRIDAY. 
The 'lie-test' provides indications for the correctness of such a difference: (57) seems a 
proper reaction to (55), but not to (56), which indicates that Bob's going to the baker 
is part of the foregrounded information in (55), but not in (56). 
(57) That's not true. SARAH went to the baker that day. 
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The function of Pi's is to select the appropriate perspective in the discourse representa-
tion for the storage of the foregrounded information. It seems reasonable to assume 
that perspectives are characterized by the elements in the perspective and by their 
spatio-temporal characteristics. This suggests that the relevant perspectives can be 
selected by using different types of characteristics. An example of this was seen in 
(41)a, where one perspective is selected by using a locational phrase and the other by 
the entities within the perspective. As a further example consider the situation in which 
it is known to both conversational partners that they spent their holidays in 1985 in 
France and in 1986 in Spain. In such a context it is perfectly acceptable to use an 
utterance like: 
(58) In FRANCE we spent our holidays SIGHTSEEING, but in 1986 we went 
mostly to the BEACH. 
Moreover it suggests that more than one characteristic can be used to select the 
relevant perspective, as in (59). 
(59) In FRANCE in 1985 we spent our holidays SIGHTSEEING, but in 1986 we 
went mostly to the BEACH. 
A further argument in favor of the present analysis is that the requirement of incom-
patible propositions A and -A in structure (23) can explain the unacceptability of 
example (42), repeated here: The linguistic information does not give rise to the 
construction of two perspectives containing incompatible information, since one 
proposition expresses a cause, whereas the other expresses only a temporal relation. 
(42) ?? John hates Cecile because she betrayed him, but Emily has hated her since 
the day they met. 
The inconsistency of the propositions need not be caused by lexical antonymy. In 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.1) the following example of semantic opposition was discussed: 
(60) John is tall, but Charlie is fat. 
It was argued that, despite the fact that tall and fat are not antonyms, there are good 
reasons to assume that (60) is a semantic opposition. This shows that the inconsistency 
which an adequate use of but requires is a contextually determined property of semantic 
opposition relations: An adequate use of utterance (60) implies that "being tall" and 
"being fat" cannot be predicated of the same subject. This is the case, for instance, if 
they are interpreted as "is the better candidate", in response to the question "Which of 
the two should we ask for the job, John or Charlie?". 
One may ask what the characteristic properties are of semantic opposition relations, as 
opposed to denials of expectation or concessive oppositions. In principle there are two 
ways in which the requirements of scheme (23) can be met. 
1. There are two entities in the domain of discussion. Both of them are candidates 
to fulfill a certain role in that domain. Conflicting properties are attributed to these 
competing candidates. 
2. There is only one entity in the domain of discussion. Of this entity two conflicting 
aspects are discussed. 
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The first option is taken to be typical of semantic oppositions. (Option 2. will be 
discussed in relation to denials of expectation and concessive oppositions.) Note, first, 
that semantic oppositions are typically used as an answer to WH-questions. 
(61) A: Which of the two should we ask for the job? 
B: John is tall, but Pete is strong. 
WH-questions suggest a choice from a list of minimally two candidates.8 
A second argument for such a characterization of semantic opposition relations is 
that in semantic oppositions the conjuncts do not have an intrinsic argumentative 
opposition, i.e. that they are argumentatively neutral. In (61) the first conjunct of B's 
answer is an argument in favor of asking John, and the second is an argument in favor 
of Pete. As such, these arguments do not conflict. The conflict arises because the 
context allows only one answer to the question. 
It can be shown that these two properties of semantic oppositions relate to scheme 
(23) and the assumption that semantic oppositions are about two entities in the domain 
of discussion. If the Pi's refer to two different entities, as is supposedly the case with 
semantic oppositions, the propositions expressed by the conjuncts cannot be contradic­
tory. For if the two conjuncts have different subjects (are about different entities), then 
there is no possible choice of the predicates that results in contradictory propositions. 
For instance, (61)B can be paraphrased as in (62). 
(62) As for John, he is tall, but as for Pete, he is strong. 
In other words, the properties "being small" and "being tall" are predicated of John 
and Pete, respectively. Because of the different subjects the embedded propositions are 
not contradictory. The contradiction required by condition (23) will have to be derived 
from contextual factors, i.e. the contradiction is indirectly related to the surface 
information: Within the given context the propositions "John is tall" and "Pete is 
small", in themselves neither logically nor semantically contradictory, are incompatible 
due to the way the discourse representation has been organized. In this case the 
context indicates that the choice is limited to John or Pete. Within this context the 
arguments for John and Pete, respectively, are incompatible. 
Note that at a more abstract level the conjuncts in (61)B are interpreted differently. 
As it is they do not constitute an answer to the question in (61)A. Such an answer must 
either specify the person that A and В must ask for the job, or it must indicate the 
impossibility or unwillingness of В to give such a specification. Disregarding the latter, 
an adequate answer to the question must be John, Pete or I don't know. In its 'surface 
form' (61)B does not qualify as such an answer. However, the information in the 
conjuncts of (61)B functions as arguments in favor of a choice for John and Pete, 
respectively, so that at a more abstract level the answer is interpreted as is indicated in 
paraphrase (63). 
β
 It is a property of contrast relations, as yet not explained in the literature, that the list of 
candidates consists of no more than two members. In this respect contrast relations differ from 
such relations as additions: As McCawley (1981, p. 76-81) notes there are good linguistic 
reasons to assume that natural language conjunction can exist of an arbitrary number of 
conjuncts. However, no ftwi-coordination can exist of more than two conjuncts of the same 
syntactic level, although logically there are no reasons why such a relation could not exist. The 
present approach possibly offers a solution: Scheme (23) dictates among others that the 
conjuncts in a contrastive coherence relation present contradictory information. It is not 
possible to find triplets of propositions, of which each pair is contradictory (i.e. P, is contradic­
tory with P2 and Рз, and Pj is contradictory with Pj). 
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(63) There is one argument that the one we must ask for the job is John and 
there is another argument that the one we must ask for the job is Pete. 
Below it will be argued that concessive opposition relations are interpreted similarly. 
This is a first indication that the difference between the types of contrastive coherence 
relations is gradual. In Section 3.7 the same point is stressed. 
One of the claims of the present discussion is, then, that in a semantic opposition 
relation the contrast is more or less explicitly realized: The Pi's and the contrasting 
propositions (or propositional schemes) that according to scheme (23) are required, are 
somehow marked in surface structure. This accounts for the fact that in a semantic 
opposition the conjunction but can be replaced by the more neutral conjunction and: 
Semantic oppositions do not need an explicit marker of the contrastive coherence 
relation to derive the correct interpretation. 
3.5.2 On the structure of denial of expectation relations. 
Whereas in semantic opposition relations both conjuncts are directly related to the 
contrastive structure (23), in denials of expectation only part of the explicit information 
is directly involved in the contrastive interpretation: Tbe proposition that is embedded 
under the PI F, is the proposition expressed by the second conjunct; P2 refers to the 
speaker perspective. Consider the following two examples. 
(64) Elsa says that John does not play basketball, but he does [ play basketball ]. 
(38) John is small, but he plays basketball. 
Apart from some stylistic differences due to word repetition, the two examples differ in 
the presence or absence of an explicit PI in the first conjunct. (64) is a straightforward 
case and can be paraphrased as: 
(64)' Elsa says that John does not play basketball and in reality he does play 
basketball. 
In terms of scheme (23), F, refers to the speaker perspective and therefore the 
proposition -A, related to the second conjunct, is true for the speaker. The proposition 
A, related to the first conjunct, is embedded under the PI Eka says, i.e. is true in Elsa's 
perspective. 
Tbe second conjunct of (38) is in all relevant respects similar to that of (64) and is 
therefore also taken to express that the proposition -A ("John plays basketball") 
obtains in the speaker perspective. This raises the question how proposition A ("John 
does not play basketball") relates to the explicit information in the first conjunct, given 
that the first conjunct does not contain an explicit PI. 
Note, first, that the explicit information expressed by the first conjunct C, (viz. "John 
is small") is true in the speaker perspective. Note furthermore that A cannot be true in 
the speaker perspective, since that would be in conflict with the restriction on consis-
tent perspectives. From this it follows that A cannot presuppositionally or via logical 
entailment be related to C,: If C, is true in the speaker perspective and A is a presup-
position or an entailment of C¡, then A is also true in the speaker perspective. This 
means that A is less strictly related to the explicit information, for instance because it is 
a conversational implicature of C,. Such an implication is taken to be a proposition 
that is not valid in the speaker perspective, but in a perspective representing plausible 
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states of affairs. There must be an implication relation between C, and A. Pj indicates 
a perspective in which the implication "C, =» A" holds: Thus, in a sentence like John is 
going to France, but he will not vmt Paris the implied relation is "It is plausible that if χ 
is going to France χ will visit Paris". 
Hence, (38) can be paraphrased as: 
(38)' It is plausible that John does not play basketball, and in reality he does play 
basketball. 
The main claim of the approach defended here is that only those contrastive coherence 
relations are adequately used which can be represented as structures of the type (23). 
In other words, (23) functions as a restriction on the outcome of the interpretation of 
contrastive coherence relations. It does not specify the exact route by which a reader/-
listener arrives at that interpretation. As a consequence the analysis allows for those 
cases in which the second conjunct plays an important role in indicating which implica­
tion relation is denied. 
Consider by way of demonstration examples (65)-(66). 
(65) John went to see his doctor, but he is not ill. 
(66) John went to see his doctor, but she doesn't like him. 
In (65) the inference needed to satisfy restriction (23) is based on stereotypical 
information ("if someone is going to see his doctor, he is ill"). This is a generally valid 
expectation and a reader/listener may select the correct perspective for storage of the 
implied information after having interpreted only the first conjunct. However, in (66) 
the relevant inference is not predictable on the basis of the first conjunct: The implica­
tion relation ("if someone is going to see a person, that person likes him") has to be 
constructed ad hoc, after interpretation of the second conjunct. 
There is not always one unique way to satisfy restriction (23). (The discussion of other 
possible outcomes of the interpretation process is postponed to Section 3.6.) This 
implies that the label "denial of expectation" is only adequate for a subset of the 
contrastive coherence relations discussed in this section. It does not apply to those 
cases where the first conjunct has an explicit PI (example (64)), and to those cases 
where the relevant inference has to be constructed ad hoc (example (66)). 
Note that in these cases it is hardly possible to add yet, which explicitly marks the 
denial of an expectation, to the second conjunct. This brings us to an account of the 
two distinguishing properties of a denial of expectation, viz. the insertibility of yet in 
the second conjunct and the fact that the conjuncts cannot be reversed without a 
change in meaning.' 
One of the functions of yet is to express an element of surprise: A sentence modified 
by yet expresses a certain event or state of affairs which is true, contrary to what is 
expected on the basis of the preceding context. König and Traugott (1982) relate this 
meaning aspect to the temporal origin of yet. They state that yet carries the presup-
position of a continuation up to an imminent boundary and note that: 
' Since this study deals with global contrastive coherence relations, which, by definition, do 
not include subordinate relations, the possibility of paraphrase by means of a subordinate 
construction is not discussed here. See Jaspers (in preparation) for more details. 
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There is a strong affinity between the notions of "continuation" and "conces­
siveness" (cf. German dennoch, French encore que, Spanish aunque). The asser­
tion that "q continues" given another fact ρ gives rise to the generalized conversa­
tional implicature that this persistence is remarkable or unexpected and that 
therefore ρ and q do not normally go together. This conversational implicature 
later comes to be conventionally associated with the temporal adverb, (p. 178, 
note 4) 
The use of yet therefore presupposes a high degree of dependency between the 
segment containing yet and its preceding context. This dependency is exactly what is 
found in a denial of expectation: The second conjunct bars a possible inference made 
on the basis of the first conjunct. In a semantic opposition the two conjuncts are nearly 
independent, due to the fact that it is about two entities. In the next section we will see 
that in a concessive opposition the dependence relation between the conjuncts is 
weaker than in a denial of expectation, because here the interpretation involves both 
an inference on the basis of the first conjunct and an inference on the basis of the 
second conjunct. 
That the conjuncts of a denial of expectation cannot be reversed without a change in 
meaning, follows from the pragmatic/argumentative function of this type of contrastive 
coherence relation: In a denial of expectation the second conjunct bars a possible 
inference based on the first conjunct. It seems sound to assume that something can 
only be denied if it has been introduced in one way or another in the discourse. 
(Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972, p. 30) discuss a similar principle in their treatment 
of negation: The use of a negation presupposes the presence of its positive counterpart. 
See Horn (1985) for a concise overview of the philosophical history of this idea.) The 
source of the inference barred by a denial of expectation is the first conjunct. The 
denial is given by the second conjunct. Because of the principle just mentioned, this 
order cannot be changed: Reversing the order would mean that first the inference is 
denied and subsequently the source of the inference is given. The point can be made 
clear by the following example: 
(67) The storm blew over the tennis-court. Yet the referee decided to let the 
match go on. 
(68) * Yet the referee decided to let the match go on. The storm blew over the 
tennis-court. 
The presence of yet in the first conjunct of (68) is intended to indicate that this is the 
conjunct in which an expectation is denied. The unacceptability of the example is 
caused by the fact that this expectation is created afterwards. 
The irreversibility of denials of expectation does not mean that for all denials of 
expectation reversal of the order of the conjuncts will lead to an unacceptable result: 
(69) The storm blew over the tennis-court, but/yet the referee decided to let the 
match go on. 
(70) The referee decided to let the match go on, but/yet the storm blew over the 
tennis-court. 
Both for (69) and (70) contexts can be found in which they are acceptable. There is, 
however, an important interpretational difference between the two: In (69) the denied 
expectation is "if a storm blows, then the match will be cancelled", whereas in (70) the 
denied expectation is "if a match goes on, then the weather is good". 
54 CHAPTER 3 
5.5.5 On the structure of concessive opposition relations. 
The concessive opposition relation resembles denial of expectation relations, because 
its conjuncts need not contain overt Pi's. A difference is that it is even more abstract 
than denial of expectation relations: Its interpretation demands making inferences on 
the basis of both conjuncts in the i>M/-coordination. The first conjunct, C,, leads to an 
inference "-R", and the second conjunct, C* leads to an inference "R". Again, there 
are two cases, one with and one without explicit Pi's. The two cases are exemplified in 
(71) and (39), respectively. 
(71) Charlie says that John is dangerous, but Peter says that John is not danger-
ous. 
(39) John is small, but he took karate-lessons. 
Note the resemblance between example (71) and the semantic opposition in (46). The 
structure of (71) and the difference with (46) is discussed below. 
What is the structure of (39)? What is the relation between A (or -A) and the 
explicit information in the conjuncts, given that the conjuncts do not contain overt Pi's? 
Since but is truth-conditionally equivalent to ami, the two conjuncts C, and C2 are true 
in the speaker perspective. From this it follows that A and -A cannot be entailments or 
presuppositions of C, and Cj. This leaves open the possibility that C, and C2 lead to 
conflicting inferences, i.e. on the basis of John is small it is inferred that "it is plausible 
that John is not dangerous" and on the basis of he took karate-lessons it is inferred that 
"it is plausible that John is dangerous". In other words, it is assumed that the explicit 
information is related to the underlying propositions via implication relations that exist 
in perspectives representing plausible states of affairs. 
That assumption explains why at the level where the contrast exists (39) can be 
paraphrased as (39)'. 
(39)' It is plausible that John is not dangerous and it is plausible that John is 
dangerous. 
This paraphrase does not capture the fact that the relationship in a concessive opposi-
tion relation between the explicit and implicit information is of an argumentative 
nature (C, and C2 function as arguments for -A and A), rather than, say, expectations. 
There is no adequate explanation for this fact. The fact that the two conjuncts are 
conjoined indicates that they are related in one way or another. Since there is no 
inherent relationship between C, and C^ the only way to relate the two conjuncts is by 
assuming a tertium comparationis (TC) that must be present in the context. There seem 
to be no a priori reasons to exclude other than argumentative relationships. Not all 
relationships involving a TC are argumentative (all transitive relations involve a TC), 
nor do all argumentative relations involve a TC (cf. the standard syllogism). 
The Asymmetry Hypothesis indicates that the proposition embedded under the PI of 
the second conjunct percolates to the higher perspective. 
It would seem that, speaking on a general level, denials of expectation and concessive 
oppositions complement semantic oppositions as to the way in which the requirements 
of scheme (23) can be met, i.e. that in these types of constructions two conflicting 
aspects of one entity in the domain of discussion are mentioned. Note, for instance, 
that denials of expectation and concessive oppositions typically are replies to Yes-No-
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questions. (Above it was claimed that semantic oppositions typically respond to WH-
questions.) 
(72) A: Does John play basketball? 
B: He is small, but he plays basketball. 
(73) A: Is John dangerous? 
B: He is small, but he took karate-lessons. 
Note furthermore that in denials of expectation and concessive oppositions the 
conjuncts have an intrinsic argumentative opposition: The first conjunct of B's reply is 
an argument against an answer "yes", and the second conjunct is an argument in favor 
of an answer "yes". (By contrast, the conjuncts in a semantic opposition are neutral in 
this respect.) illese two properties can be explained by assuming that the Pi's of denial 
of expectation and concessive opposition relations correspond to the two conflicting 
aspects of the one entity in the domain of discussion. 
For if in a denial of expectation or a concessive opposition the Pi's of the two 
conjuncts refer to two aspects of one entity in the domain of discussion, the proposi-
tions A and vl have to have an intrinsic opposition in order to be contradictory: Two 
propositions with the same subject can only be contradictory if the predicates in the 
propositions are contradictory (i.e. if A = D(j) and -A = ~D(j)). Any other choice for 
the two predicates would not result in contradictory propositions. Thus, in the case of 
example (73)B j stands for John, -D stands for "being not dangerous" and D stands for 
"being dangerous". 
Should the opposing argumentative tendencies not be clear from the predicates used 
in the 'surface structure' of a denial of expectation or concessive opposition, as in (74), 
then the predicate whose argumentative tendency is unclear will be reinterpreted, 
relative to the context, in accordance with scheme (23). 
(74) A: Is John dangerous? 
B: He is small, but he lives in The Hague. 
Assuming that being small is a clear argument against being dangerous, to live in The 
Hague will be interpreted as though it was an argument in favor of being dangerous. 
This property of contextual reinterpretation of 'neutral' arguments has been inves-
tigated in an experiment examining the effect of but on the interpretation of concessive 
opposition relations. This experiment is discussed in Chapter 4. 
At this point it is possible to account for the difference between (46) and (71), 
repeated here. 
(46) JOHN says that Cecile's a BORE, but CHARLES says that she's ADORABLE. 
(71) - Charlie says that John is dangerous, but Peter says that John is not dangerous. 
(46) is an example of a semantic opposition, (71) was presented as an example of 
concessive opposition. Despite the surface similarities between the two examples, there 
is a difference, namely the relation with the context: (46) relates to a context like 
"Who is right, John or Charles?". (71) relates to a context like "Should we ask John to 
join our team?". Thus, adequate paraphrases of these examples would be: 
(46)' It is plausible that John is right and it is plausible that Charles is right. 
(71)' It is plausible that we must not ask John and it is plausible that we must ask 
John. 
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Henceforth these differences between semantic oppositions on the one hand and 
concessive oppositions and denials of expectation on the other will be referred to as: 
Semantic oppositions are about two entities in the domain of discussion, and denials of 
expectation and concessive oppositions are about one entity in the domain of discus-
sion. 
This analysis offers an account for the fact that but cannot be replaced by and in denial 
of expectation and concessive opposition relations without a change in meaning, cf. B's 
answer to A's question in (75) and (76). 
(75) A: Does John play basketball? 
B: ??He is small and he plays basketball. 
(76) A: Is John dangerous? 
B: ??He is small and he took karate-lessons. 
The conjunction and has little semantic function, best described, probably, as additive: 
Its use presupposes the truth of the conjuncts and what Lakoff (1971) calls a common 
topic. Because the conjuncts in a denial of expectation or concessive opposition are 
'about' one entity, they are interpreted as a complex predicate, applied to that entity, if 
they are conjoined by and: The coordination of the predicates D and E applied to a 
constant;", i.e. D(j) AND E(j), will be interpreted as a complex predicate D AND E (j). 
As Osgood and Richards (1973) point out on the basis of experimental data, such a 
complex predicate will have one single argumentative tendency (or polarity, in their 
terminology). It is extremely hard to interpret tall, handsome and 18 years old in (77) as 
having different polarities: Due to the unambiguous handsome (which for most people 
has a positive 'polarity'), the other predicates are also interpreted as positive: 
(77) Peter is tall and handsome and 18 years old. 
But this coinciding tendency or polarity is in conflict with what is requested by a denial 
of expectation or concessive opposition: In these types of contrastive coherence 
relations the conjuncts have an intrinsic opposition, due to the fact that they are about 
one entity. That is to say, the restrictions on a complex predicate are in conflict with 
the restrictions on a denial of expectation or concessive opposition. As a consequence, 
denials of expectation and concessive oppositions cannot occur with and. 
The situation is quite different with semantic oppositions: Here the two conjuncts 
are about two different entities and have two distinct subjects. Therefore, coordination 
with and will not lead to the formation of a complex predicate, i.e. DQ') AND E(k) will 
not be reducible to a form in which D AND E predicates over one and the same 
constant, and no restrictions are posed on the polarity of the conjuncts10. 
The final property of concessive oppositions to be discussed in this section is the inser-
tibility of concessive elements like it is true or its Dutch equivalent weliswaar in the first 
conjunct of a concessive opposition. The discussion is restricted to the Dutch cases. 
Clauses containing weliswaar cannot occur in isolation. They invariably end with high 
pitch and rising intonation and are continued by a clause starting with maar (but). That 
is, there is a high degree of dependency between a weliswaar-clause and its maar-
continuation. 
10
 To say that in a semantic opposition but is replaceable by and is not to say that there are 
no interpretational differences between a semantic opposition with but and one with and: The 
Asymmetry Hypothesis claims that there is such a difference. 
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A first approximation of the literal meaning of weliswaar is that it signals the truth 
of the conjunct that it modifies. On the assumption that maar marks and cancels 
inconsistency these observations suggest that the literal meaning of weliswaar must be 
described as: "accept the truth of the conjunct modified by weliswaar and nothing more, 
since that would lead to inconsistency".11 Since an utterance as a rule is not only used 
to convey the explicit information, but also the implicit information that by default is 
attached to it, one can say that weliswaar functions to cancel default interpretations, 
thus weakening the assertion made through the utterance. 
Given this description of the semantics of weliswaar and given the observation that 
we/ùvvaor-clauses never occur in isolation, one can assume that the relevant type of 
inconsistency is of a special type, notably an inconsistency caused by directly relating 
the propositions underlying the two clauses, i.e. by relating two contradictory proposi-
tions. 
Should this analysis be valid, there is an explanation for the fact that a concessive 
opposition is a natural environment for the occurrence of weliswaar. Above we saw that 
the interpretation of concessive oppositions involves the derivation of contradictory 
propositions.12 
By contrast, a semantic opposition is not a natural context for weliswaar to occur. 
Here the union of the two conjuncts does not directly lead to an inconsistency (does 
not involve a contradiction between the conjuncts): The first conjunct of a semantic 
opposition gives rise to an inference D(j) and the second gives rise to an inference 
E(k), and percolation of these two inferences does not create an inconsistent set of 
propositions. The inconsistency only arises by assuming an additional premise, viz. that 
a choice for j is equivalent to a choice against k. 
There seems to be another context suited for the occurrence of welùwaar, viz. the 
denial of expectation, for a denial of expectation is about one entity, and the possible 
inference based upon the first conjunct contradicts the information expressed by the 
second conjunct. Nevertheless, denials of expectation containing weliswaar are some-
what deviant. 
(78) A: Wist jij dat Jan basketbal speelt? 
В: ? Ja, gek hè, hij is weliswaar klein, maar hij speelt basketbal. 
(A: Did you know that John plays basketball? 
B: ? Yes, it is odd, isn't it, he is small, it is true, but he plays basketball.) 
A possible explanation of this fact might be that weliswaar is an operative marker (of 
the type discussed in Section 1.1), i.e. an element that does not contribute to the 
11
 One might be inclined to derive this meaning aspect of clauses containing weliswaar from 
the Gricean maxim of quantity: "make your contribution as informative as and not more 
informative than necessary". Thus, this meaning aspect would be a conversational implicature 
of the use of weliswaar. By explicitly stating the truth of a clause one implicitly indicates 
nothing but the truth of the clause. This suggestion is, however, untenable, as the meaning 
aspect of weliswaar lacks a property specific to conversational implicatures: It cannot be 
cancelled. 
Most likely the semantic description of weliswaar must be extended in the sense that a 
clause weliswaar ρ can only be adequately used if "p" is an instantiation of a previous part of 
the discourse, i.e. if "p" is treated as old information. 
12
 The (more or less) obligatory presence of but/maar in a concessive opposition (cf. 
example (76)) indicates that in a concessive opposition it is the proposition related to the 
second conjunct which percolates to the speaker-domain. This is in accordance with the 
semantics of weliswaar. 
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prepositional content of the utterance, and primarily has an argumentative function. I 
assume that denials of expectation do not typically have an argumentative function, and 
are primarily used descriptively: There is no position that is defended in a denial of 
expectation like I pressed the button, but the light didn't go on. 
There is a discrepancy between the Pi's usually found in semantic oppositions on the 
one hand and the ones found in concessive oppositions and denials of expectation on 
the other: Pi's in semantic oppositions are predominantly elements that are explicitly 
present in surface structure, whereas Pi's in the other two types of constructions in 
general refer to plausible states of affairs and remain implicit. It might be argued that 
the differences between these Pi's are so large that it is an illusion to consider the 
analysis presented so far as a more or less unified account of the three types of but-
coordinations. 
However, recall that there are semantic oppositions in which the Pi's refer to 
plausible states of affairs (cf. paraphrase (63), repeated here), and denials of expecta-
tion and concessive oppositions in which the Pi's are explicitly present in surface 
structure (cf. example (71), repeated here). 
(63) There is one argument that the one we must ask for the job is John and 
there is another argument that the one we must ask for the job is Pete. 
(71) Charlie says that John plays basketball, but Peter says that John does not 
play basketball. 
It seems, then, that none of the Pi's is specific to any of the three types of but-coor-
dinations. 
What is the exact nature of the differences between these Pi's? A somewhat 
speculative answer is that explicit Pi's refer to locutionary or semantic meaning, 
whereas plausibility indicators refer to illocutionary or pragmatic meaning. An argu-
ment in favor of such a view is that once the contrastive structure of for instance a 
denial of expectation is made explicit (becomes part of the semantic content), it has 
the properties of a semantic opposition: The conjuncts can be inverted, but can be 
replaced by and and a vWii/e-paraphrase is possible (see example (79)). However, these 
issues are left for future research (see also Spooren and Jaspers, 1988). 
(79) I came in, but the lights were out. 
(79)' (While) it is expected that the lights were on, (but/and) in reality the lights 
were out. 
3.6 Restrictions on BUT-coordinations 
The basic idea behind the analysis of contrastive coherence relations in the previous 
paragraphs is that the three types of contrastive buí-coordinations, semantic opposition, 
concessive opposition, and denial of expectation, exhaust the possibilities that Hypothe-
ses I and II leave for acceptable ¿>ui-coordinations. That is, apart from these restrictions 
no other conditions have to be formulated to account for the restrictions on but-
coordinations.13 
To emphasize this point, note that there are ¿ui-coordinations that are more or less 
explicit (i.e. that involve no inferences to satisfy restriction (23)), viz. semantic opposi-
13
 No claims are made about the applicability of the analysis to the ftMfs-coordinations (Not 
John, but Bill is ill), briefly discussed in Chapter 2. For a discussion of these constructions in 
the present framework see Jaspers (in preparation) and Jaspers and Spooren (1988). 
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tions, buf-coordinations that involve inferences on the basis of both conjuncts, viz. 
concessive oppositions, and ¿>u/-coordinations that involve inferences on the basis of 
only the first conjunct, viz. denials of expectation. There are no ¿uf-coordinations that 
involve inferences on the basis of only the second conjunct. In other words there are no 
buf-coordinations that have a structure à la (80). 
(80) In reality A, but it is plausible that -A. 
The analysis presented so far gives an account for this gap in the set of í>Mí-coordina-
tions. Hypothesis II dictates that it is the proposition embedded in the second perspec-
tive that percolates to the speaker perspective, i.e. -A. However, on the basis of the 
first conjunct it is clear that the speaker perspective contains the proposition A. 
Therefore, any such construction would result in an inconsistent perspective. 
The subject of this section is the distribution of but/maar and the way it is accounted 
for by the present analysis. Basic to the discussion are the restrictions that were 
encountered in the review of the literature in Chapter 2: 
1. The conjuncts cannot be identical. 
2. The conjuncts cannot be contradictory. 
3. The conjuncts cannot entertain a relation of semantic inclusion. 
4. The conjuncts must contrast to a certain degree. 
3.6.1 Semantic identity and contradiction of the conjuncts. 
The restriction that bars identical and contradictory conjuncts (exemplified in (81) and 
(82), respectively) reflects very general conditions on coordinated material. 
(81) ?? John is rich, but he is rich. 
(82) ?? John is rich, but he is not rich. 
Example (81) is excluded because of the uninformativeness of the conjuncts, whereas 
(82) is excluded because its interpretation results in an inconsistent perspective.14 
According to the approach presented here, fcu/-coordinations can receive different 
interpretations, depending on the way restriction (23) is satisfied. What interpretation is 
constructed depends, among other things, on the context. Take (82) as an example. If 
(82) is treated as a semantic opposition (this reading is arrived at by stressing John/he 
and rich I not rich), then it can be paraphrased as in (82)a. This paraphrase is not in 
accordance with (23) because the Pi's involved indicate identical perspectives. 
(82)a As to John, he is rich, and as to John, he is not rich. 
However, if (82) is interpreted as a denial of expectation, then it can be paraphrased as 
in (82)b, which is perfectly in accordance with (23). 
(82)b It is plausible that John is rich, and in reality John is not rich. 
That is, in this reading (82) is 'procedurally' well-formed - an adequate contrastive 
structure can be derived on the basis of the explicit information - and only semantical-
14
 With respect to (81) and (82) only those interpretations are considered in which John 
and he are coreferential and the predicate "be rich" has the same meaning in both conjuncts. 
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ly deviant - the explicit information itself is contradictory. This may account for the 
inclination to reinterpret the aMoug/z-paraphrase of (82), which strains the denial of 
expectation reading, in such a manner that "be rich" refers to different properties in 
the two conjuncts (e.g. be rich financially, but poor socially). 
(83) Although John is rich, he is not rich. 
For the semantic opposition reading, which is both semantically and procedurally 
deviant, there is no such inclination. 
The analysis makes an interesting prediction regarding the interpretation of utterances 
of the type in (84). 
(84) John is tall, but Bill too. 
If (84) is taken as a semantic opposition (for example, as a response to the question in 
(85)), it should have (84)a as a paraphrase. If it is interpreted as a concessive opposi­
tion (for instance, as an argument against someone's claim in (86)), it can be para­
phrased as in (84)b. 
(85) Who is the best candidate, John or Bill? 
(86) John is the only candidate suited for the job. 
(84)a As to John, he is tall, and as to Bill he is tall [, too]. 
(84)b It is plausible that John is the only one suited for the job, and it is plausible 
that John is not the only one suited for the job. 
Note that (84)a is not in accordance with restriction (23). Note furthermore that it is 
not an adequate paraphrase of (84). That is, the analysis correctly predicts that (84) is 
not acceptable as a semantic opposition. 
3.6.2 Semantic inclusion of the conjuncts. 
Another restriction on the bui-distribution bars the semantic inclusion of the conjuncts. 
(87) ?? Dodo is an animal, but it is a cat. 
(88) ?? Dodo is a cat, but it is an animal. 
Note, first, that there are perfectly well-formed readings for these examples if they are 
taken to be concessive opposition constructions. Thus, suppose participant A claims 
that he hates animals and В objects that A loves her, B's, cat Dodo. In such a context 
A could utter (87). This reading of (87) would be represented as in (87)a. 
(87)a It is plausible that I hate Dodo and it is plausible that I do not hate Dodo. 
In the denial of expectation reading (87) receives a representation like: 
(87)b It is plausible that Dodo is not a cat and in reality Dodo is a cat. 
Thus (87) is acceptable in the denial of expectation reading if a context can be 
constructed in which "not being a cat" is a plausible inference of "being an animal". 
Such contexts are somewhat hard to find, but consider the situation in which someone 
claims that cats are extinct, so that if you see an animal it is not a cat. In such a 
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situation (87) can be uttered as a denial of expectation, i.e. as synonymous to the 
o/fnougA-paraphrase in (89). 
(89) (You're wrong.) Although Dodo is an animal, it is a cat. 
In sum, the ban on semantic inclusion relations is valid in case of default interpreta-
tions, but it can be overruled by contextual conditions. This shows that ¿wi-coordina-
tions are very different from disjunctions with or15 The latter obey the True Alterna-
tives Condition' (Seuren, 1985, p. 335), which dictates that the disjuncts in an οτ-
construction must be true alternatives, i.e. one disjunct cannot entail the other, as 
shown in examples (90). 
(90)a * My children have come or my family. 
(90)b * Either John is London or he is in England. 
The considerations presented here show that the present approach can deal with the 
contextual dependency of conjunct relationships in ¿Mi-coordinations. 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that 'expectation' is not a very adequate term for the kind of 
inference bridging the contents of the two conjuncts in a denial of expectation. This 
inference is often constructed ad hoc, depending on the context. This aspect of denials 
of expectation is often employed in ironic uses of fcuf-coordinations. A Dutch example 
is (91), by Multatuli (Ideen, I, 41). 
(91) Ik leg me toe op 't schrijven van levend Hollands. Maar ik heb school-
gegaan. 
I aim at writing living Dutch. But I went to school. 
A paraphrase of (91) in its denial of expectation reading is (92): 
(92) It is plausible that I didn't go to school, and in reality I went to school. 
That is, the first conjunct (ƒ aim at writing living Dutch) must give rise to the expecta-
tion "I didn't go to school". Let ρ stand for "I aim at writing living Dutch" and -q for 
"I did not go to school". Then, in the notation of Abraham (1979) (cf. Section 2.4), this 
expectation could be expressed as Us(p » -q), which is logically equivalent to Us(^(p & 
q)). The ironic interpretation is created by the fact that for most people the opposite 
relation holds (viz. that aiming at writing living Dutch co-occurs with going to school, 
or Us(p ά q)). 
The point is that (91) is interpreted as ironical, rather than unacceptable. This shows 
the .reality of the intermediate inference Us(p =» -q). And since this is not an 
established 'expectation', cases like these indicate that the bridging inferences can be 
created ad hoc, and speakers must be aware of the capability of hearers to create these 
inferences. This, then, is a case in which, according to Blakemore (1987, p. 32), "shared 
knowledge is a result of, rather than a prerequisite for, successful communication" 
[emphasis added]. 
There are also cases in which the intermediate inference is dependent on jargon. As 
a consequence someone not familiar with the subject will not be able to draw the 
relevant inference. An example is (93), error message # 14692 from the SPSSx 
program. 
1 31 owe this observation to P. Seuren. 
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(93) You specified that the data are unconditional, but there is only one input 
matrix. 
Even though most people will not succeed in establishing the relevant link, the 
resulting interpretation will not be that (93) is unacceptable, but that apparently there 
is some relationship between unconditional data and the number of input matrices, to 
the effect that as a rule unconditional data imply the specification of multiple input 
matrices. In this case, then, the coherence relation leads to an extension of the 
knowledge base. 
There is a complete class of ÒM/-coordinations in which the restriction on semantic 
inclusion relations between the conjuncts is apparently violated. An example is (94). 
(94) John likes football, but (then) all Brits like football. 
The information in the first conjunct is entailed by the information in the second 
conjunct. If (94) is interpreted as a semantic opposition it should be paraphraseable by 
(95). 
(95) As to John, he likes football, and as to all Brits, they like football. 
This representation is excluded for two reasons. The first is that the Pi's do not refer 
to different classes (John belongs to the set denoted by all Brits). The second is that the 
embedded propositional schemes are not contradictory. 
An interpretation of (95) as a denial of expectation is not very likely either, since it 
would require an inference from John likes football to "it is not the case that all Brits 
like football". 
This leaves an interpretation as a concessive opposition. And indeed there are 
plausible inferential links between the explicit information in the conjuncts and the 
intended contrast, if "informativeness" is taken to be the relevant issue. The informa-
tion in the first conjunct must then be taken to be an argument in favor of the 
informativeness of uttering John likes football, whereas the second conjunct is inter-
preted as an argument against that informativeness. That is, representation (96) is an 
acceptable interpretation of (94). 
(96) It is plausible that uttering "John likes football" is informative, and it is 
plausible that uttering "John likes football" is not informative. 
3.6.3 Contrast between the conjuncts. 
Another restriction encountered in Chapter 2 is that the conjuncts must contrast to a 
certain degree. 
(97) John is a nice guy, but he teases his sister. 
(98) ?? John is a tall guy, but he teases his sister. 
The explanation of this restriction is straightforward. If (97)-(98) are to be interpreted 
as denials of expectation, then they should receive an interpretation like in (99). 
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(99) It is plausible that John doesn't tease his sister, and in reality he teases his 
sister. 
That is, in both cases there should be a link from the information in the first conjunct 
to "John doesn't tease his sister". It is obvious that such a link is much more plausible 
in case of (97) than in case of (98). "If you are a nice guy you don't tease your sister" 
is - out of context - a more plausible rule than "if you are a tall guy you don't tease 
your sister", because nice and tease are somehow related, either through their lexical 
meaning or, anyway, through common encyclopedic knowledge. But, as in the previous 
cases, contexts can be constructed that make the latter rule more plausible. If, for 
instance, someone has just made the observation that all the tall guys in the class are 
also nice guys, then (98) is a perfectly acceptable reaction. 
Saeb0 (1988) discusses examples like (lOO)-(lOl) in which the conjunct introduced by 
but seems to reinforce rather than contrast with the information in the first conjunct. 
(100) Maggie ate some, but not all, of the cheddar. 
(101) The meal was warm, but not hot. 
In these examples the bu/-clause seems to asserts a so-called scalar implicature 
(Gazdar, 1979; Levinson, 1983) of the first clause. It seems therefore that these are 
counterexamples to the claim that but is a marker of cancellation. However, note first 
that these are special cases: But does not as a rule assert implicatures, viz. (102) where 
the implicature "you can get fuel there" is cancelled. 
(102)A: I'm out of fuel. 
B: There's a garage around the comer, but you cannot get any fuel there. 
Furthermore, in none of the other uses of but discussed in this and the previous 
chapter a confirmation function of but was encountered. This strongly suggests that 
what is at issue in examples like (100) is not the (scalar) implicature of the first 
conjunct, but something else. 
(103) seems to be a natural context for an example like (100). 
(103) Johnny dislikes cheddar. His mother, however, wants him to eat his daily 
portion, because she thinks it's good for him. Johnny's sister, Maggy, is fond 
of cheddar, and Johnny hopes that she ate all of it. However, Maggie ate 
[may have eaten] some, but not all, of the cheddar. 
In such a context the first conjunct of the büí-coordination leaves open the possibility 
that (i.e. functions as an argument in favor of) "Maggie ate all of the cheddar". The 
second conjunct functions as an argument against that claim. In other words, (100) it is 
a standard case of concessive opposition. The scalar implicature is not involved in the 
contrast. The same holds for an example like (101): The first conjunct indicates that 
anything less than warm on the scale does not apply and leaves therefore room for 
anything up the scale, i.e. the conjunct is an argument in favor "The meal was hot", the 
second conjunct is an argument against such a claim.1' In short, it seems that even in 
these cases but performs a cancelling function. 
16
 This is basically the analysis of Anscombre and Ducrot (1977). See Jaspers and Spooren 
(1988) for more details. 
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3.7 Apparent counterexamples 
Since the relevant condition (23) can be fairly abstractly related to the surface realiza-
tion of the constructions under discussion one may expect that the linguistic regularities 
mentioned before are tendencies rather than rules. Thus there are cases in which 
semantic oppositions are answers to non-WH-questions. 
(104)A: Do all trees have the same color? 
B: No, oaks and firs are green, but some beeches are red. 
In (104) the relevant predicate "to have a certain color" is more general than, for 
instance, "to be green" (the latter entails the former). In a certain sense, then, A's 
question brings more than one property into the discussion. There are clear indications 
that B's answer is a semantic opposition: But can be replaced by and (cf. (105)), and it 
is true cannot be inserted in the first conjunct (cf. (106)). 
(105)A: Do all trees have the same color? 
B: No, oaks and firs are green and some beeches are red. 
(106)A: Do all trees have the same color? 
B: ??No, oaks and firs are green, it is true, but some beeches are red. 
That the presence of the 'general' predicate is relevant to the occurrence of semantic 
oppositions as answers to non-WH-questions can be seen from (107), in which the 
'general' predicate is replaced by a more 'concrete' predicate. In that case a concessive 
opposition is the appropriate answer: 
(107) A: Are all trees green? 
B: No, oaks and firs are green, it is true, but (??and) some beeches are red. 
Other indications of the difference between (104) and (107) are the different phonolo-
gical properties (cf. Chafe, 1976; Bing, 1983): In (104) both oaL· and firs/beeches and 
geen J red receive contrastive stress. In (107) only oaks and firs ¡beeches receives 
contrastive stress, and green receives high pitch and rising intonation. The latter is 
typical of a concessive opposition. 
Another deviation from the 'rule' is that there are cases in which the conjuncts of a 
concessive opposition do not have the same grammatical subject: 
(108)A: Shall we rent this room? 
B: The price is high, but the view is beautiful. 
B's answer in (108) will be interpreted as "the room's price is high, but the room's view 
is beautiful", which indicates that, although the conjuncts have different grammatical 
subjects, they are nevertheless 'about' one and the same entity, the room. 
Yet another apparent problem is the phenomenon that there are fcuf-coordinations that 
superficially resemble semantic oppositions, whereas at a closer view they turn out to 
be concessive oppositions. 
(109) A: We need a tennis-partner. Must we ask Bill to play with us? 
B: Bill has a good forehand, but John's defense is unbeatable. 
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B's answer superficially resembles a semantic opposition. It seems to be about two 
entities (Bill and John) and the arguments do not have conflicting argumentative 
tendencies. Nevertheless, B's answer is a concessive opposition: One can add it is true 
to the first conjunct, the answer responds to a Yes-No-question, and but cannot be 
replaced by and. 
A closer look shows that the two conjuncts do have conflicting argumentative 
tendencies, and that the entire construction is about one entity: The first conjunct is an 
argument in favor of asking Bill and the second conjunct is an argument against asking 
Bill. Given that paraphrase (110) of (109)B is perfectly in agreement with scheme (23), 
(109)B is not in conflict with the analysis. 
(110) It is plausible that we must ask Bill to play with us and it is plausible that 
we mustn't ask Bill to play with us. 
It seems, then, that Hypotheses I and II can account for a variety of fcuf-coordinations 
without any additional conditions. However, many problems remain unsolved. A 
problem that has not been discussed so far is how the intermediate inferences come 
about that are needed to construct a representation that satisfies scheme (23). Another 
problem is why scheme (23) is the way it is. I do not have any definite answers to these 
questions, but I can, and shall now, present some speculative thoughts about them. 
Various types of inferences are needed in order to assign a structure corresponding 
to (23) to all types of fcui-coordinations. Several of these types have been encountered. 
In some cases the relevant inferences were conversational imphcatures. An example of 
this was (94), repeated here, where the maxim of relevance was at issue. 
(94) John likes football, but (then) all Brits like football. 
However, the conversational maxims cannot always account for the inferences needed. 
World knowledge, organized in scripts or frames, is frequently employed. This is the 
case in an example like (111): Part of our world knowledge is that going to church 
probably means that the vicar is in the church. 
( I l l ) I went to church, but the vicar wasn't there. 
However, pairs like (112) indicate that mechanisms are needed that are capable of 
constructing the inferences rather than picking them from a pile of 'expectations'. 
(112)a I pressed the button, but the alarm went off. 
(112)b I pressed the button, but the alarm didn't go off. 
At this moment the mechanisms underlying inference processes are but little under-
stood. A guiding principle seems to be that in general hearers make the minimum of 
assumptions that result in a coherent discourse representation. In the case of contras-
tive coherence relations this means representations conforming to (23). Often this will 
be done by means of what Seuren (1985) calls post hoc or backward suppletion. Thus, 
if, at a given moment, hearers note that they can only come to a coherent discourse 
representation by making a certain assumption with respect to previously given 
information, they will add this assumption to the discourse representation. 
The final problem to be discussed in this section concerns scheme (23), which, by 
hypothesis, is basic to the contrastive coherence relations discussed in this chapter. The 
theory as it stands assumes that whenever a structure like (23) can be derived for a 
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certain construction, one is dealing with an acceptable contrastive coherence relation. 
The structure does not specify any relation between the Pi's P1 and P2. From this it 
follows that any pair of Pi's will do. However, this is clearly not the case: The two Pi's 
must be members of the same semantic class, as can be seen from the unacceptability 
of example (113). 
(113) ?? Picasso's Guernica is big, but an ion is small. 
Abraham (1979) suggests a solution to this problem. This solution is cast in a frame-
work that differs somewhat from the one presented here. He assumes that there is only 
a gradual difference between semantic oppositions and concessive oppositions and he 
therefore proposes that the interpretation of a semantic opposition, like the interpreta-
tion of concessive oppositions, involves finding a tertium comparationL· with respect to 
which the conjuncts contrast. Thus (37), repeated here, is interpreted with respect to 
the proposition "it was expected that both John and Pete are tall". 
(37) John is tall, but Pete is small. 
The class-relatedness of the Pi's is thus guaranteed, since the tertium comparationL· can 
only be derived if there is, among others, a class to which both John and Pete belong. 
Note, however, that this solution applies only to those cases in which the contrastive 
construction disjungates two propositions that were conjugated in the context. It does 
not apply to cases in which (37) relates to a context like "Which of the two should we 
pick for the job?". In fact, the tests given previously suggest that the cases for which 
Abraham's solution works are not really semantic oppositions, but concessive opposi-
tions. Indications for such a claim are that one can add clause final it L· true to the first 
conjunct, that it ends with rising intonation and high pitch, and that but cannot be 
replaced by and in (37)': 
(37)' A: John and Pete are both tall. 
B: John is tall, but Pete is small. 
Semantic oppositions do not function as disjungations of conjugated propositions, and 
therefore it remains unclear what the tertium comparationis would be in their case. 
The conclusion is that there is as yet no account of the class-relatedness of all of the 
Pi's that can occur in structure (23). It seems inevitable, then, to stipulate that there is 
such a class-relatedness. 
3.8 Discourse perspectives and intensionality 
In recently developed theories of discourse semantics, notions like discourse domains, 
mental spaces and files are pivotal. At first sight these notions bear much resemblance 
with the notion discourse perspective as it has been used throughout this chapter. In 
this section some of the resemblances as well as the differences between the notions 
will be discussed. 
Over the last decades much attention has been paid, both in logic and in semantic 
theory, to the so-called opacity phenomena, created by the use of modal and/or 
attitudinal predicates, such as verbs of saying, hoping, believing etc. (see Quine, 1960, 
p. 141-156). It has been known for a long time now that these elements can block 
substitution salva ventate and/or existential entailments ("generalizations"). Verbs like 
think establish opaque contexts, for the premises in (114)a and (114)b do not automa-
tically warrant the conclusion in (114)c. Furthermore, whereas the truth of (115)a 
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implies the truth of (115)c, one cannot infer the truth of (115)c from the truth of 
(115)b. 
(114)a David Banner is the Hulk. 
(114)b Jack thinks that David Banner is dead. 
(114)c Jack thinks that the Hulk is dead. 
(115)a Edward kicks the Hulk. 
(llS)b Jack thinks that Edward kicks the Hulk. 
(115)c The Hulk exists. 
Thus, given the truth of (H4)a, an example like (114)c is ambiguous between a reading 
that is synonymous to (114)b and a reading that is not. 
In the last decade these and similar phenomena have been treated within a framework 
known as incremental or discourse semantics. Authors like Bosch (1983), Fauconnier 
(1985), Heim (1982), Kamp (1981), Kamp and Rohrer (1983), Koene (1984), Van der 
Sandt (1982), and Seuren (1985) have made elegant proposals for the analysis of some 
of the most acute problems in semantic theory, such as context dependency of truth 
conditions and presupposition projection, anaphora interpretation, and scope am-
biguities. In this framework the opacity/transparency ambiguity of, for instance, (114)c 
is not caused by an ambiguous semantic representation, it is a result of the way the 
semantic representation is related to the current knowledge of the recipient. Which 
reading of (114)c is computed depends on the context in which the sentence occurs. 
In order to substantiate these claims, interpretive systems have been developed in 
which linguistic expressions are evaluated with respect to cognitive representations. 
Fauconnier (1985), for instance, introduces the notion 'mental space'. Mental spaces 
contain the information expressed by a discourse. They correspond closely to what 
Seuren (1985) calls 'discourse domains', 
cognitive Svorking spaces' set up for the specific purpose of interpreting successive 
utterances (Seuren, 1985, p. 314). 
Mental spaces are the mental images that are created on the basis of verbal or non-
verbal input. 
Linguistic expressions are considered to be instructions for updating the mental 
spaces. Indefinite noun phrases typically set up new elements in a mental space, 
whereas definite noun phrases and proper names typically refer to elements that are 
already present in a mental space. Some elements, like sentential adverbs (probably) 
and Vorld creating' verbs (say, think), are instructions to set up a new mental space. A 
mental space is always set up subordinate to a 'parent space'. The outermost mental 
space is that of the speaker's reality. 
Fauconnier formulates a principle which defines the relations that elements from 
different mental spaces can entertain. This identification principle states that if two 
objects are linked (for instance, via a relation of physical resemblance), then a 
description of the one may be used to identify the other. Thus the principle accounts 
for the fact that one can point at a picture of a python and say: 
(116) That animal is found in India. 
The referent of that animal is a picture. The description that animal is used to identify 
a species of living creatures. The relation that allows this indirect identification is the 
'image' relation: the relation between an object and its image. Because of the iden-
tification principle an element in one space may have a counterpart in another space. 
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With these mechanisms it is possible to account for, for example, the 'de dicto'-'de 
re' ambiguity of (117). 
(117) John says that he bought a house. 
There are (at least) two ways to arrive at an interpretation of (117). In the first case 
the phrase a house sets up an element in the mental space corresponding to John's 
sayings and this element has the property that John bought it (the 'de dicto' reading), 
in the other case a house sets up an element in the parent space corresponding to the 
speaker's reality, and this element has a counterpart in the space corresponding to 
John's sayings (the 'de re' reading). The first reading can be made explicit by a 
continuation of (117) with but in reality it is a pigsty, the second reading is elicited with 
a continuation like although he thinks it L· a pigsty. 
Seuren's (1985) criteria of what elements set up discourse domains exclude some of the 
elements that Fauconnier (1985) assumes to create mental spaces. For instance, 
Fauconnier assumes that preposed temporal and locational phrases belong to that class. 
However, these elements allow for substitution salva ventate: (118)c is a valid inference 
of the premises in (118)a and (118)b. Furthermore, they do not block existential entail-
ments: Whoever commits himself to the truth of (119)a commits himself also to the 
truth of (119)b. Therefore they do not create intensional contexts. 
(118)a David Banner is the Hulk. 
(118)b In 1979 David Banner died. 
(118)c In 1979 the Hulk died. 
(119)a In 1979 Edward kicked the Hulk. 
(119)b (In 1979) the Hulk existed. 
The explanation seems straightforward: An established identity relation obtains, 
irrespective of the time of reference. 
Both the phrase John thinks and the phrase in 1979 indicate a shift from the speaker's 
hie et nunc. The difference between the two phrases is that the shift indicated by John 
thinks is more radical: For all that matters John may not believe that there is such a 
thing as gravity and he may take the world to be flat; hence the acceptability of such 
examples as (120). By contrast sentences like (121)a are false, and a sentence like 
(121)b is only true if it is taken to mean that "in 1491 the people thought that the 
world was flat". 
(120)a John thinks that objects do not fall when you release them. 
(120)b John thinks that the world is flat. 
(121)a In 1979 objects did not fall down when you released them. 
(121)b In 1491 the world was flat. 
These examples accentuate the difference between elements that create intensional 
contexts and elements like preposed temporal phrases. 
However, Fauconnier also discusses some phenomena that resemble the intensionality 
phenomena very much. His examples suggest the relevance of a concept that might be 
called perspectivation17, that is related to, but not identical with intensionality. Example 
(122) displays the same ambiguity that (117) displays. 
17
 The term is not used by Fauconnier. 
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(122) In 1929 the lady with grey hair was blond. 
This example has (at least) two readings: In one reading two conflicting properties are 
attributed to the same entity (the lady having both grey and blond hair), in the other 
reading the lady with grey hair identifies an element in the perspective of the speaker's 
hie and nunc, and this element is used to identify its counterpart in the perspective 
corresponding to the situation in 1929. The point of the example is that the second 
interpretation can only be derived if two different mental spaces are assumed. 
Given this broader concept there seem to be more configurations indicating 
perspectives. Suppose that John and Jake are mistaken about the country in which their 
cars were made: They both think that their cars originate from Germany, whereas 
John's car actually comes from France and Jake's car comes from Italy. This situation 
can be described by (123) without contradiction, provided that John and Jake bear 
contrastive stress. 
(123) JOHN has a German car from France, and JAKE has a German car from 
Italy. 
The contrastive stress has more or less the same function as a preposed adverbial 
phrase: It establishes a perspective that may or may not differ from the speaker's 
perspective. The phrase German car is used to identify elements in the John-perspec-
tive and the Jake-perspective, the phrases car from France and car from Italy are used 
to identify their counterparts in the speaker's perspective. 
Examples like (124) show that contrastive structures typically function to contrast 
conflicting information coming from different perspectives, and that this may even 
affect the truthconditional level: (124)b is possible, but (124)c is a contradiction. 
(124)a Cassius Clay is Muhammed Ali. 
(124)b CASSIUS CLAY was shy, but MUHAMMED ALI wasn't. 
(124)c MUHAMMED ALI was shy, but MUHAMMED ALI wasn't. 
From this we can conclude that there are interesting relationships between notions like 
intensionality and perspectivation. The exact nature of the relationships between these 
concepts is a promising line of research. For instance, it seems that intensionality is a 
special case of perspectivation (as is suggested by the list in Section 3.1 of parameters 
defining the boundaries of a perspective). Furthermore, it would seem that a perspec-
tive might be characterized in terms of the radicalness of the shift from the speaker 
perspective that it implies. Whereas intensional domains imply the most radical shift 
(leaving room for domains without gravity and with a flat earth), perspectives indicated 
by contrastive stress merely indicate a shift of the camera to a separate section of the 
universe of discourse. Obviously these relationships are in need of further investigation. 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter some suggestions have been made concerning the analysis of a broad 
range of i>Mf-coordinations. In the analysis the concept of perspectives was crucial: But-
coordinations (more generally, contrastive coherence relations) were taken to be 
coordinations of perspectives containing conflicting information. The perspectives are 
signalled by the perspective indicating elements P, and P* which sometimes have to be 
inferred. Different types of buf-coordinations were characterized in terms of the way 
this scheme was related to the surface information. 
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Information embedded in a perspective can become valid in a higher perspective, a 
process which was percolation. It was claimed that the information embedded under P2 
stands a better chance of percolating to the speaker perspective than the information 
embedded under P^ In this respect but differs from an element like and, which, in a 
contrastive context, does not give any indications as to what proposition will percolate. 
This conjecture was labeled the Asymmetry Hypothesis. 
This analysis of contrastive coherence relations suggests a natural relation between 
the argumentative and the referential content of a discourse, thus satisfying one of the 
conditions mentioned in Chapter 2 for an appropriate analysis of contrastive coherence 
relations. 
To a large extent the analysis has remained very sketchy. No attempt was made to 
specify concretely how the explicit information in the conjuncts is related to the 
abstract scheme (23). Nor was there any attempt to formalize the representations 
involved in interpreting buf-coordinations. This is no accident. No adequate semantic 
system seems available to express the conditions of use of the conjunction maar (but). 
This has been demonstrated for the case of discourse semantics. Essentially, this is a 
theory about local relationships (adjacent sentence pairs) and truth-conditional 
phenomena, and much the same holds for other theories of semantic interpretation. 
However, but is typically an element that links information stemming from such varying 
sources as the dialogue situation (you may be right, but...), world knowledge (/ went to 
see the doctor, but I wasn't ill) and linguistic information, that still await a unifying 
theory. 
The analysis was primarily based on sentential contrasts. In the following chapters 
empirical evidence supporting the analysis will be given. It will concern both the 
Asymmetry Hypothesis and the relevance of the analysis to global contrastive coher-
ence relations. 
4 STRUCTURE AND CONTENT: THE SENTENCE EXPERIMENTS 
In the previous chapter a linguistic theory of contrastive coherence relations was 
developed on the basis of intuitions regarding sentential contrasts. In this chapter two 
experiments are reported in which readers' interpretations of sentential contrasts are 
investigated. 
4.1 Experiment 1: Testing the Asymmetry Hypothesis 
4.1.1 Introduction. 
The Asymmetry Hypothesis (repeated here) plays an important role in the analysis of 
oui-coordinations presented in the previous chapter. 
Asymmetry Hypothesis 
When a bur-coordination is used, the information related to the second conjunct 
stands a better chance of percolating to the higher perspective than the informa­
tion related to the first conjunct. In this respect buf-coordinations differ from and-
coordinations, in which neither of the conflicting informational units percolate. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Asymmetry Hypothesis makes certain claims about the 
interpretation of argumentative texts containing contrast relations. Thus it implies that 
writers of such a text will present the argument they favor in the second conjunct of 
the contrast relation. (Apparent counterexamples to this claim were discussed in 
Section 3.4) In Experiment 1 this prediction has been tested, by examining the readers' 
interpretations of the writer's opinion. 
In the experiment readers judged the argumentative tendency of sentential contrasts, 
i.e. of contrastive coherence relations in which the conjuncts consist of one sentence. 
The experimental sentences were argumentative, because they related to a certain 
claim. The readers judged the argumentative tendency of a sentence by choosing 
between three possible continuations of the sentences. These continuations related to 
three possible opinions regarding the claim under discussion. An example text with 
three continuation sentences is given in (1), followed by an English translation (2). 
(1) 
A: In wat voor omgeving zou je willen wonen? 
В: Een dorp is heerlijk rustig, maar in een stad valt van alles te beleven. 
(i) Dus wil ik het liefst in een dorp wonen. 
(ii) Dus wil ik het liefst in een stad wonen. 
(iii) · Dus weet ik het eigenlijk niet. 
(2) 
A: What kind of environment would you like to live in? 
B: A village is lovely and quiet, but in a city there is a lot of action. 
(i) So I would prefer living in a village. 
(ii) So I would prefer living in a city. 
(iii) So I really don't know. 
According to the Asymmetry Hypothesis the presence of maar ("but") determines the 
interpretation of the contrastive coherence relation, in that the information related to 
the second conjunct is dominant over the information related to the first conjunct. 
72 CHAPTER 4 
There is some evidence that the order of the arguments has an effect on readers' 
judgments of texts that argue for contradictory points of view. In Hovland (1957) 
several factors determimng the readers' judgments have been discussed, such as the 
format of the message (one speaker/writer vs. two speakers/writers), the ethos of the 
speaker/writer, the intelligence of the audience, and the order of the arguments in the 
text. Both the view that the first argument is decisive and the view that the second 
argument is decisive are defended. In order to distinguish the asymmetry effect from an 
effect of the order of the arguments, judgments on text versions containing maar ('but') 
were compared with text versions containing en ('and'). 
It was possible that the content of the arguments had an influence on the readers' 
choices. For instance, strong arguments presumably have a greater impact on the 
argumentative tendency of a text than weak arguments. As a control condition for such 
an effect of the content, the arguments in the texts were presented in two orders. 
As a consequence two factors have been manipulated in Experiment 1. 
1. Linguistic signaling: The contrastive coherence relation is either explicitly 
expressed by the conjunction maar ('but'), or it remains implicit. In the latter case the 
conjunction en ('and') is used. A consequence of this manipulation is that the sentential 
contrasts in the experiment are all semantic oppositions: It was noted in Section 3.5.3 
that in concessive oppositions maar cannot be replaced by en felicitously. 
2. Order of the conjuncts: The conjuncts involved in the contrastive coherence 
relation have been presented in two different orders. 
The hypothesis was that in sentences with maar the writer's opinion regarding the claim 
under discussion was more salient than in sentences with en, and that it related to the 
second conjunct. 
4.1.2 Method. 
Material 
The material of Experiment 1 consisted of 16 texts. The texts were dialogues. Each text 
consisted of a question asked by one person and an answer to the question given by 
another person. The answer consisted of a compound sentence. The conjuncts of the 
answer (conjunct A and conjunct B) had opposite argumentative tendencies (cf. 
example (l)-(2)). 
Four versions of each text were made. The versions differed in the type of conjunc-
tion relating the two conjuncts of the answer {maar or en), and in the order of the con-
juncts. 
Four experimental lists were constructed. A list consisted of 16 experimental texts. The 
distribution of the four text versions in the lists was varied systematically: Across the 
four lists, each experimental text occurred once in each version. In each of the four 
conditions of a list there were four experimental texts. Each list was presented to 12 
subjects. 
As an additional control on an effect of the content of the arguments, the strength 
of these arguments was tested in a pre-test. This was done by presenting subjects with 
the question of an experimental text and one of the arguments as its answer. The 
subjects gave their judgment in maximally three steps. First they decided whether or 
not the answer was relevant to the question (if the answer was considered irrelevant, 
then the subject skipped the rest of the item). Second, if the answer was considered 
relevant, then the subjects chose between one of two possible continuation sentences 
(So I want to live in a village or So I want to live in a city). Finally, if they had chosen a 
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continuation sentence, they also had to indicate whether or not they were certain about 
their choice. 
The strength of the arguments was judged by 18 subjects (students from Nijmegen 
University). Each subject judged the strength of every argument. The subjects were 
divided into two groups, which differed as to the order in which the arguments were 
presented to the subjects. The answers of the subjects were transformed to a 5-point 
scale from 1 to 5 (1 = village chosen, subject is certain; 2 = village chosen, subject is 
not certain; 3 = the answer is irrelevant; 4 = city chosen, subject is not certain; 5 = 
city chosen, subject is certain). 
The results of the experiment showed that the arguments occurring in an answer had 
different argumentative tendencies. The mean strength of the arguments against the 
claim which the text was about was 1.33 and the mean strength of the arguments in 
favor of the claim was 4.68 (^,(1,16) = 817.43, ρ < .01; ^(1,14) = 732.71, ρ < .01; 
minF'(l,29) = 386.38, ρ < .01). Moreover, the means are on opposite sides of the scale 
and symmetric. Thus one can safely conclude that the arguments used in the experi­
ment had opposite, but equal strengths. 
The conjuncts of the answers had more or less equal length (For each text the word 
length of the second conjunct in the original version was divided by the word length of 
the first conjunct. This resulted in a mean ratio of 0.9 (SD = 0.3).) The mean length of 
a text (consisting of a question and an answer) was 25.9 words. 
Subjects and procedure 
Fourty-eight subjects, students from Tilburg University, participated in Experiment 1. 
They were paid for their participation. The experiment was conducted as part of a 
series of experiments. In the first part the subjects read a text, subsequently they 
participated in Experiments 1 and 2 and finally they had to recall the text they had 
read earlier. Experiment 2 will be discussed in Section 4.2. The first part took 
approximately 10 minutes, Experiment 1 and 2 took approximately 30 minutes, the 
third part took approximately 5 minutes. 
The texts were presented to the subjects on the screen of a microcomputer (Apple 
II + ). An example of the presentation of a text is given in (3)-(4). The two speakers in 
the dialogue were indicated by hyphens. 
(3> 
- In wat voor omgeving zou je willen wonen? 
- Een dorp is heerlijk rustig, maar in een stad valt van alles te beleven. 
1 
üc weet het 
dus eigen-
lijk niet. 
2 
Dus zou ik 
het liefst 
in een stad 
wonen. 
3 
Dus zou ik 
het liefst 
in een dorp 
wonen. 
o (redelijk) zeker o niet zeker 
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(4) 
- What kind of environment would you like to live in? 
- A village is lovely and quiet, but in a city there is a lot of action. 
1 2 3 
So I really So I would So I would 
don't know. prefer living prefer living 
in a city in a village. 
о (fairly) certain о not certain 
The presentation of a new text was subject-paced. At the start of a new text a star 
appeared on the screen, which served as a focus of attention for the position of the text 
to appear. By pressing a button the star disappeared and the line Nieuwe tekst ('New 
text') appeared. After a fixed period of 1500 ms. this line was replaced by the first line 
of the new text, the question. Subsequently the answer was presented. The duration of 
presentation of the question and the answer depended on their length: It was minimally 
1000 ms and increased at a rate of 1000 ms per 35 letters. Finally the three continua­
tion sentences were shown, continuation A (the continuation referring to conjunct A), 
continuation В (the continuation referring to conjunct B), and a neutral continuation 
sentence. The neutral continuation sentence was the same for each text: Ik weet het dus 
eigenlijk niet ('So I really would not know*). The subjects chose a continuation sentence 
by pressing a button that had the same label as the continuation sentence (1, 2, or 3). 
If the subjects chose a different continuation than the neutral sentence, they also had 
to indicate how certain they were about their choice: fairly certain or not certain. 
Each type of continuation sentence was presented equally frequently in each column. 
The subjects were told that the reply of the second speaker was incomplete: In the 
original reply the second speaker had made a clear choice1 and this choice had been 
left out. Their task was to identify the correct continuation sentence in the original 
reply. 
4.1.3 Results. 
The subjects' responses were transformed to a five-point scale (1 = continuation A, 
certain; 2 = continuation A not certain; 3 = neutral continuation; 4 = continuation B, 
not certain; 5 = continuation B, certain) and analyzed by means of two analyses of 
variance, with subjects and experimental texts as the random factor respectively. 
In the analyses the factors Linguistic Signaling and Order of Conjuncts had two 
levels and were repeated with respect to both subjects and experimental texts. The 
factors Subject Groups and Text Groups had four levels and were between-subjects and 
between-texts factors respectively. Table 1 gives the means for the factors Linguistic 
Signaling and Order of Conjuncts. 
1
 Due to the information in the instruction that a clear choice had been made in the 
original reply, the neutral continuation sentence was seldom chosen. 
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Table 1 
Mean Scale Values for Choices of Continuation Sentences, with 
the Factors Linguistic Signaling and Order of Conjuncts 
(Experiment 1). 
Order of conjuncts A-B B-A 
Linguist ic 
signaling 
maar 3.63 2.01 
en 3.08 2.67 
Hote. Scale values from 1 to 5. A » conjunct А, В = conjunct 
B. 
There is an interaction of the factors Order of Conjuncts and Linguistic Signaling: 
F,(\M) = 37.06, ρ < .01, F2(l,12) = 34.41, ρ < .01, wi>iF'(l,36) = 17.34, ρ < .01. The 
means show that versions with тааг get more extreme scores than versions with en. 
The means for the factor Order of Conjuncts differ significantly in the тааг-
constructions (F,(l,44) = 23.32, ρ < .01); F2(l,12) = 34.78, ρ < .01; mwiF'(l,46) = 
13.96, ρ < .01), whereas they do not differ in the e/z-constructions (F;(l,44) = 1.47, ρ 
= 0.23; F2(l,12) = 2.19, ρ = 0.16). This then supports the second part of the hypothe­
sis: The effect found in maor-coordinations is absent in ел-coordinations. 
These findings support the hypothesis that readers judge the writer's opinion to be 
related to the second conjunct of a semantic opposition signalled by moor. In a 
semantic opposition with en there is no such effect. 
There is also a main effect of the factor Order of Conjuncts: F/(l,44) = 56.42, ρ < 
.01, F2(l,12) = 125.71, ρ < .01, m/>iF'(l,53) = 38.94, ρ < .01. Since the en-versions do 
not differ significantly, this main effect is mainly caused by the effect of тааг on the 
interpretation. 
4.1.4 Discussion. 
Experiment 1 showed that the subjects' responses were determined by the most recent 
conjunct and that this effect was stronger if the contrastive coherence relation was 
marked by тааг. ßuf-coordinations are therefore asymmetric, because second argu-
ments in a ¿«f-coordination are judged to be stronger arguments than first conjuncts. In 
ond-coordinations no such difference between first and second conjuncts was found. 
These results clearly are in conformity with the Asymmetry Hypothesis, which dictates 
that the inference related to the second conjunct stands a better chance to percolate to 
the speaker's (writer's) perspective. 
These findings are especially remarkable because the contrastive constructions that 
were used in the experiment are semantic oppositions. It will be argued in Section 5.3.4 
that this type of contrastive coherence relation displays less asymmetry than concessive 
oppositions. 
It might be suggested that the results of Experiments 1 should be described as a 
difference in acceptability between тааг- and en-coordinations. According to such a 
claim the difference between semantic oppositions with moor and semantic oppositions 
with en is that contrastive coherence relations with en are unacceptable and therefore 
lead to more or less randomly chosen continuation sentences. 
In order to investigate this possibility an experiment was carried out in which 
readers judged the acceptability of the material that was used in Experiment 1. This 
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was done by presenting subjects with the question and the answer of an experimental 
text. The subjects were told that all the answers were indirect answers and they were 
asked to judge whether they considered the answer a good sentence as an answer to 
the question. A sentence was to be judged good if it was natural, whereas it was to be 
judged not good if there was something strange about it. No further specification of the 
notion 'good sentence' was given. The subjects gave their answer on a seven-point-
scale. They were instructed to interpret the minimum of the scale as "the answer is a 
bad sentence" and the maximum as "the answer is a good sentence". 
Four experimental lists were constructed. A list consisted of 16 experimental texts. 
The distribution of the four text versions in the lists was varied systematically: In each 
of the four conditions of a list there were four experimental texts. Across the four lists, 
each experimental text occurred once in each condition. 
In this experiment 72 subjects, students from Nijmegen University, participated. They 
were paid for their participation. The experiment was carried out as part of a series of 
three experiments. In the first part (approximately 10 minutes) the subjects read a text, 
in the second part (approximately 30 minutes) they participated in the present accep­
tability judgment experiment, and in the third part (approximately 15 minutes) they 
recalled the text that they had read in the first part. 
The replies of the subjects were put on a seven-point numeric scale (1 = "the 
answer is a bad sentence", 7 = "the answer is a good sentence"). Two analyses of 
variance were carried out on the data, one with subjects as the random factor and one 
with experimental texts as the random factor. The factors Linguistic Signaling and 
Order of Arguments had two levels and were repeated with respect to both subjects 
and texts. The factors Subject Group and Text Group had four levels and were a 
between-subjects and a between-texts factor, respectively. 
The means are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Mean Scale Values for Acceptability Judgments of Answers in 
Experiment 1, with the Factors Linguistic Signaling and Order 
of Conjuncts (Experiment 1). 
Order of conjuncts A-B B-A 
L i n g u i s t i c 
s igna l ing 
maar 5.30 5.20 
en 4.51 4.43 
Note. Scale values from 1 to 7. A = conjunct А, В = conjunct 
B. 
Although there was a main effect of the factor Linguistic Signaling (F;(l,68) = 52.89, ρ 
< .01, F2(1,12) = 35.53, ρ < .01, mmF'(lJl) = 21.25, ρ < .01), indicating that тааг-
coordinations were judged more acceptable than ел-coordinations, there is no indica­
tion whatsoever in Table 2 that e/i-coordinations are judged unacceptable. Thus there 
are no grounds for assuming that e/i-coordinations lead to random choices of continua­
tion sentences. 
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4.2 Experiment Tz the Interpretation of Neutral Arguments 
4.2.1 Introduction. 
Lang (1984) notes that the interpretation of each conjunct in a coordinate structure 
depends heavily on the interpretation of the other.2 If, for example, a conjunct that is 
ambiguous or vague in isolation is coordinated with an unambiguous or clear conjunct, 
then the result will be a loss of the ambiguity or vagueness. An example was given in 
Chapter 2. It is repeated here as (5). The second conjunct of (5) seems to lack an 
argumentative tendency: It can merely be used in an informative statement. However, 
if it appears in an ami-coordination together with a clear argument it becomes an 
argument itself. 
(5) John is amiable and he wears bow-ties. 
One may expect to find interesting interactions of structural and content properties of 
contrastive coherence relations, for it seems to make a difference whether the weak 
argument is used in a structurally dominant position (the second conjunct, marked by 
but) or in a less dominant position. The question of how the content of the conjuncts 
affects the interpretation of a contrastive coherence relation is the object of Experi-
ment 2. 
Henceforth the term 'neutral arguments' is used instead of weak or nonsensical 
arguments. Neutral arguments are arguments without a clear argumentative tendency in 
isolation. 
Not every sentential contrast can impose an argumentative tendency on neutral 
information. Semantic oppositions, for example, are unfit because of their underdeter-
mined character. In Chapter 3 it was noted that the contrast involved in interpreting 
semantic oppositions has to be derived from the context: The inferences related to the 
conjuncts of a semantic opposition are not contradictory themselves, they conflict due 
to the information given in the context (cf. Section 3.5.1). That is why semantic 
oppositions have to be fairly explicit: Otherwise, a reader will not succeed in deriving 
the contrastive interpretation. 
Whereas the interpretation of semantic oppositions is underdetermined, concessive 
oppositions can be said to be overdetermined: Concessive oppositions are about one 
entity in the domain of discussion, and deriving their interpretation involves deriving a 
contradiction between the inferences related to the conjuncts. It is this property of 
concessive oppositions that was claimed to be responsible for the irreplaceability of but 
by and. The use of but determines the interpretation of the conjuncts in a coordination: 
If the first conjunct gives a positive attribute of the entity under discussion, then the 
reader may know, after having read but, that what follows will be a negative attribute 
of the entity, irrespective of the exact content of what follows. In example (6) the first 
answer to the question is a neutral argument: Because it has no clear argumentative 
tendency it is unfit to qualify as an answer to the question. In the second answer the 
neutral argument is embedded in a imf-coordination. This embedding creates a context 
in which the neutral argument can be given a non-neutral (negative) interpretation. 
The third answer consists of two arguments with the same argumentative tendency: It is 
2
 Kuno (1987, p. 7ff) makes the same observation and relates this 'Parallel Interpretation 
Tendency' to cognitive processes in general. 
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deviant, because the arguments do not conflict and therefore do not allow the use of 
but.3 
(6) 
A: Shall we rent this room? 
B: (i) ?? There are blue coverlets on the beds. 
(ii) It has a beautiful view, but there are blue coverlets on the beds. 
(iii) * It has a beautiful view, but the room service is very efficient. 
In a comparable ami-coordination the situation is quite different: And is semantically 
nearly vacuous, because it only requires the truth of the related parts (in a coordina­
tion of sentences, or rather, propositions), and very often it merely has an additive 
function. Therefore, attributes of an entity coordinated by and must have the same 
tendency (cf. example (7)iii). Embedding the neutral argument of example (6) in an 
a/id-coordination, as in example (7)ii, gives it an argumentative tendency that is 
equivalent to that of the other argument in the coordination (i.e. a positive one). 
(7) 
A: Shall we rent this room? 
B: (i) ?? There are blue coverlets on the beds. 
(ii) It has a beautiful view and there are blue coverlets on the beds. 
(iii) It has a beautiful view and the room service is very efficient. 
In short, neutral arguments are reinterpreted according to the context in which they 
appear. Lang (1984, p. 51) talks about the transfer effect of coordination: The inter­
pretation of one conjunct in a coordination is transferred to that of the other, due to 
the role the conjuncts and the conjunction play in establishing a so-called 'common 
integrator' (cf. Section 2.6). 
The question to be investigated in Experiment 2 can now be further specified as: What 
is the effect of the structural properties of the contrastive coherence relation on its 
interpretation? If there is such an effect (as may be expected, given examples (6) and 
(7)), how does it affect the interpretation of the conjuncts? Does it persist if the 
conjuncts are considered in isolation? 
The first two questions were investigated in the first part of Experiment 2: Subjects 
judged the argumentative tendency of bui-coordinations consisting of different combina­
tions of different types of arguments (positive, negative and neutral). As a control 
condition for other contextual effects the same combinations were also presented in an 
аЫ-coordination and in different orders. As in Experiment 1, the buf-coordinations 
were presented as the answer given by one speaker to a question posed by another 
speaker. The subjects' task was to choose between three possible continuation senten­
ces: a positive (relating to the positive argument), a negative (relating to the negative 
argument), and a neutral one (/ don't know). 
The third question (does an effect of the structual properties of a ftu/-coordination 
persist if the conjuncts are considered in isolation?) was investigated in the second part 
of Experiment 2. The texts were presented again to the subjects, but now the answer of 
3
 Interpreting ÒMf-coordinations involves making inferences and language users are inclined 
to find coherent interpretations of everything they read. Undoubtedly interpretations can be 
found in which the third answer is acceptable. It is not, however, in an interpretation that 
considers both conjuncts as arguments in favor of renting the room. 
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the second speaker consisted only of the neutral argument. The text that was shown to 
the subjects is therefore of type (6)i, (7)i. Again, the subjects judged the argumentative 
tendency of the answer by choosing between three possible continuation sentences, a 
positive one, a negative one, and a neutral one. There was an average distance of 80 
items between the first time that the subjects saw the neutral argument (in a concessive 
opposition-construction) and the second time that it was presented (in isolation). The 
question is whether an effect of the structural properties of the construction in which 
the neutral argument was presented the first time influenced the choice of continua-
tions, even after such a long time interval and after the subjects had judged so many 
sentential contrasts. 
The two parts of Experiment 2 will be discussed separately. 
In the first part of Experiment 2 three factors were manipulated. 
1. The content of the arguments. There were three combinations of arguments: A 
positive argument was coordinated with a negative argument; a positive argument was 
coordinated with a neutral argument; a negative argument was coordinated with a 
neutral argument. 
2. The type of conjunction. The arguments were conjoined by maar or by en. 
3. The order of the arguments. An argument was presented in initial or in final 
position. 
The factors that were relevant for the second part of the experiment are: 
1. The content of the previous co-argument. The neutral argument previously co-
occurred with a positive or with a negative argument. 
2. The type of conjunction. The neutral argument previously occurred in a maar-
coordination or in an en-coordination. 
3. The previous position of the neutral argument. The neutral argument previously 
occurred in initial or in final position. 
As to the expectations regarding the outcome of the experiment, it is not at all obvious 
that the c/i-coordinations can function as a baseline condition, as was the case in 
Experiment 1. As argued in Chapter 3, concessive oppositions do not allow for a 
replacement of maar by en, contrary to semantic oppositions. For en has an additive 
function, and due to the fact that concessive oppositions are about one entity, the 
second conjunct of a 'concessive opposition' with en must add to the first one. In 
concessive oppositions with maar the coherence relation is contrastive. By contrast, 
since semantic oppositions are about two entities in the domain of discussion, and 
hence more explicit, the coherence relation between the conjuncts remains contrastive, 
whatever the conjunction. 
The term 'structural properties' that was used so far is shorthand for at least three 
properties. The first is that of asymmetry: Explicitly marked contrastive coherence 
relations are asymmetrical, as opposed to unmarked contrastive constructions. Experi-
ment 1 provided ample evidence for the existence of this factor. The second is the 
contribution of the conjunction: Different conjunctions (maar versus en) may contribute 
differently to the interpretation of the construction. This property is not identical to 
asymmetry: In the following chapter an experiment will be discussed that shows that 
asymmetry is not restricted to constructions with maar. The third property is the order 
of the conjuncts. Since a straightforward comparison of maar with en is not possible in 
case of a concessive opposition, it is difficult to isolate the contribution of each of these 
three properties. 
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The expectations are formulated separately for maar- and en-coordinations. Given 
three types of arguments, a positive one (referred to as P), a negative one (referred to 
as β), and a neutral one (referred to as R), the following expectations regarding the 
results can be formulated. 
1. Judgments of complete constructions 
1.1 Judgments of concessive oppositions with maar. 
a. P-maar-Q and Q-maar-P. Under the assumption that Ρ and Q have equal, but 
opposite argumentative weight (an assumption that is justified in the next subsection), 
the responses to these constructions were expected to differ as follows: In the P-maar-
Q construction the inference related to the ß-conjunct percolates to the speaker 
perspective. That is, the entire construction receives a negative interpretation. In the Q-
maar-P construction the positive inference percolates to the speaker perspective. As a 
consequence P-maar-Q favors a choice of the negative continuation sentence (i.e. the 
ß-continuation), Q-maar-P favors a choice of the positive continuation sentence (i.e. 
the F-continuation). 
b. R-maar-Q and R-maar-P. Because of the transfer effect, R in R-maar-Q receives a 
positive interpretation. It remains a weak argument, however. Due to the order of the 
arguments and the presence of maar the construction favors a choice of a continuation 
sentence relating to Q. Due to the weak argument R this effect is stronger than in the 
case of P-maar-Q. By the same reasoning, the R-maar-P constructions lead to more 
positive choices than Q-maar-P. 
с Q-maar-R and P-maar-R. Because of the transfer effect, R from Q-maar-R 
receives a positive interpretation. Due to the order of the arguments and the asym­
metry effect the entire construction receives a positive interpretation, i.e. it favors 
positive choices. Due to the weak argument R this interpretation is not as strong as in 
the case of the Q-maar-P construction. By the same reasoning it follows that P-maar-R 
favors negative choices. 
This results in the following expectation: Given a scale of possible scores, the minimum 
of which represents a negative argumentative tendency (i.e. only choices of negative 
continuations) and the maximum of which represents a positive argumentative tendency 
(i.e. only choices of positive continuations) the mean scores for the six concessive 
oppositions with maar were expected to be distributed as in (8): 
(8) Expected order of mean scale values for concessive oppositions with maar 
R-maar-Q P-maar-Q P-maar-R Q-maar-R Q-maar-P R-maar-P 
minimum maximum 
1.2. Judgments of 'concessive oppositions' with en. 
a. Q-en-P and P-en-Q. Since Ρ en Q are of equal, but opposite argumentative 
weight, the mean scores for these constructions can be expected to fall near the middle 
of the scale of possible scores. 
b. Q-en-R/R-en-Q and R-en-Q/R-en-P. The transfer effect will cause the neutral 
argument of Q-en-R and R-en-Q to receive a negative interpretation. The entire 
construction therefore consists of two negative arguments and it favors negative 
choices. Mutatis mutandis it holds good that P-en-R/R-en-P favor positive choices. 
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This leads to the following expectation: Given the scale of possible scores representing 
the potential argumentative tendency of the constructions, the following distribution for 
the mean scores is expected. 
(9) Expected order of mean scale values for 'concessive oppositions' with en 
R-en-Q P-en-Q R-en-P 
Q-en-R Q-en-P P-en-R 
minimum maximum 
2. Judgments of neutral arguments in isolation 
2.1. Judgments of neutral arguments from concessive oppositions with maar. 
A conjunct R from P-maar-R receives a negative interpretation because it contrasts 
with a positive argument. Furthermore, the writer uses this argument in a position that 
is reserved for strong arguments, because of the structural properties of the construc­
tion. Conjunct R from R-maar-P is also negative, due to its environment, but since it is 
not in a prominent position it is less negative than R from P-maar-R. Similarly, 
conjunct R from Q-maar-R receives a more positive interpretation than conjunct R 
from R-maar-Q. This leads to the following expectation: 
(10) Expected order of mean scale values for neutral arguments from concessive 
oppositions with maar 
R from R from R from R from 
Р-тааг-R R-maar-P R-maar-Q Q-maar-R 
I 1 
minimum maximum 
2.2. Judgments of neutral arguments from 'concessive oppositions' with en. 
As discussed under 1.2., conjunct R from R-en-Q and Q-en-R is interpreted as a 
negative argument and leads to negative choices. Mutatìs mutandL· it holds true that R 
from R-en-P and P-en-R leads to positive choices. That is: 
(11) Expected order of mean scale values for neutral arguments from 'concessive 
' oppositions' with en 
R from R from 
R-en-Q R-en-P 
and and 
Q-en-R P-en-R 
К 1 
minimum maximum 
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4.2.2 Method. 
Material 
In the first part of Experiment 2, subjects judged the argumentative tendency of a 
number of texts. For the experiment 48 texts were constructed. As in Experiment 1 the 
texts were dialogues, consisting of a question raised by one person, and an answer 
given by another person. The answers were sentential contrasts, consisting of two 
arguments with different argumentative tendencies. They were all concessive opposi­
tions. 
Of each text 12 versions were made. The versions differed from each other in the 
type of conjunction relating the arguments (maar vs. ей), in the order of the arguments, 
and in the content of the arguments (the conjuncts are positive, negative, or neutral 
arguments). An example is given in (12)-(13). In this example hij heeft een prachtig 
uitzicht ('it has a beautiful view') is a positive argument, and hij is erg duur ('it is very 
expensive') is a negative argument. The neutral argument for this text was er liggen 
blauwe spreien op de bedden ('there are blue coverlets on the beds'). 
(12) 
A: Zullen we deze kamer nemen? 
B: Hij heeft een prachtig uitzicht, maar hij is erg duur. 
(i) Dus moeten we hem niet nemen. 
(ii) Dus moeten we hem nemen. 
(iü) Ik weet het dus eigenlijk niet. 
(13) 
A: Shall we take this room? 
В: It has a beautiful view, but it is very expensive. 
(i) So I think we shouldn't take it. 
(ii) So I think we should take it. 
(iii) So I really wouldn't know. 
There are several ways in which an argument can be neutral. For one thing, it may be 
neutral because it is vague. An example is given in (14). 
(14) 
A: Will you buy that car? 
B: It costs 5,000 pounds. 
The price of a car is obviously a relevant consideration when deciding whether or not 
to buy it. The only reason why the answer cannot receive a clear interpretation is that 
the reader does not know whether the person who gives the answer considers 5,000 
pounds to be expensive or not. If we knew this, then the answer would cease to be 
neutral and receive a clear (positive or negative) interpretation. 
A related, but different kind of neutrality is found in (15). 
(15) 
A: Will you buy that car? 
B: It has served as a demonstration model. 
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Again, the answer is relevant. Nevertheless, it cannot be interpreted unambiguously, 
because some readers will consider a car that has served as a demonstration model a 
positive property of that car (it reduces the price, it will be in good shape since it has 
always been taken care of properly, etc.), whereas other readers will consider it a 
negative property (the car is no longer new, various types of drivers have used it, etc.). 
Therefore, the argument will receive a dear interpretation, positive or negative, 
depending on the preferences of the reader of this text. 
Quite a different kind of neutrality is found in (16). 
(16) 
A: Will you buy that car? 
B: My previous car was a Ford. 
The answer to the question is irrelevant rather than vague. Its interpretation is not 
dependent on the preferences of the writer or reader of the text, since it is utterly 
unclear what the answer has to do with the question. It is this kind of neutrality that 
was used in the experiment: Only if a reader is willing to reinterpret the answer can it 
make sense. 
The distinction between vague and irrelevant neutral arguments is not clear-cut. 
Nevertheless, it seems intuitively correct to make the distinction, and its implications 
for the experiment are apparent: Vague arguments are hidden positive or negative 
arguments, and as such not of any use for the experiment. 
Twelve experimental lists were constructed. A list consisted of 48 experimental texts. 
The distribution of the 12 text versions in the lists was varied systematically: Across the 
12 lists, each experimental text occurred once in each version. In each of the 12 
conditions of a list there were four experimental texts. Each list was presented to four 
subjects. 
In order to find out whether the classification of the arguments as positive, negative or 
neutral was correct, a pre-test has been carried out in which subjects judged the 
argumentative status of the conjuncts. This was done much in the same way as with the 
material of Experiment 1. The question of an experimental text was presented to the 
subjects with one of the three arguments as its answer. The subjects gave their 
judgment in maximally three steps. First they decided whether or not the answer was 
relevant to the question. Second, if the answer was considered relevant, then the 
subject chose between one of two possible continuation sentences (So I think we should 
take the room or So I think we shouldn't take the room). Finally, if the subjects had 
chosen one of these continuation sentences they also indicated whether or not they 
were certain about their choice. 
The strength of the arguments was judged by 18 subjects (students from Nijmegen 
University).4 Each subject judged the strength of every argument. To control for an 
effect of the order in which the arguments were judged, the material was divided into 
three blocks of 48 texts. The blocks differed in the argument that functioned as the 
answer to the question. Three lists were constructed, by varying the order of the three 
blocks. 
The answers of the subjects were transformed to a five-point scale from 1 to 5 (1 = 
negative continuation sentence chosen, certain; 2 = negative continuation sentence 
chosen, not certain; 3 = irrelevant argument; 4 = positive continuation sentence 
chosen, not certain; 5 = positive continuation sentence chosen, certain). 
* These subjects were the same as the ones who judged the weight of the arguments used 
in Experiment 1. 
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The results of the pre-test showed that the arguments had different argumentative 
tendencies: The mean strength of the positive arguments was 4.57, the mean strength 
of the negative arguments was 1.64, and the mean strength of the neutral arguments 
was 3.03 (/",(2,30) = 519.21, ρ < .01; F2(2,90) = 498.97, ρ < .01); mi>iF'(2,83) = 
278.12, ρ < .01). Moreover, the means indicated that the mean strengths of the positive 
and negative arguments were on opposite sides of the scale and symmetrical, whereas 
the mean strength of the neutral arguments fell midway. Thus it was concluded that the 
arguments used in the experiment had the weight they were intended to have. 
The mean length of the questions in the experimental texts was 6.8 words {SD = 
2.2), the mean length of the positive conjuncts was 5.8 words {SD = 1.7), the mean 
length of the negative conjuncts was 6.2 words {SD = 2.1), the mean length of the 
neutral arguments was 6.5 words {SD = 2.0). 
The first part of the experiment consisted of 48 experimental items. Since there were 
32 experimental items in the first part that contained a neutral argument, the second 
part of the experiment consisted of 32 experimental items. 
Subjects and procedure 
In Experiment 2 the same subjects participated as in Experiment 1 (48 students of 
Tilburg University). 
The presentation of the texts was similar to that in Experiment 1. The texts were 
displayed on the screen of a microcomputer. First the question was presented. Then 
the answer was presented below the question. The duration of presentation depended 
on the length of the question and the answer. Finally three possible continuation 
sentences were shown, one referring to the positive argument, another referring to the 
negative argument, and a neutral continuation sentence. The neutral continuation 
sentence was the same for each text: Ik weet het dm eigenlijk niet ('So I really would 
not know'). 
An example of the presentation of an item in the first part of the experiment is 
given in (17)-(18). 
(17) 
- Zullen we deze kamer nemen? 
- Hij heeft een prachtig uitzicht, maar er liggen blauwe spreien op de bedden. 
1 
Ik weet het 
dus eigen­
lijk niet. 
2 
Dus moeten 
we hem niet 
nemen. 
3 
Dus moeten 
we hem ne­
men. 
o (redelijk) zeker o niet zeker 
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(18) 
- Shall we take this room? 
- It has a beautiful view, but there are blue coverlets on the beds. 
1 2 3 
So I really So I think we So I think we 
wouldn't know. shouldn't take should take 
it. it. 
о (fairly) certain о not certain 
An example of the presentation of an item in the second part of Experiment 2 is given 
in (19)-(20). 
(19) 
Zullen we deze kamer nemen? 
Er liggen blauwe spreien op de bedden. 
1 
Ik weet het 
dus eigen­
lijk niet. 
2 
Dus moeten 
we hem niet 
nemen. 
3 
Dus moeten 
we hem ne­
men. 
o (redelijk) zeker o niet zeker 
(20) 
- Shall we take this room? 
- There are blue coverlets on the beds. 
1 2 3 
So I really So I think we So I think we 
wouldn't know. shouldn't take should take 
it. it. 
о (fairly) certain о not certain 
The instruction given to the subjects and the presentation of an item on the screen was 
the same as that of Experiment 1 (see Section 4.1.2 for a description). 
4.13 Results. 
C O N C E S S I V E O P P O S I T I O N S W I T H MAAR 
The interplay of structural and content factors lead to the predictions in (8), repeated 
here: 
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(8) Expected order of mean scale values for concessive oppositions with maar 
R-maar-Q P-naar-Q P-maar-R Q-maar-R Q-maar-P R-maar-P 
minimum maximum 
The responses of the subjects were transformed to a five point scale (1 = negative 
continuation sentence chosen, certain; 2 = negative continuation sentence chosen, not 
certain; 3 = neutral continuation sentence chosen; 4 = positive continuation sentence 
chosen, not certain; 5 = positive continuation sentence chosen, certain). Two analyses 
of variance were carried out: one with subjects as the random factor and one with 
experimental texts as the random factor. In both analyses the six possible argument 
combinations for the /noor-versions of a concessive opposition were treated as the six 
levels of a factor Argument Combination, which was repeated with respect to both 
subjects and texts. The factor Subject Group was a between-subjects factor with 12 
levels and the factor Text Group was a between-texts factor with 12 levels. The means 
for the factor Argument Combination are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Wean Sca/e Values for the Judgments of Concessive Oppositions 
with MAAR, with Factor Argument Combination (Experiment 2). 
Arg.Com. R-maar-Q P-maar-Q P-maar-R Q-maar-R Q-maar-P R-maar-P 
1.61 2.08 3.29 2.74 4.03 4.55 
Note. Scale values from 1 to 5. Ρ = p o s i t i v e argument, Q -
negative argument, R = neutral argument. 
The means for the different argument combinations differed significantly: F/5,180) = 
104.47 (p < .01), F2(5,180) = 117.52 (p < .01), minF'(5,35S) = 55.31 (p < .01). A test 
for linear trend with subjects as the random factor indicated that the order of the 
means was to a large extent in agreement with the predictions (F(l,180) = 467.28, ρ < 
.01). The means for the F-maor-Ä-versions were higher than expected, and the means 
for the ß-maar-Ä-versions were lower than expected. A Newman-Keuls analysis for 
multiple comparisons of the means indicated that the six means differed significantly 
from each other at the one per cent level. 
These results are in conformity with the hypothesis that there is a systematic relation 
between the structural properties of moor-coordinations and the content of the 
conjuncts, albeit that the relation differs in one point from the prediction. 
'CONCESSIVE OPPOSITIONS' WITH EN 
The expectation for the judgments of 'concessive oppositions' with en was formulated in 
(9), repeated here: 
(9) Expected order of mean scale values for 'concessive oppositions' with en 
R-en-Q P-en-Q R-en-P 
Q-en-R Q-en-P P-en-R 
minimum maximum 
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The responses of the subjects were transformed to a five point scale. In two analyses of 
variance (one with subjects as the random factor and one with texts as the random 
factor) the six сл-versions were treated as the levels of a factor Argument Combina­
tion, which was repeated with respect to both subjects and texts. The two other factors 
involved were Subject Group (12 levels, between-subjects) and Text Group (12 levels, 
between-texts). 
The means for the factor Argument Combination are given in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Wean Sca7e VaTues for the Judgments of Concessive Oppositions 
with EN, with Factor Argument Combination (Experiment 2). 
Arg.Com. R-en-Q Q-en-R P-en-Q Q-en-P P-en-R R-en-P 
1.43 1.42 3.05 3.17 4.53 4.68 
The means for the various argument combinations differed significantly: F;(5,180) = 
262.24 (p < .01), F2(5,180) = 299.04 (p < .01), mmF*(5,358) = 139.72 (p < .01). A test 
for linear trend with subjects as the random factor showed that there was a significant 
linear trend in the order of the means: FO.ISO) = 1214.12 (p < .01). The means 
display a clear regularity: There are three groups of constructions, the members of a 
group being the versions differing only in the order of the arguments. This regularity 
was confirmed by the results of a Newman-Keuls analysis for a comparison of the 
means: With the exception of the version that differed only in the order of the 
arguments, each version differed significantly from the other versions at the one 
percent level. These results are in accordance with the hypothesis about the relation 
between conjunct properties and en-coordinations. 
NEUTRAL ARGUMENTS FROM CONCESSIVE OPPOSITIONS 
The expectations regarding the mean scores are repeated here: 
(10) Expected order of mean scale values for neutral arguments from concessive 
oppositions with moor 
R from R from R from R from 
P-maar-R R-maar-P R-maar-Q Q-maar-R 
minimum maximum 
(11) Expected order of mean scale values for neutral arguments from 'concessive 
oppositions' with en 
R from 
R-en-Q 
and 
Q-en-R 
R from 
R-en-P 
and 
P-en-R 
minimum maximum 
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The responses of the subjects were transformed to a five-point scale. In the two 
analyses of variance carried out on the data (one with subjects as the random factor 
and one with texts as the random factor) there were three factors with two levels that 
were repeated with respect to both the subjects and the texts: the Type of Conjunction 
(maar/en) with which the neutral argument previously occurred, Previous Position of 
the Neutral Argument (initial or final) and Previous Co-argument of the Neutral 
Argument (positive or negative). The other factors involved in the analyses were 
Subject Group (12 levels, between-subjects) and Text Group (12 levels, between-texts). 
For the sake of readability the means for the eight conditions are presented in Table 
5 in a format comparable to the expectations in (10) and (11). 
Table 5 
Mean Scale Values for the Judgments of Neutral Arguments from 
Concessive Oppositions with HAAR and with EN (Experiment 2). 
R from 
P-maar-R 
3.06 
R from 
Q-en-R 
3.00 
R from 
R-maar-P 
3.17 
R from 
R-en-Q 
3.21 
R from 
R-maar-Q 
3.35 
R from 
R-en-P 
3.26 
R from 
Q-maar-R 
3.39 
R from 
P-en-R 
3.52 
There were two significant interactions. The first was that between Type of Conjunc­
tion and Previous Co-argument (FX1,36) = 13.91, ρ < .01; ^(1,36) = 9.38, ρ < .01; 
min/"(l,69) = 5.60, ρ < .05). The means in Table 5 indicate that the behavior of 
neutral arguments from /noor-coordinations was the inverse of the behavior of neutral 
arguments from en-coordinations. If a neutral argument had previously occurred in a 
/noor-coordination, its interpretation was the opposite of the previous coargument (if it 
had been presented in combination with a positive argument it was given a somewhat 
negative interpretation, and if it had been presented in combination with a negative 
argument it was given a somewhat positive interpretation). In neutral arguments from 
en-coordinations the opposite relation holds (if a neutral argument had previously been 
presented with a positive argument it was given a positive interpretation, and if it had 
previously been presented in combination with a negative argument it was given a 
negative interpretation). 
The second interaction was that between Type of Conjunction, Previous Co-argu­
ment and Previous Position (F,(l,36) = 9.12, ρ < .01; Fj(l,36) = 11.64, ρ < .01; 
minF'(l,7Q) = 5.11, ρ < .05). The means in Table 5 indicate that the effect of Type of 
Conjunction on the interpretation of the neutral argument was stronger if the neutral 
argument had previously been presented in final position than if it had been presented 
in initial position. 
A comparison of the means shows a linear trend, both for neutral arguments from 
maar-coordinations (F;(l,36) = 8.97, ρ < 01; F2(l,36) = 10.15, ρ < .01; minF'(l,71) = 
4.76, ρ < .05) and for neutral arguments from en-coordinations (F;(l,36) = 20.80, ρ < 
.01;Fj(l,36) = 23.54, ρ < .01; minF'(l,71) = 11.04, ρ < .01). 
These results indicate that there is a systematic relation between the structural 
properties of тааг- and en-coordinations and the content of the conjuncts in the 
coordination. Note that the linear trend for neutral arguments from en-coordinations 
was not expected: Apparently the position of the neutral argument is the dominant 
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factor determining the interpretation of neutral arguments in isolation, whether or not 
they stem from woor-coordinations. 
4.Z4 Discussion. 
The contrastive constructions investigated in Experiment 2 are concessive oppositions. 
According to the analysis of Chapter 3 these constructions are 'about one entity'. Two 
factors are relevant to the interpretation of the data of the experiment. The first is that 
maar creates an asymmetric relation, to the effect that the inference related to the 
second conjunct stands a better chance of percolating to the speaker perspective. The 
second is that en has an additive function and, as a consequence, must relate two 
predicates with matching argumentative tendencies. (See Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3 for a 
discussion of these properties of maar and en.) 
The first factor accounts for most of the findings with respect to the maar-coordina-
tions. In waor-coordinations without neutral arguments the structural properties of the 
construction result in an interpretation that is in accordance with the expectation. In 
maar-coordinations with an initial neutral argument the neutral argument is considered 
more or less irrelevant for determining the argumentative tendency of the entire 
construction. 
Maar-coordinations with neutral arguments in final position deviate slightly. The P-
maar-R versions are interpreted more positively than expected and the Q-maar-R 
versions are interpreted more negatively than expected. Note that the deviations occur 
in versions with a neutral argument in the position that is supposed to be structurally 
more important. Versions with the neutral argument in the initial position behave 
regularly. It seems, then, that in versions with a neutral argument, the factor determi-
ning the choices for the continuation sentences is the content of the meaningful (i.e. 
positive or negative) conjuncts, rather than the asymmetry effect of maar-coordinations 
on the neutral conjuncts. 
The additive function of en accounts for the judgments of en-coordinations. In versions 
without neutral arguments the judgments are near the middle of the scale of possible 
scores, in versions with neutral arguments the judgments tally with the argumentative 
tendency of the co-argument. The judgments of the en-coordinations furthermore lead 
to the conclusion that the order of the arguments is of no importance for the inter-
pretation of these constructions. Note that this even holds good for the cases with clear 
arguments, i.e. the Q-en-P and P-en-Q versions. This differs from the findings with 
respect to the maar-coordinations, since these displayed a clear difference between the 
Q-maar-P and P-maar-Q versions. 
In the introduction it was argued that the use of the en-versions as a baseline condition 
to establish the asymmetry effect of moor is not as evident as in the semantic opposi-
tion texts of Experiment 1. Yet the point can be made that some such comparison is 
possible, since whatever the function of the conjunction, the content of the conjuncts 
remains contrastive. Evidently en-versions with neutral arguments must be excluded 
from such a comparison, because it is obvious that there is nothing contrastive in the 
interpretation of, for instance, P-en-R. Two analyses of variance were carried out on 
the data for the versions without neutral arguments, one with subjects as the random 
factor and one with texts as the random factor. Type of Conjunction (maar¡en) and 
Order of Arguments {P-Q/Q-P) were repeated with respect to both subjects and texts. 
Subject Groups and Text Groups had 12 levels and were a between-subjects and a 
between-texts factor, respectively. There was a highly significant interaction of the 
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factors Type of Conjunction and Order of Arguments (F,{\,36) = 77.09, ρ < .01; 
F2(l,36) = 68.46, ρ < .01; minF'(lJl) = 36.26, ρ < .01). The means in Table 3 and 4 
indicate that moor-versions get more extreme scores than en-versions. There was also a 
highly significant main effect Order of Arguments (^,(1,36) = 98.37, ρ < .01; F2(l,36) 
= 190.43, ρ < .01; wi>tF'(l,65) = 64.87, ρ < .01). Since the en-versions do not differ 
significantly this main effect is mostly an effect of the interaction. In as far as conces­
sive oppositions allow for a comparison of the moor-versions with the e/i-versions, these 
findings parallel the findings of Experiment 1. 
The judgments of the neutral arguments in isolation are very remarkable. The inter­
pretation of the neutral arguments is determined systematically by the context in which 
they previously occurred. This shows that moor and en put opposite constraints on the 
linguistic environment in which they occur. The results show furthermore that neutral 
arguments are not neglected during the interpretation of a contrastive coherence 
relation, i.e. neutral arguments receive an interpretation fitting the original context. 
The influence of the original context involves both the content of the arguments 
(neutral arguments from a moor-coordination receive the inverse interpretation of the 
non-neutral argument, and neutral arguments from an ел-coordination are interpreted 
parallel to the non-neutral argument) and the structural properties of the construction 
(the interpretation of neutral arguments from initial positions is less clear than the 
interpretation of originally final neutral arguments). 
The finding that the position of a neutral argument from an en-coordination is one of 
the determining factors for its interpretation contrasts with the fact that in en-coordina­
tions as a whole there is not the slightest indication of an effect of the position of the 
neutral argument. What seems to be the case, then, is that only neutral arguments that 
previously occurred in final position are encoded as either negative or positive argu­
ments. A possible explanation for this finding is that only in this position there is a 
context for the interpretation of the neutral conjunct. This context consists of the 
coargument and the conjunction. In case of initial neutral arguments there is not such a 
context, and hence the argument is neglected. 
Note that the judgments of the neutral arguments in isolation cannot be explained by 
the assumption that the subjects have repeated the response that they gave in the first 
part of the experiment. Such an explanation cannot account for the fact that, for 
example, R-maar-Q contrasts have a more negative argumentative tendency than R-
maar-P contrasts, whereas R from a R-maar-Q contrast has a more positive argumenta­
tive tendency than R from a R-maar-P contrast. 
One may conclude that structural properties interact in a systematic way with proper­
ties relating to the content of the conjuncts in determining the interpretation of a 
contrast relation. Furthermore, it has been shown that the effect of the order of the 
arguments has a very persistent effect on the interpretation of neutral arguments: It 
shows up even if the neutral arguments are judged in isolation, and even after an 
interval of approximately 80 items. 
5 TESTCNG THE ASYMMETRY HYPOTHESIS: THE TEXT EXPERI-
MENTS 
The experiments reported in the previous chapter provided evidence in favor of the 
Asymmetry Hypothesis. The contrastive coherence relations used in these experiments 
were sentential contrasts. In the present chapter a series of experiments is reported on 
in which predominantly textual contrasts were used. 
Contrastive coherence relations occur both at a local and at a more global level. In 
Chapter 2 it was concluded that in the ideal case the analysis of contrastive coherence 
relations applies to both types of occurrences of this coherence relation. The analysis of 
contrastive coherence relations in Chapter 3 is based primarily on local contrastive 
coherence relations. The purpose of the present chapter and of Chapter 6 is to 
substantiate the claim that it also applies to global contrasts. 
The object of the present chapter is, again, the Asymmetry Hypothesis. It is 
investigated whether there is an effect of the linguistic signaling of the contrastive 
coherence relation on the readers' interpretation of a text containing such a relation. 
5.2 Experiment 31 
5.1.1 Introduction. 
The Asymmetry Hypothesis predicts that the linguistic marker maar provides the 
hearer with a signal for the interpretation of the text, in that the information related to 
the second conjunct stands a better chance of percolating to the speaker perspective. If 
the linguistic marker is absent, there is no asymmetry between the conjuncts and the 
resulting interpretation is uncertainty as regards the claim. 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to find confirmation of the intuitions regarding 
the influence of the presence of maar (but) on the interpretation of a text. To this end 
subjects judged the argumentative tendency of texts with and without maar. Since the 
readers' judgments were based on a comparison of different versions of a text, these 
judgments were of a meta-linguistic nature. 
The texts in Experiment 3 contained a global contrastive coherence relation, i.e. a 
contrastive coherence relation in which the related parts consisted of one or more 
paragraphs. The contrasting conjuncts were argumentative, because they related to a 
specific claim. 
The subjects judged the argumentative tendency of a text version by indicating the 
degree to which the writer of the text agreed or disagreed with the claim in their 
opinion. 
As a control condition for an effect of the content of the arguments in the texts, the 
conjuncts in the global contrastive coherence relation were presented in two orders. 
As a consequence two factors were manipulated in the experiment: 
1. Linguistic Signaling. The contrastive coherence relation was either explicitly 
expressed or it remained implicit. In the first case the conjunction maar was used, in 
the latter case there was no conjunctive element relating the contrasted parts. 
Note the difference with respect to Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 the two levels of 
the factor Linguistic Signaling were use of maar and use of en. In Experiment 3 the 
two levels were presence of maar and no conjunction. A consequence of this difference 
was that in the experiment both semantic oppositions and concessive oppositions could 
1
 The text in this section is based on Jaspers, Spooren, Noordman and Vonk (1987). 
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be used: The restrictions preventing the use of en in a concessive opposition (cf. 
Section 3.5.3) do not apply to concessive oppositions without an explicit linguistic 
marker. 
2. Order of the arguments. The argumentative conjuncts in the contrastive coherence 
relation are presented to the subjects in two orders. 
There are texts in which maar cannot be left out. This applies in particular to texts in 
which there is no indication of the presence of a contrastive coherence relation, for 
instance because both arguments are given by one and the same person or institution. 
The reason why maar cannot be left out is that the content of the conjuncts does not 
contain any indications for the contrastive interpretation. Such a text creates interpre-
tive difficulties in the versions without maar. In these texts elements were added that 
would help the interpretation of the text. These elements were called extra opposition-
al elements. They were defined as those elements whose only function it is to indicate 
the existence of a relation between two parts of a text. From the interpretation of these 
two parts it follows that the contrastive interpretation is the preferred one. Examples of 
these elements are aho, besides, moreover (which may be called neutral, since they 
allow both a contrastive and an additive interpretation), and nevertheless, on the other 
hand, yet (which are proper extra oppositional elements, since they allow only for the 
contrastive interpretation). Apart from these extra oppositional elements there are 
elements which perform a double function: They indicate the contrastive coherence 
relation and fulfill a sentence internal semantic role. Examples are some...other(s) and 
topicalizations. The latter type of elements did not occur in the texts used in Experi-
ment 3. In Experiment 5 the presence or absence of extra oppositional elements was 
added to the design as a separate factor. 
It was expected that the readers' judgments were influenced by the content of the 
conjuncts. For instance: 
1. Strong arguments presumably have a greater impact on the judgments than weak 
arguments. 
2. If the information in one conjunct is given by a person or interest group with a 
low appeal and the information in the other conjunct is given by a person or interest 
group with a high appeal, the judgments might be influenced by this difference. 
3. The readers' opinions about the topic of the text might influence their judgment 
of the argumentative tendency. 
In order to establish the effect of Linguistic Signaling and Order of Arguments on 
the judgments it was important to control for the effect of content properties. The 
strength of the arguments was established in a pre-test (discussed in the section 
Material). Furthermore, the source of the information was comparable for each of the 
two conjuncts and it was neutral: The information was presented by journalists or 
interest groups (and not by political leaders, for instance). Finally, controversial topics 
like abortion or nuclear arms were not used in the texts. 
The hypothesis to be tested was that in versions with maar the writer's opinion was 
more clearly present than in versions without maar, and that a judgment of that 
opinion was determined by the argumentative tendency of the second conjunct. 
TEXT EXPERIMENTS 93 
5.1.2 Method. 
Material 
Eight argumentative texts were constructed. They were based on existing newspaper 
articles. The eight texts had the same structure. Each text consisted of three para-
graphs. The first paragraph was an introduction of the topic to be discussed in the text. 
Each one of the following two paragraphs gave an argument, one in favor of a specific 
position with respect to the topic of discussion, the other against that position. The 
arguments were complex, in that they consisted of several sentences and were com-
posed of sub-arguments. The length and the degree of complexity of the two arguments 
in each text were more or less the same. The two arguments had an opposite argumen-
tative tendency. Each text was followed by a claim, giving one of two possible positions 
with respect to the topic of discussion. 
An example text is given in (1), followed by an English translation in (2). 
(1) 
De Nederlandse Vereniging voor Huisvrouwen bespreekt in haar recent 
verschenen folder "Statiegeld?" de mogelijkheid om wegwerpverpakkingen te 
verbieden, met daaraan gekoppeld de herinvoering van statiegeld op flessen en 
ander glaswerk. 
Ze meent dat er veel milieutechische bezwaren kleven aan wegwerpverpakkin-
gen. De Vereniging noemt dit een zwaarwegend argument in een zo milieubewust 
tijdperk als het onze. Verder vindt ze de herinzameling middels de glascontainer, 
wat een alternatief is voor de wegwerpverpakkingen, onrendabel: maar weinig 
Nederlanders doen er vrijwillig aan mee en het stukgooien van het glas is 
uiteindelijk veel duurder dan het heel inleveren ervan. 
Maar ze wijst aan de andere kant op de voordelen die er aan wegwerpglas en 
kartonnen verpakkingen zitten. Zo hecht ze zeer aan de grote mate van hygiène 
van het wegwerpglas. Ook wijst ze er op dat kartonnen verpakkingen makkelijker 
transporteerbaar zijn, wat de prijs van het product drukt. Bovendien wordt er van 
verpakkingen die voor éénmalig gebruik bestemd zijn minder kwaliteit geëist dan 
van verpakkingen die vele malen gebruikt worden. Dit zorgt er ook voor dat de 
prijs van het product relatief laag blijft. 
Claim: Het statiegeld moet opnieuw worden ingevoerd. 
(2) 
- In a recently published leaflet entitled "Deposit Money?", the Dutch Organiza-
tion of Housewives discusses the possibility of a ban on disposable packings in 
conjunction with the reintroduction of a deposit on bottles and other glass. 
It believes that there are many ecological objections to disposable packings. 
The organization calls this a weighty argument in an environment-minded era like 
ours. Moreover, it considers the collection of glass by means of the bottle bank, 
which is an alternative to disposable packing materials, to be uneconomic: Few 
Dutchmen participate voluntarily and in the end smashing the glass is much more 
expensive than handing it in undamaged. 
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But on the other hand the organization stresses the advantages of disposable 
glass and cardboard containers. For example, it values the high degree of hygiene 
of disposable glass. It also points out that cardboard containers are easier to 
transport, which keeps the price of the product low. Moreover, less quality is 
required of packings that are intended for single use than of packings that are 
used many times. This also contributes to the relatively low price of the product. 
Claim: Deposit money should be reintroduced. 
Of each text four versions were made. In two versions the arguments were related by 
means of maar, in the other two they were not. In two versions the argument in favor 
of the claim preceded the argument against that claim, in the other two versions it 
followed that argument. 
The arguments in the experimental texts were embedded under elements referring to 
the perspectives of (potential) conversational partners (such as Ze meent (It thinks) and 
ze wijst erop (it stresses)). The mean length of the texts was 128.5 words. 
The contrastive coherence relations used in Experiment 3 were semantic oppositions 
and concessive oppositions. Denials of expectation were not used, because these 
contrastive coherence relations do not allow a reversal of the conjuncts (cf. Section 
3.5.2). 
The strength and polarity of the arguments was established in a pre-test immediately 
preceding Experiment 3. A series of claims was presented to the subjects. These were 
the claims that were given below each text in Experiment 3 (cf. example (1)). Each 
claim was accompanied by one of the arguments from the text. The subjects answered 
two questions: 1. Is the argument an argument in favor of or against the claim? 2. How 
strong an argument is it? The weight of the arguments was judged by the eight students 
who also participated in Experiment 3. Each subject judged the strength of every 
argument. Two experimental lists were constructed, which differed in the order in 
which the arguments were presented to the subjects. 
The answers of the subjects were transformed to a nine-point scale, ranging from 1 
(argument pleading maximally against the claim) to 9 (argument pleading maximally in 
favor of the claim). Two analyses of variance were carried out on the data: one with 
subjects as the random factor and one with texts as the random factor. The factor Type 
of Argument had two levels (in favor of the claim or against the claim) and was 
repeated with respect to subjects, but not with respect to arguments. The factor Subject 
Group was a between-subjects factor with two levels (List 1 or List 2). 
The judgments were near the ends of the scale and, more importantly, symmetrical. 
The mean scale value of the arguments in favor of a claim was 7.1 and the mean scale 
value of the arguments against a claim was 2.9. This difference was significant (/",(1,6) 
= 104.58, ρ < .01; F2(l,7) = 93.25, ρ < .01); mirtf"(l,12) = 49.49, ρ < .01). Thus it 
was concluded that the arguments in the text had opposite argumentative tendencies 
and more or less equal weights. 
Subjects and procedure 
Eight subjects (students of Nijmegen University) participated in Experiment 3. They 
were paid for their participation. The subjects read and compared all four versions of a 
text. After reading and comparing the texts the subjects gave their judgement of the 
writer's opinion. The four versions of a text (labelled A, B, C, and D) were presented 
on one page, so that they could be compared. The claim was printed at the bottom of 
the page. It represented a possible position with respect to the topic of discussion in 
the text (cf. example text (l)-(2)). The claim was followed by a seven-point scale. The 
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minimum of the scale was defined as "the writer of the text disagrees maximally with 
the claim", the maximum as "the writer of the text agrees maximally with the claim", 
and the center of the scale as "the text does not give any indications with respect to the 
writer's opinion". Furthermore the subjects were instructed carefully not to give their 
own opinion or the opinion of a person or institution cited in the text, but the opinion 
of the writer of the text. The subjects' task was to put the labels of the versions on the 
seven-point scale. If they could not find a difference between two versions they were 
allowed to attribute the same scale value to those versions. 
The order in which the texts were presented to the subjects was not varied. 
5.1.3 Results. 
The replies of the subjects were transformed to a seven-point numeric scale (1 = the 
writer disagrees maximally with the claim, 7 = the writer agrees maximally with the 
claim, 4 = the text does not give any indications regarding the writer's opinion with 
respect to the claim). Two analyses of variance were carried out on the data: one with 
subjects as the random factor, and one with experimental texts as the random factor. In 
both analyses the factors Linguistic Signaling and Order of Arguments had two levels 
and were repeated with respect to both subjects and texts. 
The means for these two factors are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Wean 5ca7e Values for the Judgments of Writer's Opinion, with 
Factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling (Exper­
iment 3). 
Order of arguments F-A A-F 
Linguist ic 
Signaling 
Maar 2.89 4.94 
No Conjunction 3.68 4.00 
Note. F <= argument in Favor of the claim. A = argument Against 
the claim. Scale values from 1 to 7. 
There was an interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling: 
In versions with тааг the means were closer to the extremes of the scale of possible 
scores than in versions without тааг (Fl(l,7) = 23.55, ρ < .01; /2(1,7) = 128.20, ρ < 
.01; minF'(l,9) = 19.90, ρ < .01). 
The means for the factor Order of Arguments differ significantly in the versions with 
тааг (F(l,7) = 23.34 (p < .01) for the comparison based on the analysis with subjects 
as the random factor), whereas they do not differ in the versions without a conjunction 
(F < 1). This supports the second part of the Asymmetry Hypothesis: The effect found 
in contrastive coherence relations signaled by тааг is absent when there is no such 
signal. 
There was also an effect of the factor Order of Arguments (Fi(l,T) = 8.82, ρ < .05; 
/2(1,7) = 20.59, ρ < .01; minF'(l,12) = 6.17, ρ < .05). The writer's opinion was 
identified as the second part of the contrast. Since the versions without conjunction do 
not differ significantly, this effect is mainly due to the effect of тааг on the interpreta­
tion. 
Therefore these results confirm the Asymmetry Hypothesis. 
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5.1.4 Discussion. 
The data show that the judgments were determined by the order of the arguments, and 
that the second argument was decisive: For instance, it was much more often assumed 
that the writer agreed with the claim when the claim was in agreement with the second 
argument than when it was in agreement with the first argument. More importantly, the 
data showed that the presence of maar had the predicted effect on the judgments: If 
the contrastive coherence relation was marked by means of maar, the writer's opinion 
was more often identified as the second part of the contrastive coherence relation than 
if the contrast was not explicitly marked. Without such a marker the effect was absent. 
These results can be phrased in terms of the Asymmetry Hypothesis: The inference 
that can be derived from the second conjunct stands a better chance of percolating to 
the speaker perspective if the contrastive coherence relation is marked by maar than if 
there is no explicit marking of the contrastive coherence relation. 
The texts used in Experiment 3 contained global contrastive coherence relations. 
The results of the experiment therefore suggest that the analysis of Chapter 3 also 
applies to these types of contrastive coherence relations. 
5.2 Experiment 4 
5.2.1 Introduction. 
The task of the subjects in Experiment 3 was meta-linguistic: In order to examine the 
influence of certain variables on the interpretation of that text, the subjects compared 
different versions of a text. Quite a different issue is whether the presence of maar is 
also of influence in more normal reading situations. This question was examined in 
Experiment 4. 
The variables that were manipulated were the same as in Experiment 3. The 
expectations regarding the results were identical to those of Experiment 3: It was 
expected that the writer's opinion would be related to the second argument and that it 
would be more salient in versions with maar than in versions without maar. 
5.12 Method. 
The material used in Experiment 4 was identical to the material of Experiment 3. The 
difference was the procedure that was used. In Experiment 4 the subjects read only one 
version of each text. After each text the subjects answered the question whether the 
writer of the text agreed or disagreed with a claim. This claim was presented below the 
text. It was a possible position regarding the topic discussed in the text. 
The two possible answers of the subjects were the choices "writer agrees" and "writer 
disagrees". No neutral alternative was allowed. The reason for this is that the differen-
ces between the versions with respect to their argumentative tendency were expected to 
be subtle: It had to be avoided that subjects frequently chose a neutral alternative. 
That would conceal the differences between the versions, if any. 
The subjects were 20 students of Nijmegen University, who were paid for their 
participation. 
Four experimental lists were constructed. The distribution of the four text versions 
in the lists was varied systematically. Across the four lists, each experimental text 
occurred once in each version. In each of the four conditions of a list there were two 
experimental texts. Each list was presented to five subjects. 
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5.2.3 Results. 
The answers of the subjects were transformed to a two-point scale (1 = writer dis-
agrees with the claim, 2 = writer agrees with the claim). Two analyses of variance were 
carried out on the data, with subjects and experimental texts as the random factor, 
respectively. In both analyses the factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling 
had two levels and they were repeated with respect to both subjects and experimental 
texts. In the analysis by subjects Subject Group was a between-subjects factor with four 
levels. In the analysis by experimental texts the factor Text Group was neglected. The 
data are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Mean Scale Values for the Judgments of Writer's Opinion, with 
Factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling (Exper-
iment 4). 
Order of arguments F-A A-F 
Linguist ic 
Signaling 
«aar 1.23 1.76 
No Conjunction 1.49 1.49 
Note. F = argument in Favor of the claim. A = argument Against 
the claim. Scale values from 1 to 2. 
There was a main effect of the factor Order of Arguments: Fl(l,16) = 9.23 (p < .01), 
F2(l,7) = 8.19 (p < .05), minF'(\,\K) = 4.34 (p < .05). With respect to the predicted 
interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling only the analysis 
with subjects as the random factor gave a significant result: F\(\,\&) = 12.78 (p < .01), 
/2(1,7) = 3.22 (p = 0.06, one-tailed). 
5.14 Discussion. 
The task of the subjects in Experiment 4 was more like a normal reading situation than 
in Experiment 3: TTie subjects did not give meta-linguistic judgments on the basis of a 
comparison of four text versions, but read only one version of a text. The results only 
partly correspond to the predictions. 
The significant effect of the factor Order of Arguments indicates, once again, that 
the most recent argument was most decisive in identifying the writer's opinion. 
The data did not show more than a tendency of the signaling function of moor found 
in previous experiments. The means in Table 2 are in the predicted direction: Versions 
with moor received a more extreme scale value than versions without moor. Because 
the asymmetry effect may be attenuated by the small number of texts, a similar 
experiment was carried out in which more texts and subjects were used. 
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5.3 Experiment 5 
5.3.1 Introduction. 
Expenment S differed from Experiment 4 in the sense that more texts and subjects 
were used. Moreover, in this experiment the effect was investigated of two other factors 
on the argumentative tendency of texts containing a contrastive coherence relation, viz. 
Type of Contrastive Coherence Relation (semantic opposition vs. concessive opposi­
tion) and Extra Oppositional Element (present or absent). The method of investigation 
and the task of the subjects were basically the same as in Experiment 4. 
As a reminder one example of each type of contrastive coherence relation one example 
is given: (3) is an example of a semantic opposition and (4) is a concessive opposition. 
(3) A: Which of the two should we ask for the job? 
B: John is tall, but Pete is strong. 
(4) А: к John dangerous? 
B: He is small, but he took karate-lessons. 
In Section 3.5 some of the differences between semantic and concessive oppositions 
were discussed. On the basis of that discussion it can be expected that concessive 
oppositions display more asymmetry than semantic oppositions, since the conflict which 
is required for an adequate use of the contrastive coherence relation is more urgent in 
the former: The contrastive coherence relation in a concessive opposition leads to a 
direct contradiction of the conflicting inferences, whereas in a semantic opposition this 
contradiction has to be derived from contextual information. 
Extra oppositional elements fulfill a role similar to maar. They make the contrast 
between the related parts explicit. Therefore it was expected that their presence had 
the same effect on the interpretation of the text as the presence of maar. It was not 
dear, however, whether the asymmetry effect would be stronger in a text containing 
both an extra oppositional element and maar. 
These considerations lead to the following expectations: 
1. Judgments of the writer's opinions agree with the content of the second argument. 
2. This order effect is stronger in versions with maar or an extra oppositional 
element than in versions without an explicit signal for the contrastive interpretation. 
3. The effects of the order of the arguments and the presence of an explicit contras­
tive signal is stronger in concessive oppositions than in semantic oppositions. 
5.3.2 Method. 
Material 
The material in Experiment 5 consisted of 24 texts, 12 semantic opposition texts and 12 
concessive opposition texts. Sixteen new texts were added to the eight argumentative 
texts used in Experiments 3 and 4. The 16 new texts were constructed in the same 
manner as the texts used previously. They were based on existing newspaper articles 
and their structure was more or less invariable. A text consisted of an introduction and 
two arguments. 
Six semantic opposition texts and six concessive opposition texts contained an extra 
oppositional element, and six texts of each type did not have such an element. 
All texts were provided with a title introducing the topic of the text. 
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Of each text four versions were made. The versions differed in the order of the two 
arguments and in the presence or absence of the conjunction maar. 
The mean length of the texts used in Experiment 5 was 118.4 words. The mean 
length of the semantic opposition texts was 130.2 words; that of the concessive opposi-
tion texts was 106.6 words. 
Subjects and procedure 
Forty subjects (undergraduate students of the Department of Language and Literature 
of Tilburg University) participated in Experiment 5. They were paid for their participa-
tion. The subjects were instructed that the concluding paragraph of each text had been 
left out. In the missing paragraph the writer had expressed his point of view regarding 
the topic of the text. The subjects were asked to identify the writer's opinion on the 
basis of the remaining text parts. The subjects gave their answer in two steps: First they 
decided whether the writer agrees or disagrees with the claim, and then they indicated 
the degree of certainty of their answer (certain or not certain). Thus they had a better 
opportunity to express the differences between the versions than in Experiment 4. 
Unlike Experiment 4, the claim was not presented on the same page as the text, but 
on the following page. This was supposed to increase the depth of processing of the 
information in the text. Moreover, this prevented the subjects from looking back in the 
text and withheld them from basing their answers on subtle content clues, such as 
expressions from specific stylistic registers. 
After every fourth text the subjects had to answer two questions about the content of 
the four texts that they had just read. This aspect of the procedure aimed at maintain-
ing the subjects' concentration at an optimum during the experiment. 
Halfway the experiment there was a ten-minute break, during which the subjects 
talked about topics not related to the experiment with the experimenter. This pause 
was intended to prevent fatigue and loss of concentration. 
The experimental material was presented to the subjects in eight lists. A list consisted 
of 24 experimental texts. The distribution of the four text versions in the first four lists 
was varied systematically. Across the lists, each experimental text occurred once in each 
version. In each of the four conditions within a list there were four experimental texts. 
Four other experimental lists were constructed on the basis of Lists 1-4 by exchanging 
the first and the second half of the experimental material. Thus apart from the order of 
the texts Lists 1-4 and Lists 5-9 were identical. Each list was presented to five subjects. 
5.3-3 Results. 
The answers of the subjects were transformed to a four-point scale (1 = writer 
disagrees with the claim, subject is certain; 2 = writer disagrees with the claim, subject 
is not certain; 3 = writer agrees with the claim, subject is not certain; 4 = writer 
agrees with the claim, subject is certain). Four analyses of variance were carried out on 
the data. In the first two analyses, with subjects and experimental texts as the random 
factor, Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling had two levels and were repeated 
with respect to both subjects and experimental texts. The factor Type of Contrastive 
Coherence Relation had two levels and was repeated with respect to subjects, but not 
with respect to experimental texts. The factor Order of Presentation had two levels 
(List 1-4 vs. List 5-8) and was a within-texts and between-subjects factor. The factors 
Subject Group and Text Group had four levels and were between-subjects and 
between-texts factors, respectively. 
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Two separate analyses of variance (with subjects and texts as the random factor, 
respectively) were carried out to investigate the effect of the factor Extra Oppositional 
Element, because incorporating this factor in the previous analyses left only very few 
observations per cell. The factor had two levels and was repeated with respect to 
subjects, but not with respect to texts. The factor Text Group was neglected in the 
analysis by texts. The other factors were as in the previous two analyses. 
ТЪе data are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Mean Scale Values for the Judgments of Writer's Opinion, with 
Factors Linguistic Signaling, Order of Arguments, Extra Op­
positional Element, and Type of Contrastive Coherence Relation 
(Experiment 5). 
Type of Contrastlve Semantic Concessive 
Coherence Relation Opposition Opposition 
Order of Arguments F-A Α-F F-A A-F 
Linguistic 
Signaling 
With Extra Oppositional Element 
Haar 1.84 2.36 2.06 3.05 
No Conjunction 2.01 2.38 2.34 2.94 
Without Extra Oppositional Element 
Haar 2.78 2.83 1.84 2.61 
No Conjunction 2.90 2.81 1.85 2.70 
Note. F - argument in Favor of the claim. A - argument Against 
the claim. Scale values from 1 to 4. 
The expected interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic Signaling 
was not found (^(1,32) = 1.52, ρ = 0.23; ^ ( І . іб) = 1.03, ρ = 0.33). Of the interaction 
between Order of Arguments and Extra Oppositional Element only F, reached 
significance (^(1,32) = 4 .47^ < .05; ^(1,20) = 2.16, ρ = 0.16). 
There was a main effect of the factor Order of Arguments: F7(l,32) = 36.66 (p < 
.01), F2(l,16) = 23.57 (p < .01), mwF'(l,35) = 14.35 (p < .01). The means indicate 
that the second argument had a stronger influence on the subjects' judgments than the 
first argument. This is in line with the first hypothesis. 
There was also a significant interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and Type 
of Contrastive Coherence Relation: F,(l,32) = 12.97 (p < .01), ^
г
(1,16) = 6.68 (ρ < 
.05), m/nF'(l,32) = 4.41 (ρ < .05). The means in Table 3 indicate that the effect of the 
order of the arguments was stronger in concessive oppositions than in semantic 
oppositions. This result is in agreement with the third hypothesis. 
Another finding was a significant F, for the factor Extra Oppositional Element: 
F/(l,32) = 5.46 (p < .05), F, < 1: Texts with extra oppositional elements tended to 
receive lower scale values than texts without extra oppositional elements. Furthermore, 
there was an interaction of the factors Extra Oppositional Element and Type of 
Contrastive Coherence Relation: F;(l,32) = 47.44, F2(l,20) = 7.66 (p < .05), 
minFXl,26) = 6.60 (p < .05). The means indicate that semantic oppositions with extra 
oppositional elements received low scale values and semantic opposition without extra 
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oppositional element received high scale values, whereas in concessive oppositions the 
opposite relation held. 
5.3.4 Discussion. 
The effect of the factor Order of Arguments can be interpreted as: The second 
argument is of greater importance for the readers' judgments than the first argument. 
The interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and Type of Contrastive Coherence 
Relation indicates that the effect of the order of the arguments is greater in concessive 
oppositions than in semantic oppositions. This is in line with the analysis given in 
Chapter 3: Semantic oppositions are about two entities in the domain of discussion and 
concessive oppositions are about one entity. The conflict between the conjuncts of a 
semantic opposition is less urgent than in a concessive opposition, since in the latter it 
leads to the direct derivation of a contradiction, whereas in the former the contradic­
tion is to be derived from contextual information. 
There is no satisfactory explanation for the effect of the factor Extra Oppositional 
Element, because, similar to the factor Linguistic Signaling, one would only expect an 
interaction with the factor Order of Arguments. The effect probably has to be ascribed 
to textual differences between texts with and texts without extra oppositional elements, 
such as differences in the weight of the arguments: Note that Extra Oppositional 
Element is a between-texts factor. 
Another problematic finding is the interaction of the factors Type of Contrastive 
Coherence Relation and Extra Oppositional Element. Given that each of the four 
means is based on different groups of texts (both Type of Contrastive Coherence 
Relation and Extra Oppositional Element are between-texts factors) one must assume 
that the interaction is caused by textual differences, such as differences in the argumen­
tative weight of the conjuncts. 
Contrary to expectation there is no interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and 
Linguistic Signaling, nor of Order of Arguments and Extra Oppositional Element. The 
data do not give any indication that explicitly marking the contrastive coherence 
relation has any effect on the judgments of the argumentative tendency of the texts. 
To summarize, the results of Experiment 5 indicate that readers' judgments of the 
argumentative tendency of texts containing a contrastive coherence relation are 
influenced by the order of the arguments (the most recent argument is generally 
decisive) and the type of contrastive coherence relation (in a semantic opposition this 
order effect is smaller than in a concessive opposition). The data do not show any 
systematic effect of a linguistic marking of the contrastive coherence relation, either by 
maar от by an extra oppositional element. 
One may conclude from Experiments 3-5 that the presence of maar does not have a 
clear influence on the text interpretations. Judgments of the argumentative tendency of 
sentential contrasts are evidently determined by the presence of maar (Experiments 1 
and 2). The meta-linguistic judgments of the readers in Experiment 3 confirmed that in 
this task there is a strong effect of the presence of maar on the argumentative tendency 
of a text. In a more normal reading task (Experiments 4 and 5) this effect was not 
found. 
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5.4 Experiment d* Perspectives and Asymmetry1 
5.4.1 Introduction. 
A plausible line of explanation for the outcomes of Experiments 1-S is that there is a 
difference between the texts used in Experiments 3-5 and the sentences used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 with regard to the presence of perspective indicating elements 
(Pi's), i.e. elements referring to the perspective of a (potential) conversational partner 
or a (potential) state of affairs. The texts of Experiments 3-5 contained such Pi's. The 
sentential contrasts did not contain Pi's, since here the information in the conjuncts 
was given from the perspective of the speaker of the sentence. It might be that the 
presence of Pi's affected the results of the text experiments. In Experiment 6 the 
presence of these elements in the conjuncts of sentential contrasts was treated as an 
experimental factor. 
It was expected that there would be a relation between the asymmetry of moor-
coordinations and the presence or absence of explicit Pi's in the conjuncts: In senten­
tial contrasts with explicit Pis the asymmetry effect would be less than in sentential 
contrasts without such elements. 
5.4.2 Method. 
Material 
The material was similar to the semantic oppositions used in Experiment 1. There were 
32 experimental texts. Of each text eight versions were made. The versions differed 
from each other in the type of conjunction relating the two conjuncts (maar/en), in the 
order of the conjuncts (either conjunct A preceded conjunct В or conjunct A followed 
conjunct B), and in the presence of a perspective indicator in each conjunct. As to the 
latter, apart from a version like (5)/(6) there was also a version like (7)/(8). 
(5) 
Welk boek zullen we aanbevelen voor een oriënterende cursus taalfilosofie? 
"The Philosophy of Language" geeft een goed overzicht van recente ontwikkelin-
gen in het denken over taal, maar in "Language and Reasoning" zijn uitgebreide 
en makkelijk hanteerbare bibiliografische aantekeningen opgenomen na elk 
hoofdstuk. 
(i) Het is dus beter om "The Philosophy of Language" aan te bevelen. 
(ii) Het is dus beter om "Language and Reasoning" aan te bevelen. 
(6) 
Which book shall we recommend for an introductory course in language philo-
sophy? 
"The Philosophy of Language" gives a good overview of recent developments in 
thinking about language, but "Language and Reasoning" has extensive and easily 
usable bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter. 
(i) So it is better to recommend "The Philosophy of Language". 
(ii) So it is better to recommend "Language and Reasoning". 
2
 This section is based on Vonk, Spooren and Noordman (in preparation). Experiment 6 
was carried out by P.W.M. Coerwinkel. 
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(7) 
Welk boek zullen we aanbevelen voor een oriënterende cursus taalfilosofie? 
Volgens professor Pieters geeft "The Philosophy of Language" een goed overzicht 
van recente ontwikkelingen in het denken over taal, maar professor Wilkens zei 
dat in "Language and Reasoning" uitgebreide en makkelijk hanteerbare bibiliogra-
fische aantekeningen zijn opgenomen na elk hoofdstuk. 
(i) Het is dus beter om "The Philosophy of Language" aan te bevelen. 
(ii) Het is dus beter om "Language and Reasoning" aan te bevelen. 
(8) 
Which book shall we recommend for an introductory course in language philo-
sophy? 
According to Professor Pieters "The Philosophy of Language" gives a good 
overview of recent developments in thinking about language, but Professor 
Wilkens said that "Language and Reasoning" has extensive and easily usable 
bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter. 
(i) So it is better to recommend "The Philosophy of Language". 
(ii) So it is better to recommend "Language and Reasoning". 
The experimental texts were presented on paper. Each text was followed by two 
possible continuation sentences, one relating to conjunct A (continuation A) and one 
relating to conjunct В (continuation B). The subjects were instructed that the texts 
were incomplete and that they had to choose the missing part from the two sentences 
below each text. They also had to indicate whether they were certain or not about their 
choice. Thus they could give one of four answers. There was no neutral continuation 
sentence. 
Procedure 
Eight experimental lists were constructed. Each text occurred in every list. A list 
consisted of two blocks: A block containing 16 texts with explicit perspective indicators 
and a block containing 16 texts without explicit perspective indicators. Across the eight 
lists, each experimental text occurred once in each version. In each of the eight 
conditions within a list there were eight experimental texts. On the basis of these eight 
lists eight other lists were constructed. The latter eight lists differed from the former in 
the order of the two blocks of 16 texts. Thus, apart from the order of the experimental 
material, list 1-8 and list 9-16 were identical. 
Subjects 
Sixty-four subjects, students from Nijmegen University, participated in the experiment. 
They were paid for their participation. Each list was presented to four subjects. 
5.4.3 Results. 
The responses of the subjects were transformed to a four-point scale (1 = choice for 
continuation A, subject is certain; 2 = choice for continuation A, subject is not certain; 
3 = choice for continuation B, subject is not certain; 4 = choice for continuation B, 
subject is certain). Two analyses of variance were carried out on the data, one with 
subjects as the random factor and one with texts as the random factors. In both 
analyses the factors Order of Conjuncts, Linguistic Signaling, and Perspective Indicator 
had two levels, and they were repeated. The factor Order of Presentation had two 
levels (Lists 1-8 vs. Lists 9-16), and was a between-subjects and within-texts factor. The 
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factor Subject Group had eight levels and was a between-subjects factor. The data are 
summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Mean Scale Values for Choices of Continuation Sentences, with 
Factors Order of Conjuncts, Linguistic Signaling, and Perspec­
tive Indicator. 
Perspective Indicator 
Order of Conjuncts 
Linguistic 
Signaling 
Haar 
En 
present 
B-A A-B 
1.75 
2.47 
3.13 
2.63 
absent 
B-Α A-B 
1.70 3.39 
2.50 2.60 
Note. Scale values from 1 to 4. Source: Vonk, Spooren and 
Noordman ( i n preparation). 
There was a main effect of the factor Order of Conjuncts: F,(l,48) = 68.82, ρ < .01, 
F2(l,31) = 169.74, ρ < .01, minF'(lJ5) = 48.97, ρ < .01. The means indicate that the 
second conjunct had a greater influence on the choices than the first conjunct. Second, 
there was a significant interaction of the factors Order of Conjuncts and Linguistic 
Signaling: ^,(1,48) = 144.56, ρ < .01, F2(l,31) = 211.73, ρ < .01, inuiF'(l,78) = 74.34, 
ρ < .01. The means indicate that versions with тааг received more extreme scores 
than versions with en. A final finding is the three-way interaction of the factors Order 
of Conjuncts, Linguistic Signaling, and Perspective Indicator: F;(l,48) = 4.73, ρ < .05, 
F2(l,31) = 6.15, ρ < .05, m;'nf'(1,78) = 2.67, ρ = 0.05 (one-tailed). In versions in 
which the conjuncts had perspective indicators the asymmetry effect was smaller than 
in versions in which the conjuncts did not have perspective indicators. This result is in 
accordance with the hypothesis. 
5.4.4 Dbcussion. 
Experiment 6 replicated the findings of Experiment 1: The order of the conjuncts has 
an influence on the interpretation of contrastive coherence relations and this effect is 
stronger in versions with тааг than in versions with en. In terms of the Asymmetry 
Hypothesis, contrastive coherence relations marked by тааг display more asymmetry 
than unmarked contrastive coherence relations. It is especially the third finding that is 
of particular interest: The asymmetry effect is smaller in texts with explicit perspective 
indicators than in texts without such elements. Both F, and F2 reached significance. 
These results are a strong indication of the relevance of the factor Perspective 
Indicators for the interpretation of contrastive coherence relations. Recall that in the 
texts used in Experiments 3-5 the conjuncts of the contrastive coherence relation had 
such perspective indicators. This suggests an experiment in which the interpretation of 
global contrastive coherence relations without perspective indicators is investigated. 
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5.5 Experiment 7: The Salient Marking of Global Contrastive Coherence Relations 
5.5.1 Introduction. 
In Experiment 7 the asymmetry of global contrastive coherence relations was inves-
tigated anew. In view of the results of Experiment 6 the conjuncts in the texts did not 
contain perspective indicators. Furthermore the marking of the contrast was made 
more salient. Thus, instead of the conjunction maar, the contrast was marked by a 
contrastive sentence such as Maar daartegenover staat de andere kandidaat (But in 
contrast with this there ü the other candidate). 
The rationale of this latter manipulation is that the asymmetry effect of explicitly 
marking the contrast may well be proportional to the size of the contrasted parts, in 
the sense that global contrastive coherence relations need more salient markers to 
indicate the asymmetry than local contrastive coherence relations. Such an explanation 
accounts for the fact that the only experiment in which texts were used and in which 
the presence of maar had an effect on the readers' judgments was Experiment 3: In 
this experiment the subjects were instructed to pay attention to text versions with and 
without moor, i.e. the subjects were pointed, so to speak, at the presence or absence of 
maar. 
In Experiment 7 subjects judged the argumentative tendency of global contrastive 
coherence relations.3 The contrastive coherence relations were either unmarked or 
marked by a salient contrast marker. 
In order to avoid the use of perspective indicators, the texts used in Experiment 7 
had the format of interviews, in which an interviewee gave an answer to a question 
using a global contrastive coherence relation. As a consequence the two conjuncts of 
the contrastive coherence relation were embedded in the same perspective, viz. that of 
the interviewee. 
In order to control for an effect of the content of the arguments, the texts were 
presented in two argument orders. 
The subjects judged the argumentative tendency of the texts by choosing between 
two continuation sentences, each relating to a different argument in the text. 
As in the other experiments, the hypothesis to be tested was that marked contrastive 
coherence relations reflect the writer's opinion regarding the topic of discussion more 
clearly than unmarked contrastive coherence relations. 
5.5.2 Method. 
Material 
Sixteen argumentative texts were constructed. The texts in the experiment were all 
semantic oppositions. The argumentation in the texts was based on existing texts. The 
texts were dialogues, presented as radio or newspaper interviews. Each text consisted of 
two parts. In the first part an interviewer introduced the topic of discussion and asked 
a question, in the second part the interviewee gave an answer to the question. The 
answer consisted of two conjuncts, which argued for opposite positions regarding the 
topic of discussion. The conjuncts were argumentatively complex, in that they consisted 
of more than one sentence and contained sub-arguments. The length and argumenta-
tive complexity of the conjuncts were more or less the same in each text. The mean 
3
 Experiment 7 was carried out by H. van de Gevel, as a student of the Department of 
Dutch Language and Literature of Nijmegen University. He was supervised by Dr. W. Vonk. 
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length of the texts was 203.7 words, the mean length of the contrastive sentences 
functioning as salient contrast markers was 7.9 words. 
Of each text four versions were made. The versions differed in the presence or 
absence of a salient contrast marker and in the order of the conjuncts. 
Subjects and procedure 
Thirty-two subjects (students of Nijmegen University) participated in Experiment 7. 
They were paid for their participation. The experiment was presented as part of a 
series of experiments. In the first part the subjects read a text, the second part was 
Experiment 7 and in the third they had to recall the text read in the first part. A 
complete series lasted circa 35 minutes. 
Four experimental lists were constructed. A list consisted of 16 experimental texts. 
Across the four lists, each experimental text occurred once in each version. Within each 
list there were four experimental texts occurring in each of the four conditions. The 
subjects were divided into four groups, which differed as to the list version that was 
presented to the subjects. 
The texts were presented on the screen of an Olivetti M24 microcomputer. Since 
most of the texts were too long to be presented on one screen, they were divided into 
two parts: The first part consisted of the interviewer's question, the second part 
consisted of the interviewee's reply. 
After the announcement of a new text, the first line on the screen was Interviewer to 
indicate who was speaking. By pressing a button the subjects made the sentences of the 
question appear on the screen consecutively. Each sentence appeared below the 
previous one, i.e. the previous sentences of a text part remained on the screen until the 
text part had been read. All the sentences of a text part had a fixed starting point, viz. 
the first column of the screen. As a consequence the texts did not contain orthographi-
cal indications of the structure of the text (such as paragraph indents). 
Once the reading of the question was completed, the screen was cleared, the name 
of the interviewee appeared on the first line of the screen, and the sentences of the 
reply were presented. Subsequently the screen was cleared and two alternative con-
tinuation sentences appeared. 
An example of a text is given in (9). In the English translation (10) the historical 
present of the Dutch original is replaced by the past tense. 
(9) 
First screen: 
Nieuwe tekst 
Second screen: 
Interviewer : 
Het fundament van onze West-Europese beschaving wordt gevormd door een periode 
van zo'n 1000 jaar Griekse en Romeinse overheersing. 
In de vijf eeuwen voor het begin van onze jaartelling waren het vooral de Grieken en 
hun nazaten die de toon aangaven. 
Daarna namen de Romeinen deze voortrekkersrol over. 
Dát de antieken onze moderne samenleving tot op grote hoogte beïnvloed hebben 
staat buiten kijf. 
Professor de Greef, mijn vraag aan U is welk volk de grootste invloed heeft gehad. 
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Third screen: 
Professor de Greef : 
De Romeinen zijn vooral praktisch ingesteld. 
Dat komt omdat zij van oorsprong boeren zijn. 
Die praktische kant komt in heel hun doen en laten naar voren. 
De Romein is een bouwer en een uitvinder, hij neemt de natuur goed waar. 
De Romeinen heben de meest fabelachtige bouwwerken geconstrueerd en op geniale 
wijze de kalender hervormd. 
Ze hebben rechtssystemen ontworpen die ook nu nog aan juridische studenten worden 
onderwezen. 
Het waren magistrale sprekers en grote staatslieden. 
Maar daartegenover staat de inbreng van de andere cultuur. 
De Grieken zijn met hart en ziel denkers. 
Ze zijn goed in de abstractie. 
Het hoeft dan ook geen verwondering te wekken dat de Grieken vooral uitblonken op 
het terrein van de fundamentele wetenschap. 
Het zijn biologen en wiskundigen, astronomen en aardrijkskundigen. 
De Grieken zijn ook de eersten die een wetenschappelijk en systematisch overzicht van 
de kennis over de ons omringende wereld hebben opgesteld. 
Denk maar aan de werken van Aristoteles. 
Fourth screen: 
o Ik denk dus dat de Grieken onze o Ik denk dus dat de Romeinen 
moderne samenleving het meest onze moderne samenleving het 
beïnvloed hebben. meest beïnvloed hebben. 
o (redelijk) zeker 
o niet zeker 
(10) 
First screen: 
New text 
Second screen: 
Interviewer : 
The .foundation of our Western European civilization was laid during a period of about 
1000 years of Greek and Roman domination. 
In the five centuries before the beginning of our era it was mainly the Greeks and their 
descendants who set the tone. 
Afterwards the Romans took over this pioneering role. 
That the Classics have influenced our modern society to a high degree is beyond 
dispute. 
Professor de Greef, I want to ask you which nation has had the greatest influence. 
Third screen: 
Professor de Greef : 
The Romans were mainly practically minded. 
That is so because originally they were farmers. 
This practical aspect shows up in all their doings. 
The Romans were builders and inventers, they carefully observed nature. 
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The Romans have constructed the most fabulous edifices and they have brilliantly 
amended the calendar. 
They have designed legal systems that even today are taught to law students. 
They were masterly orators and great statesmen. 
But then again there is the contribution of the other culture. 
The Greeks were philophers in heart and soul. 
They were good at abstraction. 
Therefore it does not come as a surprise that the Greeks mainly excelled in the field of 
pure science. 
They were biologists and mathematicians, astronomers and geographers. 
The Greeks were also the first to compile a scientific and systematic survey of the 
knowledge of the world surrounding us. 
Just think of Aristotle's works. 
Fourth screen: 
о So I think that the Greeks have о So I think that the Romans have 
influenced our modem society most. influenced our modem society 
most. 
о (fairly) certain 
о not certain 
In the instruction the subjects were told that the texts were incomplete, and that the 
concluding sentence of the reply had been left out. The subjects' task was to identify 
the missing sentence by choosing between the two alternatives. The subjects also had to 
indicate how certain they were about their choice: fairly certain or not certain. 
Given a text in which the reply consists of two conjuncts A and B, the subjects could 
choose a continuation sentence related to conjunct A (continuation A) or a continua­
tion sentence related to conjunct В (continuation B). In each of these cases they could 
be certain or not certain. 
5.5.3 Results. 
The responses of the subjects were transformed to a four-point scale (1 = choice for 
continuation A, certain; 2 = choice for continuation A, not certain; 3 = choice for 
continuation B, not certain; 4 = choice for continuation B, certain). 
Two analyses of variance were carried out on the data, with subjects and texts as the 
random factor respectively. In both analyses Linguistic Signaling and Order of Argu­
ments had two levels and were repeated with respect to both subjects and texts. The 
factors Subject Group and Text Group had four levels and were between-subjects and 
between-texts factors, respectively. The data are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Wean 5ca7e Values for the Choices of Continuation Sentences, 
with Factors Linguistic Signaling and Order of Arguments 
(Experiment 7). 
Order of conjuncts B-A A-B 
Linguistic 
Signaling 
Salient marking 
No marker 
Note. Scale values from 1 to 4. 
There was a significant interaction of the factors Order of Arguments and Linguistic 
Signaling: ^(1,28) = 8.56 (p < .01), F2(l,12) = 5.08 (p < .05), minF\\,2ò) = 3.19 {ρ 
< .05) (one-tailed). In the versions with a salient contrast marker judgments were more 
extreme, i.e. nearer to the ends of the scale of possible scores, than in the versions 
without a salient contrast marker. This is in accordance with the hypothesis. 
There was also a main effect of the factor Order of Arguments: ^,(1,28) = 25.53 (p 
< .01), F2(l,12) = 114.02 (p < .01), тіпР\\,У1) = 20.86 (ρ < .01). The means indicate 
that the most recent conjunct had the greatest influence on the subjects' decisions. 
Because the means for the versions in the 'No marker' condition differ also signifi­
cantly (F;(l,56) = 10.26, ρ < .01; F2(l,24) = 19.83, ρ < .01; minF\l,19) = 6.76, ρ < 
.05), this effect of the argument order cannot be attributed entirely to the presence of 
salient markers. 
5.6 Discussion 
Salient marking of contrastive coherence relations has a clear effect on the interpreta­
tion of the text in which such a contrastive coherence relation occurs. This is in 
conformity with the Asymmetry Hypothesis: Contrastive coherence relations containing 
salient contrast markers are clearer with respect to their argumentative tendency than 
contrastive coherence relations without such a marker. Thus, Experiment 7 provides 
evidence in favor of the Asymmetry Hypothesis. 
The results of Experiment 7 resemble those of Experiment 1, in that they display a 
clear effect of the explicit contrastive marker. (A minor difference is that in Experi­
ment 7 the versions without an explicit marker differ significantly.) These results differ 
from the results of Experiments 4 and 5. It is not entirely clear, however, what the 
exact cause of the difference is. A first difference between Experiments 4 and 5 on the 
one hand and Experiment 7 on the other is the marking of the contrastive coherence 
relation. A second difference is the absence of perspective indicators in the texts of 
Experiment 7. The importance of that factor was demonstrated by the results of 
Experiment 6. Whatever the exact cause may be, the main point is that the experiments 
described in this and the previous chapter show an influence of the linguistic marking 
of the contrastive coherence relation on the interpretation of a text. Somehow this 
effect has to be accounted for. The theory presented in Chapter 3 may contribute to 
such an account, and as such these experiments present evidence in favor of that 
theory. 
1.87 
2.06 
2.96 
2.66 

6 AN ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 some aspects have been described of a theory of contrastive coherence 
relations. It was assumed that these relations are, at some abstract level of representa-
tion, coordinations of contradictory propositions that are embedded under explicit or 
implicit perspective indicating elements (Pi's). Contrastive coherence relations were 
differentiated on the basis of the Asymmetry Hypothesis: If the contrast relation is 
explicitly realized, the proposition modified by the PI of the second conjunct stands a 
better chance of percolating to the higher perspective than the proposition modified by 
the PI of the first conjunct. In contrastive coherence relations that are not explicitly 
marked, there is no effect of the order of the conjuncts, i.e. neither one of the 
embedded propositions tends to percolate. 
In the ideal case, the analysis applies to both local and global contrast relations. In 
Chapters 4 and 5 several experiments were discussed in which the Asymmetry Hypothe-
sis has been put to test. The outcome was that in a normal reading situation the effect 
of the presence of an explicit marker on the interpretation of the contrastive coherence 
relation is relative to the size of the related parts. In sentential (local) contrast 
relations the presence or absence of but influenced the interpretation, in textual 
(global) contrast relations a more salient marker created the asymmetry effect. These 
findings were taken as a confirmation of the Asymmetry Hypothesis. 
In the present chapter an analysis is presented of natural argumentative texts contain-
ing a global contrastive coherence relation. The purpose of the analysis was to make an 
inventory of a series of properties of these texts, and to compare them to the texts used 
in the experiments. The outcomes of the analysis were used to find out whether, apart 
from the Asymmetry Hypothesis, other aspects of the theory of contrastive coherence 
relations also apply to global contrast relations. 
To this effect a corpus was collected that consisted of natural argumentative texts 
containing a global contrastive coherence relation and of the texts used in the experi-
ments. Furthermore a model of analysis was developed. Each text in the corpus was 
analyzed with respect to the various factors in the model of analysis. The results of the 
analysis were summarized in frequency tables. The various steps of the analysis will be 
discussed successively. 
The analyses were carried out by two analysts. In case of disagreement the analysts 
discussed the analysis in order to reach consensus. The units of analysis were the 
sentences of the text.1 An example of a text analysis is presented in the appendix. 
6.2 The Corpus of Texts Analyzed 
One part of the corpus consists of the 24 texts used in Experiment 5. The other part 
consists of 38 natural texts. The selection of the natural texts was based on the criteria 
that the texts be natural argumentative texts, written by different authors and contain-
ing a global contrastive coherence relation. 
In order to satisfy these criteria, texts were chosen from three major Dutch newspa-
pers (NRC-Handelsblad, Volkskrant, Telegraaf). The texts all appeared in May, 1983. 
The selection was restricted to two types of texts, editorial comments and letters to the 
1
 The notion 'sentence' was taken as an orthographical unit, starting with a capital and 
ending with a full stop. 
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editor. Thus it was guaranteed that the texts are argumentative and that they stem 
from different authors. The argumentation in the texts was analyzed using the Toulmin-
model (Toulmin, 1958) to find out whether the contrast relation had a major text struc-
turing role. 
This selection resulted in a corpus of 38 natural texts (6 from the NRC-Handelsblad, 
14 from the Telegraaf, 18 from the Volkskrant), which was taken to be a more or less 
randomly chosen sample of texts that satisfied the criteria. Of these texts, 24 were 
editorial comments (2 from the NRC-Handelsblad, 13 from the Telegraaf, and 9 from 
the Volkskrant), and 14 were letters to the editor (4 from the NRC-Handelsblad, 1 
from the Telegraaf, and 9 from the Volkskrant). The text length varied from 104 words 
to 1220 words*. 
Of the experimental texts it was always the original version, i.e. that version from 
which the other versions had been derived, that was analyzed. This implies, among 
other things, that all experimental texts in the analysis have an explicit contrast marker 
maar. 
6.3 The Model of Analysis 
The goal of the analysis was to make an inventory of those properties of natural and 
experimental texts that might be relevant to the theory of contrastive coherence 
relations. The factors that appear in the model of analysis were chosen in view of this 
goal. The choice of the factors and their levels is motivated in this section. Due to the 
inventory character of the analysis the levels of the factors are not always exhaustive: 
The choice of levels was instigated by the need for an appropriate analysis of the texts. 
In case the levels of a factor were grouped to simplify the analysis, the groupings are 
mentioned and motivated. 
Certain items appear at different points in the analysis: An element like welbwaar 
(clause final it is true) is both an extra oppositional element and a qualification 
indicating the restrictive truth of the assertion modified by it, and was classified 
accordingly. 
1. Locality 
One of the findings of the experiments in the previous chapters is that the asymmetry 
of buf-coordinations is restricted to sentential contrasts and that global contrasts need a 
more salient marker to indicate the asymmetry. This raises the question whether global 
contrast relations occurring in natural texts that are felt to be asymmetric are perhaps 
locally expressed. Let (1) be a (schematic) example of a global contrast, then what is 
meant by a locally expressed global contrast is indicated in (2). 
(1) Is X the case or not? 
Argument in favor of X. 
Argument in favor of not-X. 
(2) Is X the case or not? 
Argument in favor of X. 
Therefore, one might be inclined to assume that X, but there are reasons to 
assume that not-X. 
Argument in favor of not-X. 
2
 The length of the conjuncts in the contrast relation seems to be a more relevant feature 
than the overall length of the texts. Therefore, the other aspects relating to text length that are 
discussed below refer to conjunct length. 
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If natural global contrasts displaying asymmetry are of the form in (2), and not of the 
form in (1), then it does not come as a surprise that the texts in Experiment S do not 
display asymmetry: These experimental texts did not contain a local realization of the 
global contrast. 
This factor has two levels: The global contrast is locally expressed or not. 
2. Structural realtation of the global contrastive coherence relation 
The Asymmetry Hypothesis explicitly states that there is a strict relation between the 
realization of the contrastive coherence relation and its interpretation. The experiments 
confirmed the hypothesis for both local (sentential) and global (textual) contrasts, 
albeit that in global contrasts a salient marking was required to create the asymmetry. 
This raised the question of how natural global contrasts are realized structurally, and 
whether there is a relation between the structural realization of the contrast relation 
and its interpretation. 
This factor has four levels: 
1. No realization of the global contrast relation. 
2. Realization by means of maar (but) or echter (however). 
3. Parallel sentence construction. 
4. Start of a new paragraph. 
Combinations of 2-4 can also occur. 
The use of a new paragraph to separate the contrasted conjuncts can have a major text 
structuring function, thus indicating the importance of a text part. The parallel sentence 
construction, or syntactic homogeneity, refers to the syntactic structure of what is called 
the main assertion of the conjuncts: The main assertion is that sentence of each 
conjunct that is most prominent, according to the analysis of the argumentation in the 
text. Syntactic parallelization of the contrasted parts can be of help to the reader to 
derive the contrastive, or, more generally, coordinate, interpretation. See Lang (1984, p. 
40-51) on the syntactic homogeneity of the conjuncts in a coordination. 
The structural realizations of the global contrast relation mentioned here show 
different degrees of explicitness: The most explicit structural realization of the global 
contrast is the use of maar/echter in combination with the start of a new paragraph, 
whereas a mere parallel sentence construction, without a new paragraph, can be taken 
to be the least explicit. 
3. Structural realaation of the local contrastive coherence relation 
This factor has four levels. 
1. No realization of the local contrast relation. 
2. Realization by means of maar (but) or by means of a contrastive adverb that 
cannot be combined with maar (e.g., echter (however)). 
3. Realization by means of a subordinating contrastive conjunction, e.g., hoewel 
(although). 
4. Parallel sentence construction of the conjuncts. 
In this factor those elements are summarized that can have the function of maar at the 
local level. Hoewel and echter have in common that they cannot be combined with 
maar (unless there is more than one contrast relation involved). In this respect these 
elements differ from extra oppositional elements and other elements mentioned in the 
next factor, which typically can be combined with maar. 
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4. Additional contrastive markers (in both local and global contrasts) 
The contrastive coherence relation can be indicated by various linguistic means. Some 
of these can be seen as alternatives to maar (see 2 and 3). Other elements can be 
called additional contrastive markers, because they can optionally be added to the 
conjuncts, and therefore co-occur with maar. 
This factor has the following levels: 
1. The conjunct does not contain an additional contrastive marker. 
2. The conjunct contains an extra oppositional element (expressions like yet, 
nevertheless, moreover, oho) or a contrastive element with a sentence internal 
semantic function (expressions like some...others). 
3. The conjunct contains a topicalization of a locational or temporal adverbial 
phrase. 
4. The conjunct shows a marked word order not resulting from topicalization (i.e. it 
is a passive construction, a question, or an imperative construction). 
5. The conjunct contains a negation. 
Combinations of 2-5 are also possible. It is the main assertion that was examined with 
respect to the presence of additional contrastive markers. 
The class of extra oppositional elements was described in the introduction to Experi-
ment 3 (Chapter 5): They are optional elements that support the contrastive interpreta-
tion and do not belong to the thematic structure of the conjunct. These elements have 
been distinguished from contrastive elements that do belong to the thematic structure 
of the conjunct (for instance grammatical subjects). Both types of elements may well 
function to facilitate/indicate the contrastive interpretation. Therefore, both types are 
referred to as extra oppositional elements. 
Topicalizations and passives are marked word orders, the use of which can result in 
a sentence initial position of Pi's (cf. Section 3.2 on the relation between Pi's and 
syntactic structure). Questions and imperatives were added to capture other marked 
word orders in the main assertion. 
Negative elements can be used to indicate the presence of a contrast relation {John 
went to school, Pete didn't). A special use of negation is characteristically found in the 
second conjunct of a contrast relation: The negation refers to the truth of the informa-
tion in the first conjunct (as in John says that X, but that is not true). 
In the analysis the class of additional contrastive markers of the conjunct was divided 
into syntactic markers (topicalizations, passive constructions, questions and impera-
tives) and semantic markers (extra oppositional elements and negations). 
5. Restricting the validity of information: Pi's (in local and global contrast relations) 
The distribution of Pi's in the two parts of the contrast relation is an important aspect 
of the analysis. A hypothesis underlying the theory of contrast relations is that it exists 
between two perspectives containing conflicting information. The distribution of Pi's is 
an important indication for the validity of this hypothesis, since it shows the changes in 
perspective between the conjuncts. The analysis only looks at the presence of explicit 
Pi's. It does not take into account the abstract P-operators hypothesized in the theory 
of Chapter 3. 
The levels of this factor were grouped according to the criterion whether or not 
there was a PI, and if there was a PI, whether or not it referred to the writer perspec-
tive. 
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A. The conjunct does not contain a PI. 
1. The validity of the information is not restricted (facts). 
2. The information is given from the writer perspective (opinions), but there are no 
explicit Pi's. 
B. The conjunct contains a PI that (indirectly) refers to the writer perspective. 
1. The information is embedded under an epistemic modal (e.g. muschien {pe­
rhaps)). 
2. The information is embedded under a deontic modal (e.g. behoren (should)). 
3. The information is embedded under a PI which explicitly refers to the writer 
perspective (e.g. volgens mij (in my opinion)). 
C. The information in the conjunct is embedded under a PI referring to a (potential) 
conversational partner or another (possible) world. 
Utterances containing so-called factives (predicates like know, which presuppose the 
truth of their complement) were categorized under facts (A.1). It was assumed that 
factive predicates do not result in the creation of a perspective, i.e. they do not restrict 
the validity of their complement. Arguments for this position are given in Jaspers and 
Spooren (1988) and Spooren (1987). 
Facts differ from opinions, because opinions are debatable positions, for which 
arguments can or must be given. Opinions typically allow embedding under an 
expression like in my opinion and I find (for instance, In my opinion Rome is a beautiful 
city). Facts generally do not allow such an embedding, which is why In my opinion the 
square root of 9 is 3 is strange. Needless to say that the distinction between facts and 
opinions is not always clear-cut. 
For the benefit of the analysis the levels of this factor were grouped in three ways: 
1. Presence or absence of a PI (A versus B, C). 2. The writer is responsible for an 
assertion or not (A.2, В versus A.1, C). 3. Presence or absence of a PI referring to a 
(potential) conversational partner or another (possible) world (C versus A, B). 
6. Change of perspective in the transition from one conjunct to the other 
Closely related to the presence of Pi's is the question whether the transition from one 
conjunct to the other brings about a change in perspective. A change in perspective 
occurs whenever one of the conjuncts has a PI that does not occur in the other 
conjunct. 
This factor has two levels: The information in the two conjuncts is given from the 
same perspective, or not. 
7. Writer's opinion 
A text can be explicit about the writer's opinion. The Asymmetry Hypothesis predicts 
that if the writer's opinion is overtly present in the text it is related to the second part 
of the structurally realized contrast relations, whereas in lack of a structural realization 
there is no such strict relation between the writer's opinion and the second conjunct. 
This factor has two levels: The writer's opinion is overtly present in the text or not. 
8. Asymmetry 
If a text contains explicit indications regarding the writer's opinion, it can be related to 
both parts of the conjuncts in the contrastive coherence relation. This factor has four 
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levels: The writer's opinion relates to the first or to the second conjunct of the local 
contrast (if present) and to the first or the second conjunct of the global contrast. 
9. Qualifying the information (both in local and global contrasts) 
The analysis did not systematically take into account the weight of the arguments 
involved in the contrast relation, for example by estimating that weight experimentally. 
Nevertheless, in view of the results of Experiments 3-5, it seemed to be an important 
factor. 
In order to fill this gap in the analysis, an inventory was made of those elements in 
the conjuncts that qualify the truth or validity of information. These qualifications were 
therefore taken to be indications of the argumentative strength of the information 
embedded within a perspective. 
The qualifications could take one of the following forms: 
1. The conjunct contains no qualifications. 
2. The conjunct contains a positive qualification of the truth of the information 
(waar (true)). 
3. The conjunct contains a negative qualification of the truth of the information 
(onwaar (not true). 
4. The conjunct contains a restrictive qualification of the truth of the information 
(weliswaar (it L· true)). 
5. The conjunct contains a qualification expressing the unexpectedness of the truth 
of the information (het blijkt dat (it appears that)). 
6. The conjunct contains a qualification expressing the possibility of the truth of the 
information (het lijkt erop dat (it seems that)). 
7. The conjunct contains a qualification expressing the possibility of the falsehood of 
the information. 
8. The conjunct contains a positive evaluation of the information (terecht (justly)). 
9. The conjunct contains a negative evaluation of the information (jammer (it's a pity 
that)). 
10. The conjunct contains a 'negative operator', i.e. a operator implying a negative 
evaluation of the information embedded under the operator (hij verzwijgt dat (he 
conceab that)). 
The factors in the list were grouped as follows: The conjunct contains no qualification 
(1.), the conjunct contains positive qualifications (2, 7, 8), and the conjunct contains 
negative qualifications (3-6, 9-10). 
It may seem counter-intuitive to call a qualification that indicates the possible truth 
of an information like het lijkt erop dat (it seems that) a negative qualification. These 
expressions are ambiguous with respect to their qualifying function. In a environment 
like Het lijkt er dus op dat we met deze oplossing moeten leren leven (It seems therefore 
that we have to live with thu solution) the information embedded under Het lijkt er op 
dat is evaluated positively (is considered true). In an environment like Het lijkt er op 
dat het waar is, maar bij nadere beschouwing valt het anders uit (It seems to be true, but 
at a closer look it turns out differently) the information embedded under Het lijkt er op 
dat is evaluated negatively (is considered false). It turns out that in the texts in the 
corpus these items mainly occur in the second interpretation. Therefore they were 
classified as negative qualifications. A similar remark holds, mutatL· mutandL·, for 
qualifications expressing the possible falsehood of propositions. 
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10. Relation of the information in the conjunct to that in the context (both for local and 
global contrasts) 
The relation conjunct-context is of specific interest, because the theory in Chapter 3 
stressed the importance of contextual factors in determining the interpretation of 
contrast relations. Therefore the analysis took into account whether the information in 
the conjuncts is new or old with respect to the context. 
Distinguishing new from old information is, to a certain extent, somewhat hazardous, 
since the interplay of old and new information in a text interferes with other discourse 
properties. The coherence of a discourse is established not only by means of coherence 
relations, but also by means of referential or topic continuity (cf. Givón, 1983; Schiffrin, 
1982). Referential continuity alone is not enough to classify a conjunct as presenting 
old information. A conjunct presents old information if that information can be 
inferred (for instance via an entailment or an implicature) from a predicate in the 
context. That is, in a sentence pair like John went to the bar. He wanted to make a 
phone call there is referential continuity, but the second conjunct does not present old 
information, whereas in a sentence pair like John went to the bar. He went inside the 
second conjunct displays referential continuity and it presents old information. 
This factor was assigned seven levels. 
1. The conjunct gives new information, i.e. the information given by the predicate in 
the conjunct cannot be inferred from previous information. 
2. The conjunct resumes old information, i.e. the conjunct is an assertion, entail-
ment, implicature, or presupposition from the context. 
3. The conjunct denies old information, i.e. the conjunct denies an assertion, 
entailment, implicature, or presupposition from the context. 
4. The conjunct affirms a possibility suggested by the context. 
5. The conjunct denies a possibility suggested by the context. 
6. The conjunct gives an unexpected consequence of the situation described in the 
context. 
7. The conjunct gives an undesired consequence of the situation described in the 
context. 
The affirmation of a suggested possibility (4) is found in a sentence pair like John went 
to the bar. He ordered a whiskey. The relation between these sentences can be ac-
counted for by script-like information structures. John went to the bar. He didn't order a 
whukey is an example of the denial of a suggested possibility (5). John went to the bar. 
His wife was never to see him again is an example of an unexpected consequence 
relation (6). The undesired consequence relation (7, a subtype of the former one) is 
exemplified by John went to the bar. The following morning he woke up in a police cell. 
The levels of this factor were grouped in the following manner: The conjunct gives 
new information (1), the conjunct gives old information (2, 4), the conjunct gives a 
negation of old information (3, 5, 6, 7). 
11. Length of the conjuncts (both locally and globally) 
The length of the conjuncts is a formal property of contrastive coherence relations that 
can be related directly to their interpretation: The importance of an argument probably 
is related to its length. Thus it was that the argument supporting the writer's view was 
the longest one in the text. 
The number of words in each conjunct was counted. The mean and standard 
deviation of the length of the first and second conjunct were computed. The conjuncts 
were categorized as longer or shorter than the median. Finally a ratio was calculated 
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for the conjunct lengths in a text (i.e. length of the second conjunct divided by length 
of the first conjunct). 
12. Complexity of the argumentation in the conjuncts (both locally and globally) 
Another property of the texts that can be related to the interpretation of the contras-
tive coherence relations is the argumentative complexity of the conjuncts. It was 
expected that the argument supporting the writer's point of view was elaborated best. 
The argumentation in the experimental texts is carefully constructed: Each conjunct 
has more or less the same degree of complexity. It was an open question how this 
relates to the argumentation in natural texts containing contrast relations. 
A caveat is in order here: Much of the argumentation in natural texts remains 
implicit. A decision had to be made about the degree to which the implicit argumenta-
tion was made explicit in the analysis. As a rule, only those arguments were made 
explicit that were necessary to give the text a coherent interpretation. 
The degree of complexity of the argumentation was determined by looking at the 
number of arguments, embedded or not, in each conjunct. (An argument was defined 
as a proposition that turns up as a datum in the Toulmin-analysis of the text. See the 
appendix.) In the analysis two cases were distinguished: A conjunct had simple 
argumentation if it contained at most one argument. A conjunct had complex argumen-
tation if it had more than one argument. 
13. Type of contrastive coherence relation 
Both the theory in Chapter 3 and the experiments in Chapter 4 and 5 suggested that 
there is a close relation between the type of the contrastive coherence relation and its 
interpretation: Semantic oppositions were found to display less asymmetry and 
accordingly to be less dear with respect to the writer's point of view than concessive 
oppositions. 
Four types of contrastive coherence relations were encountered in the corpus: 
1. Semantic opposition. 
2. Denial of expectation. 
3. Concessive opposition. 
4. Other (see Section 6.4.10) 
14. Rhetorical function of the global contrast relation 
Not only the linguistic properties of the contrastive coherence relation are important 
for the interpretation of the text, but also the way the contrastive coherence relation 
functions in the argumentation. 
The contrastive coherence relations occurring in the texts were categorized according 
to their rhetorical function. Since there is as yet no systematic survey of the rhetorical 
functions of contrastive coherence relations, the categorization was made on a more or 
less impressionistic basis. The types of rhetorical functions encountered in the texts 
were: 
1. The rhetorical function of the contrastive coherence relation is unclear. 
2. The contrastive coherence relation is a transition from arguments in favor of the 
claim to arguments against it. 
3. The contrastive coherence relation is a transition from arguments against the 
claim to arguments in favor of it. 
4. The contrastive coherence relation is an answer to a question raised in the 
context. 
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5. The contrastive coherence relation suggests the presence of an element in a 
perspective (e.g. John says X, but he forgets that Y). 
6. Something in the first conjunct that is not true is contrasted with something in the 
second conjunct that is true (e.g. John says X, but not-X). 
7. The contrastive coherence relation is intended to complicate a position regarding 
the topic of discussion (e.g. John says X, but he doesn't give any arguments in favor 
ofX). 
8. The contrastive coherence relation introduces nuances into the discussion (e.g. 
John says X and, given the past, such a position L· understandable, but other aspects 
must be taken into account too). 
9. The contrast relation is intended to counter opposition (e.g. John says X, but that 
cannot be true, in view of the following...). 
10. The contrast relation indicates a change in time (e.g. then...now). 
Some of the rhetorical functions are more interrelated than others. Their main 
distinguishing property is the degree of specificity. A very general function is the 
transition from one argument to the other. This function can be made more specific in 
many ways: The second argument can be a counterpunch against something mentioned 
in the first argument, and this counterpunch can take many forms, for instance 
complicating the discussion, plain negation, crushing the opposition, etc. 
For the sake of the analysis four groups of rhetorical functions were considered: The 
rhetorical function is unclear (1), the contrastive coherence relation is a transition (2, 3, 
10), the contrastive coherence relation has the function to add something to a perspec-
tive (4-5), the contrast relation is used as a rebuttal of an element in a perspective (6-
9)· 
15. Relation between the local and the global contrast (if the text contains a local 
contrast) 
Four types of relations were encountered in the corpus. 
1. The global contrast specifies the local contrast. 
2. The local contrast summarizes the global contrast. 
3. The local contrast gives the conclusion of what is discussed in the global contrast. 
4. The local contrast gives the reason for an action discussed in the global contrast. 
16. Type of text 
Three types of texts occurred in the corpus: 
1. Editorial comment. 
2. Letter to the editor. 
3. Experimental text. 
17. Source of the text 
A text in the corpus was taken from one of four possible sources: 
1. NRC-Handelsblad. 
2. Volkskrant. 
3. Telegraaf. 
4. Experiments. 
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6.4 Results of the Analysis 
6.4.1 Locality and asymmetry. 
Of 38 natural texts only 5 (13.2%) contain a local contrast. Furthermore, in only 5 texts 
(13.2%) the writer's opinion regarding the argumentative tendency of the contrast 
relation is not overtly present. The remaining 33 texts (86.8%) are clearly asymmetric. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that global contrasts need not be locally ex­
pressed, in order to be asymmetric. 
64.2 Structural realization of the global contrastive coherence relation. 
NATURAL TEXTS 
The structural realization of the global contrast relation is one of the pivotal factors in 
the text analysis. Therefore, much attention is paid to this factor and its relation to 
other factors. The main findings are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Frequencies of Structural Realizations of the Contrastive 
Coherence Relation in Natural Texts (n - 38). 
Structural Realizations N MP M SP S Ρ 
7 12 5 5 5 4 
Note. Ν - No structural realization. MP - Haar/echter in com­
bination with the start of a new paragraph. M - Naar/echter, 
no new paragraph. SP - Parallel sentence structure in combina­
tion with a new paragraph. S - Parallel sentence structure, no 
new paragraph. Ρ - New paragraph. 
In 7 texts (18.4%) there was no structural realization of the contrastive coherence 
relation. An example is given in (1). 
(3) M. Kloos stelt in zijn bespreking van de tentoonstelling "Het kleine 
bouwen" dat dit niet de aardigste expositie sinds jaren is geworden [...]. De 
negatieve bespreking van deze tentoonstelling werd nergens echt onder­
bouwd [...]. 
(3)' M. Kloos claims, in his review of the exposition "Miniature building", that it 
has not turned out to be the nicest exposition in years [...]. The negative 
review of this exposition was not really substantiated anywhere [...]. 
In 17 texts (44.7%) the global contrast was realized by means of moor {but) or its 
adverbial equivalent echter {however). In 12 texts (31.6%) the explicit contrast marker 
was accompanied by the start of a new paragraph (cf. example (4)), in 5 texts (13.2%) 
there was no new paragraph (cf. example (5)). 
(4) Uiteraard is Nederland niet in de positie om alleen de Zuid-Afrikaanse 
economie zware klappen toe te brengen. [...] 
Maar is dat een reden om er dan maar van af te zien [...]? 
(4)' Naturally the Netherlands is not in a position to inflict heavy losses on 
the South-African economy on its own [...] 
But is that a reason to give it up [...]? 
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(5) De gemeenteraadsfractie van de Partij van de Arbeid in Amsterdam meent 
te moeten overgaan op heroïneverstrekking via de hulpverlening. [...] 
Daarmee wordt echter een situatie gecreëerd waarin de drugshulpverlening 
opgezadeld wordt met de uiterst (on)dankbare taak om gratis genotmiddelen 
te gaan verstrekken. [...] 
(5)' The Partij van de Arbeid members of the city council of Amsterdam deem it 
necessary to tum over the distribution of heroin to Social Aid [...] However, 
in doing so, a situation is created in which the Drugs Aid Department is 
forced to take up the extremely (un)gratefiil task of distributing free 
stimulants. [...] 
In 10 texts (26.3%) the contrastive coherence relation was 'realized' by means of a 
parallel structure of the contrasted text parts: In 5 texts (13.2%) this structure was 
accompanied by the start of a new paragraph (example (6)), in 13.2% it was not 
(example (7)). 
(6) Het CDA-Tweede Kamerlid drs. M. Beinema heeft de AVRO verweten 
dat deze omroep zich aan volksverlakkerij schuldig maakt door net te doen 
alsof de AVRO in zijn voortbestaan bedreigd wordt door minister Brinkman 
(Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur). 
Het CDA-kamerlid maakt het met deze uitspraak toch wel erg bont. [...] 
(6)' The M.P. for the CDA, drs. M. Beinema, has reproached the AVRO that 
this broadcasting corporation is guilty of gulling the public in pretending that 
the AVRO's existence is menaced by Secretary of State Brinkman (Welfare, 
Public Health and Culture). 
The M.P. for the CDA is really going too far with this statement. [...] 
(7) [...] Minister Smit-Kroes is van mening dat dit veiliger is. Het komt mij voor 
dat hier sprake is van een ernstige beoordelingsfout. [...] 
(7)' [...] Secretary of State Smit-Kroes believes that this is safer. It seems to me 
that here we have an instance of serious misjudgment. 
In 4 texts (10.5%) the sole structural realization of the contrastive coherence relation 
was the start of a new paragraph (example (8)). 
(8) Tot nu toe is in Sovjet-standpunten altijd sprake geweest van aantallen 
lanceerinrichtingen (raketten en vliegtuigen), die in Oost en West op gelijk 
niveau zouden moeten worden gebracht. [...] 
Andropov heeft nu te kennen gegeven dat Moskou bereid is om de 
aantallen kernkoppen als maatstaf - of in ieder geval als een van de 
maatstaven - te hanteren bij het rakettenoverleg. 
(8)' In the Soviet opinions so far there have always been mentions of numbers 
of launching systems (missiles and aircraft), which ought to be put at an 
equal level in East and West. [...] 
Mr. Andropov has now given to understand that Moscow is prepared to 
use the numbers of nuclear heads as the norm - or at least as one of the 
norms - in the disarmament talks. 
On the whole the start of a new paragraph was found in 21 texts (55.3%). 
A comparison of both paragraph starts and the presence of maar shows that of the 21 
texts with a paragraph start 12 (57.1%) had maar, whereas of the 17 texts without a 
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paragraph start only 5 (29.4%) had maar. This suggests that the presence of maar tends 
to be accompanied by a paragraph start (χ2 = 2.92, .05 < ρ < .10). 
In 33 texts the writer's meaning was overtly present and related to the second 
conjunct of the contrast (cf. Section 6.4.1). The number of moar-occurrences in the 
corpus is relatively low. If one assumes that the asymmetry of the texts is somehow 
linguistically marked (as is dictated by the Asymmetry Hypothesis), then one must 
conclude that maar is not the only way to mark the asymmetry of the construction. 
An investigation into the relation between the factor Structural Realization of the 
Contrastive Coherence Relation and the other factors can reveal whether there are 
alternative ways to mark the asymmetry. 
The relation between Structural Realization of the Contrastive Coherence Relation and 
Additional Contrastive Markers 
On the assumption that structural realizations are used as an aid for the interpretation 
of the text, structural realizations of the contrastive coherence relation and additional 
contrastive markers can be expected to perform similar functions. If the text contains a 
structural realization of the contrast relation, then there is not much need for addition­
al contrastive markers and vice versa, since the reader can derive the contrastive 
interpretation anyway. This expectation is only partly met (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Frequencies of Structural Realizations and Additional Contras­
tive Harkers in Natural Texts (n - 38). 
Structural Realization 
No Additional Markers 
Additional Markers Present 
No Additional Markers 
Additional Markers Present 
-SRC 
5 
2 
0 
7 
+SRC 
First Conjunct 
16 
15 
Second Conjunct 
15 
16 
/Vote. -SRC » No structural realization of the contrastive co­
herence relation. +SRC = Structural realization of the con­
trastive coherence relation present. 
The hypothesis that structural realizations of the contrast relation and additional 
contrastive markers are complementary must be rejected. The complementary relation 
between Structural Realization and Additional Contrastive Markers only holds for the 
second conjunct and only in one direction: If there is no additional marker in the 
second conjunct, then there is some sort of structural realization. (By modus tollens, if 
there is no structural realization, then there is some sort of additional contrastive 
marker of the second conjunct.) 
Furthermore, there were five texts in which there was no structural realization and 
in which the first conjunct did not contain an additional contrastive marker. Finally, 
there were many texts in which there was a structural realization and in which one or 
both conjuncts contained an additional contrastive marker. In other words, writers give 
their readers plenty of formal indications to derive the contrastive interpretation, either 
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by a structural realization of the contrastive coherence relation, or by an additional 
contrastive marker or both. 
Table 3 allows a closer look at the relation between additional contrastive markers and 
the presence of maar/echter. 
Table 3 
Frequencies of MAAR/ECHTER and Additional Contrastive Markers 
in Natural Texts (n = 38). 
Structural Realization 
No Additional Markers 
Additional Markers Present 
No Additional Markers 
Additional Markers Present 
-M 
15 
6 
7 
14 
+M 
First Conjunct 
6 
11 
Second Conjunct 
8 
9 
Note. -M » Maar/echter absent. +M = Maar/echter present. 
There is a relation between additional markers in the first conjunct and the presence of 
moor/echter. If the text contains maar/echter the first conjunct generally has an 
additional marker (χ2 = 4.96, ρ < .05). This relation is absent in the second conjunct 
tf = 0.74, .30 < ρ < .50). 
An example of a text with first and second conjunct additional markers is given in 
(9) and (10), respectively (the additional contrastive markers are in italics). 
(9) Uiteraard is Nederland niet in de positie om [...]. Maar is dat een reden om 
[...]? [Topicalization] 
(9)' Naturally the Netherlands is not in a position to [...]. But is that a reason for 
[...]? [Topicalization] 
(10) Een rentestijging biedt daarvoor een zekere compensatie. Maar tegelijkertijd 
geeft de renteverhoging aan dat [...]. [Topicalization] 
(10)' An increase in interest rates offers some compensation. But at the same time 
that increase indicates that [...]. [Topicalization] 
A possible interpretation of this finding is that in maor-texts the first conjunct generally 
starts with a PI, whereas this is not the case for the second conjunct. This interpreta­
tion is based on the assumption that marking a conjunct generally consists of preposing 
(topicalizing) Pi's. This assumption is discussed below (Section 6.4.3, the discussion of 
additional contrastive markers in the first conjuncts of natural texts). 
The relation between Structural Realization of the Contrastive Coherence Relation and 
the Presence of Pi's in the Conjuncts 
To set the scene, two examples are given, one of a text containing first and second 
conjunct Pi's in combination with a structural marker of the contrastive coherence 
relation {maar/echter, example (11)), and one containing first and second conjunct Pi's 
without a structural marker (example (12)) (the Pi's are in italics). 
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(11) Langzamerhand lijkt de mening post te vatten, dat het maar beter is de 
conferentie zonder substantiële slotverklaring uiteen te laten gaan. Onzes 
inziens wordt daarmee echter te lichtvaardig voorbij gegaan aan [...]. 
(11)' Gradually the idea seems to have taken form that it would be better for the 
conference to break up without a substantial final declaration. In our 
opinion, however, it would be too rash to pass over [...]. 
(12) Het hoofdbezwaar dat Den Uyl tegen de Groene Partij aanvoert is dat het 
een one-issue-partij is, die zich op slechts één onderdeel richt: het milieu. 
Deze uitlatingen moeten worden rechtgezet. 
(12)' The main objection that Den Uyl robes against the Green Party is that it 
is a one-issue-party, which concentrates on one topic only: the environment. 
These remarks need to be rectified. 
The use of Pi's was expected to be an alternative to additional contrastive markers for 
indicating the contrastive interpretation (although the two may be used side by side). 
Thus, as in the case of additional contrastive markers, it was hypothesized that 
structural markers and Pi's are complementary. Table 4 gives the frequencies for each 
of these two factors. 
Table 4 
Frequencies of Structural Realizations and Presence of Pi's in 
the Conjuncts in Natural Texts (n - 38). 
Structural Real 
No Pi's 
Pi's Present 
No Pi's 
Pi's Present 
izat ion -SRC 
0 
7 
4 
3 
+SRC 
First Conjunct 
11 
20 
Second Conjunct 
20 
11 
Note. -SRC •= No structura l rea l izat ion of the contrast ive co-
herence re la t i on . +SRC = Structural rea l iza t ion of the con-
t ras t i ve coherence re la t ion present. 
The relation of complementariness between structural realizations of the contrastive 
coherence relation and the presence of Pi's holds for one conjunct only, viz. the first, 
and in one direction only: If there is no PI in the first conjunct then there is a 
structural realization, or, by modus tollens, if there is no structural marker, then there 
is a PI in the first conjunct. The opposite relation does not hold, since one cannot infer 
the absence of Pi's from the presence of structural realizations, nor the absence of 
structural realizations from the presence of Pi's. 
In one respect, then, Pi's behave similarly to additional contrastive markers: There is 
a partial complementary relation with structural realizations. The two factors differ 
with respect to the conjunct for which the complementary relation holds. Tables 2 and 
4 show furthermore that additional contrastive markers occur more frequently in the 
second conjunct, and that Pi's occur more frequently in the first conjunct. On the 
assumption that both additional contrastive markers and Pi's aid the reader to derive 
the contrastive interpretation, these findings can be described as follows: The absence 
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of a structural marker is compensated for by the presence of a marker of a type that is 
prototypical of the conjunct. 
Table 5 gives the relation between the Pi's and two subgroups of structural realizations 
of the contrastive coherence relation. 
Table 5 
Frequencies of HAAR/ECHTER, Paragraph Starts and Pi's in 
Natural Texts (n = 38). 
Structural Real 
No Pi's 
Pi's Present 
No Pi's 
Pi's Present 
izat ion 
-M 
3 
18 
14 
7 
+M -P 
First Conjunct 
8 2 
9 15 
Second Conjunct 
10 11 
7 6 
+P 
9 
12 
13 
8 
Note. -M = Maar/echter absent. +M = Maar/echter present. -P » 
No paragraph start. +P • Paragraph start present. 
In the first conjunct there is a dependency between absence of a PI and presence of 
тааг/echter. If the text does not have maar/echter the first conjunct generally has a PI 
(χ2 = 4.91, ρ < .05). This relation is not found in the second conjunct (χ1 = 0.25), .50 
< ρ < .70). 
In the first conjunct there is a dependency between absence of PI and presence of a 
paragraph start (χ : = 4.42, ρ < .05), which is absent in the second conjunct (χ2 = 0.03, 
.80 < ρ < .90). 
Thus, paragraph starts have a similar relation with (the absence οι) Pi's as the 
presence of maar/echter. The absence of a paragraph start and/or maar/echter co-
occurs with the use of a PI in the first conjunct. This is perhaps to be considered as an 
aid for the reader on the part of the writer: If the contrastive interpretation is not 
indicated in the first conjunct by a PI, then that interpretation is supported by a 
paragraph start and/or maar/echter. Note that, again, this differs from the behavior of 
additional contrastive markers, in which case it is a lack of marking the contrast 
relation in the second conjunct that is compensated for by the start of a new paragraph. 
The relation between Structural Realization of the Contrastive Coherence Relation and 
Change in Perspective between the Conjuncts 
(13) is an example of a text with a change in perspective between the conjuncts and a 
structural marker, (14) is an example of a text without a change in perspective and with 
a structural marker: 
(13) "De reorganisatie van de reclassering mag niet worden afgedaan als een 
puur technische operatie", zo luidt een van de conclusies van een or­
ganisatiebureau dat door de benarde Algemene reclasseringsvereniging 
(ARV) te hulp is geroepen. [...] 
De reclassering heeft echter een hardnekkige historie van logheid 
wanneer het om veranderingen gaat. 
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(13)' "The reorganization of the after-care of discharged prisoners cannot be 
dismissed as a purely technical operation" says one of the conclusions of an 
Organization Bureau whose help has been called in by the distressed Dis­
charged Prisoners' Aid Society (Algemene Reclasseringsvereniging, ARV). 
The after-care, however, has a stubborn history of inertia, when it comes 
to changes. 
(14) Gezien de inhoud van het stuk is die irritatie wel begrijpelijk. [...] 
Het CDA blaast echter wat al te hoog van de toren. [...] 
(14)' Given the contents of the document that irritation is understandable. [...] 
The CDA, however, brags a little too much. [...] 
A change in perspective gives, among other things, an extra clue for the interpretation 
of the text. A text in which the perspective is not changed in the transition from one 
conjunct to the other can therefore be expected to create more interpretative difficul­
ties than a text that does have such a change. That is why it was expected that texts 
without a change in perspective contained more indications of the contrastive inter­
pretation. Table 6 summarizes the relevant data. 
Table 6 
Frequencies of Structural Realizations and Changes in Perspec­
tive in Natural Texts (n = 38). 
Structural Realization -SRC +SRC 
No Change in Perspective 0 9 
Change in Perspective 7 22 
Note. -SRC - No structural realization of the contrastive 
coherence relation. +SRC = Structural realization of the 
contrastive coherence relation present. 
The data in Table 6 can be described as follows: If the text contains no structural 
realization then it contains a change in perspective, or, alternatively, if it contains no 
change in perspective then it contains a structural marker. Thus, changes in perspective 
are only partially complementary to the use of a structural realization. The majority of 
texts contains both a structural marker and a change in perspective. 
The relation between Structural Realaation of tlie Contrastive Coherence Relation and 
Length of the Conjuncts 
The analysis of this relation resulted in one remarkable finding, reported in Table 7. 
The number of moor-occurrences is significantly lower in texts with short first conjuncts 
than in text with long first conjuncts (χ2 = 5.22, ρ < .05). No such relation exists in the 
second conjunct (χ2 = 0.11, .70 < ρ < .80). 
This finding is given the following interpretation. At the end of the first conjunct the 
interpretation of the text is far from complete, since the contrasting conjunct still has to 
follow. An increase in the length of the first conjunct presumably results in a higher 
degree of complexity of the information in the conjunct (evidence for this assumption is 
given below, in Section 6.4.7). Therefore, the longer the first conjunct, the more 
complex the information in that conjunct, and the more difficulties the reader has at 
the end of the conjunct to establish the relation of the present information to the 
ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 127 
global structure of the text, i.e. to establish the role of the conjunct in the contrast 
relation. At this point the reader may need extra information, in the form of an explicit 
contrast marker, to establish the contrastive interpretation. 
Why is there no such relation between the length of the second conjunct and the 
presence of maar'! A reader interpreting the second conjunct is at a point in the text 
where the 'slots' in the structure have been filled in: He or she has interpreted the first 
conjunct and is aware of or can infer the presence of a contrast relation by comparing 
the content of the second conjunct (in as far as it was read) with that of the first 
conjunct. Derivation of the contrastive interpretation is therefore independent of the 
length of the second conjunct, which is why there is no relation between the length of 
that conjunct and the presence of markers that explicitly indicate the contrast relation. 
Table 7 
Frequencies of MAAR/ECHTER and Length of the Conjuncts in 
Natural Texts (n = 38). 
Structural Reali 
Conjunct Length 
> median 
< median 
Conjunct Length 
> median 
< median 
zation -M 
7 
14 
10 
11 
+M 
First Conjunct 
12 
5 
Second Conjunct 
9 
8 
Note. -M = maar/echter absent. +M = maar/echter present. 
The relation between Structural Realization of the Contrastive Coherence Relation and 
Type of Contrastive Coherence Relation 
One relation between Structural Realization and Type of Contrastive Coherence 
Relation was found: The number of maar/echter-ocaiTTences was significantly lower in 
semantic opposition texts than in concessive opposition texts (6 of the 20 semantic 
opposition texts (30.0%) had maar/echter, and 9 of the 14 concessive opposition texts 
(64.3%, χ2 = 3.93, ρ < .05). 
This finding corroborates the analysis of contrastive coherence relations in Chapter 
3: In Section 3.5 it was argued that in semantic oppositions the contrast is realized 
more explicitly than in concessive oppositions, and that therefore semantic oppositions 
can occur freely without an explicit marker of the contrast like maar. The finding that 
concessive oppositions generally have moor, whereas semantic oppositions have maar 
much less often strongly suggests that a similar difference exists at the global level. 
The analysis of the relation of the factor Structural Realization of the Contrastive 
Coherence Relation with other factors did not give any significant results. 
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EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS 
The factor Structural Realization was not of interest for the analysis of the experimen-
tal texts, since all of these contained maar and since they all had a paragraph start 
separating the two conjuncts. 
6.4.3 Additional contrastive markers in the conjuncts. 
AoDmONAL COVTRASnVE MARKERS IN THE FIRST CONJUNCT: NATURAL TEXTS 
Writers using a contrastive coherence relation can be expected to help their reader by 
giving indications that support the contrastive interpretation. They can do this by using 
additional contrastive markers (semantic or syntactic) or by the use of a PI in the 
conjunct. The use of syntactic markers might be confounded with the use of Pi's. In 
Section 3.2 the link between Pi's and surface structure was discussed, and it was argued 
that Pi's typically (although not necessarily) occur in sentence initial position. Topicali-
zation can have the effect of putting Pi's in sentence initial position. Therefore, it was 
expected that writers topicalize Pi's frequently. 
Note that the presence of a syntactic marker is not per se relevant for the interpreta-
tion of contrastive coherence relations. Topicalization of Pi's is not the only type of 
topicalization that can occur. A main assertion can, for instance, contain a topicaliza-
tion and not a PI, as in example (15) (the topicalization is in italics): 
(15) Vanwege de polemiche tendenzen van het rapport is de opschudding die het 
veroorzaakte begrijpelijk. 
(15)' Because of the polemic tendencies of the report, the commotion it created is 
understandable. 
It may also be the case that the main assertion contains a PI and a topicalization, but 
that it is not the PI that is topicalized (the topicalization is in italics, the PI is in 
brackets): 
(16) Vanwege de polemiche tendenzen van het rapport [noemt Jan] de opschudd-
ing die het veroorzaakte begrijpelijk. 
(16)' Because of the polemic tendencies of the report [John calls] the commotion it 
created understandable. 
Thus, there are topicalizations that are relevant to the contrastive interpretation and 
irrelevant topicalizations. The analysis does not distinguish between the two. 
At first glance, writers did not use many indications for the contrastive interpretation 
within the conjunct. In the majority of cases (21 or 55.3%) the first conjunct of a 
natural text contrast did not contain an additional contrastive marker. In 16 texts 
(42.1%) a phrase in the first conjunct was topicalized. One text had a passive construc-
tion. There was no text in which the contrast relation was indicated by an extra 
oppositional element in the first conjunct. It seems, then, that conjunct internal 
marking of the first conjunct is scarce, and if it occurs it is restricted to syntactic 
markers. 
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The relation between additional contrastive markers and Pi's in the first conjunct 
Table 8 gives an overview of the data concerning the relation between the presence of 
additional contrastive markers and of Pi's. 
Table 8 
Frequencies of Additional Contrastive Markers and Pi's in the 
First Conjunct of Natural Texts (n-38) 
Additional Contrastive Marker N Syn 
No PI 3 8 
PI Present 18 9 
Note. N - No additional contrastive marker. Syn = Syntactic 
marker. 
There is a dependency relation between the presence of additional contrastive markers 
and the presence of a PI in the first conjunct (χ3 = 4.91, ρ < .05). If there is no PI 
then there is generally a syntactic marker (cf. example (17)). The co-occurrence of a PI 
and a syntactic marker (cf. example (18)) is relatively scarce. (The syntactic markers, 
topicalizations, are in italics.) 
(17) Een doorbraak is Andropovs voorstel dus bepaald niet te noemen. 
(17)' A break-through is Andropov's proposition so certainly not to be called. 
So Andropov's proposition can certainly not be called a break-through. 
(18) In NRC Handelsblad van 9 mei wordt bij herhaling gesteld dat D'66 in het 
verleden een discussie over de grondslagen altijd overbodig gevonden heeft, 
[...]. 
(18)' In NRC Handelsblad of May 9th it is repeatedly claimed that in the past 
D'66 always regarded a discussion about the underlying principles as 
superfluous, [...]. 
In other words, although additional contrastive markers are relatively scarce in the first 
conjunct, if they occur they compensate for the absence of other indications for the 
contrastive interpretation within the conjunct. 
Note that frequently a conjunct had a syntactic marker, but no PI. In these cases the 
marked word order is irrelevant for the contrastive interpretation. 
Note furthermore that in only 3 texts (7.9%) the contrastive interpretation is not 
somehow indicated in the first conjunct. 
ADDITIONAL COVTRASHVE MARKERS IN THE RRST CONJUNCT: EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS 
Experimental texts both resemble and differ from natural texts with respect to the 
presence of additional contrastive markers. The similarity between the two types of 
texts is that additional contrastive markers are relatively scarce: In sixteen experimental 
texts (66.7%) the first conjunct did not contain an additional contrastive marker, seven 
texts (29.2%) contained a topicalized element, and in one text (4.2%) the main 
assertion was a passive. The difference between the two types of texts can be seen from 
the interplay of additional contrastive markers and the presence of Pi's (Table 9). 
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Table 9 
Frequencies of Additional Contrastive Markers and Pi's in the 
First Conjunct of Experimental texts (n=24) 
Additional Contrastive Marker N Syn 
No PI 5 0 
PI Present 11 8 
Note. N = No additional contrastive marker. Syn - Syntactic 
marker. 
There are two differences with the natural texts. The first is that in all the experimen­
tal texts with an additional contrastive marker the text contained a PI. It seems safe to 
conclude that in the experimental texts it is Pi's that are topicalized, whereas in the 
natural texts other elements are topicalized too. 
The second difference is that there is no dependency relation between the two 
factors. Unlike the natural texts, there is no complementary relation between additional 
contrastive markers and Pi's in the experimental texts. 
The relation between Additional Contrastive Markers and Argumentative Complexity 
Of the 16 conjuncts without an additional contrastive marker 12 (75.0%) had complex 
argumentation (i.e. more than one argument), whereas of the 8 conjuncts with an 
additional contrastive marker only 2 (25.0%) had complex argumentation (χ2 = 5.49, ρ 
< .05). It is hard to interpret this finding: In the construction of the experimental texts 
there was no intention of letting complex argumentation compensate for the lack of 
additional contrastive markers. 
ADDITIONAL CONTRASTIVE MARKERS IN THE SECOND CONJUNCT: NATURAL TEXTS 
In the second conjunct the situation differs considerably from that in the first conjunct. 
Here, only 15 texts (39.5%) did not contain an additional contrastive marker. Of the 
remaining 23 texts 15 had a syntactic marker (10 topicalizations, 3 question sentences, 
and 2 passives), 7 had a semantic marker (6 negations and 1 extra oppositional 
element), and in 1 text an extra oppositional element co-occurred with a topicalization. 
The difference in the number of additional contrastive markers of the contrast 
relation with the first conjunct is remarkable: 44.7% of the first conjuncts had these 
markers versus 60.5% of the second conjuncts. Moreover, marking was done in a more 
varied manner in the second conjuncts: Syntactic markers were, again, predominant, 
but there were several instances of semantic markers. An example of a syntactically 
marked second conjunct is (19) (topicalization), an example of a semantically marked 
second conjunct is (20) (negation). The additional contrastive markers are in italics. 
(19) Voorlopig lijkt het er echter veel op [...]. 
(19)' For the moment however it looks very much as though [...]. 
(20) De heer Van Thijn weet niet waarover hij praat. 
(20)' Mr. Van Thijn does not know what he is talking about. 
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The data in Table 10 show that there is no dependency relation between additional 
contrastive markers and Pi's, unlike the first conjunct. 
Table 10 
Frequencies of Additional Contrastive Markers and Pi's in the 
Second Conjunct of Natural Texts (n-38) 
Additional Contrastive Marker N Syn Sem 
No PI 8 10 б 
PI Present 7 6 1 
Note. N « No additional contrastive marker. Syn - Syntactic 
marker. Sem - Semantic marker. 
Pi's occurred (relatively) more often in conjuncts without additional contrastive 
markers than in conjuncts with such markers: Of the 23 conjuncts with an additional 
contrastive marker (syntactic or semantic), 7 (30.4%) had a PI and of the 15 conjuncts 
without such a marker, 7 (46.7%) had a PI. However, this difference was not significant 
(χ2 = 1.03, .30 < ρ < .50). 
In the second conjunct additional contrastive markers occurred frequently (in 23 
texts or 60.5%) and Pi's were relatively scarce (in 14 texts or 36.8%). In the first 
conjunct the situation was reversed (cf. Table 8: 17 first conjuncts or 44.7% had an 
additional contrastive marker and 27 first conjuncts or 71.1% had a PI). 
Note that in 8 texts (21.1%) the second conjunct had neither a PI nor an additional 
contrastive marker. 
The relation between Additional Contrastive Markers and Rhetorical Function of the 
Contrastive Coherence Relation 
Negation occurred rather often in the second conjunct: Six out of seven semantic 
markers were negations (an example of a conjunct with a negation was given in (20)). 
Its occurrence seems to be determined by the rhetorical function of the contrast 
relation, for in five out of six texts with a negation, the second conjunct affected the 
truth of the information in the first conjunct: In three texts the information in the 
second conjunct plainly negated the information in the first conjunct, in one text the 
information in the second conjunct overruled the information in the first conjunct, and 
in one text the information in the second conjunct complicated the position sketched in 
the first conjunct. 
The relation between Additional Contrastive Markers and Change in Perspective 
Of the 9 texts without a change in perspective only 2 (22.2%) had an additional 
contrastive marker in the second conjunct, whereas of the 29 texts with a change in 
perspective 21 (72.4%) had such a marker (χ2 = 7.24, ρ < .05). There is an intelligible 
interpretation for this finding: Texts with a change in perspective between the conjuncts 
can be expected to be more complex than texts without such a change. The additional 
contrastive markers are used to reduce this difficulty. 
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The relation between Additional Contrastive Markers and Relation of the Conjunct to 
the Context 
Conjuncts with additional contrastive markers have a different relation to the context 
than conjuncts without such a marker (Table 11). 
Table 11 
Frequencies of Additional Contrastive Markers and Relation of 
Second Conjunct to Context in Natural Texts (n=38) 
Additional Contrastive Marker N Syn Sem 
Relation to Context 
New 10 3 0 
Old 2 1 0 
Neg 3 12 7 
Note. New = New information. Old = Old information. Neg = 
Negation of old information. N » No addit ional c o n t r a s t i v e 
marker. Syn » Syntactic marker. Sem - Semantic marker. 
The interpretation of the data in Table 11 is somewhat problematic. There is a relation 
between conjuncts that contain an additional contrastive marker and conjuncts that give 
a negation of old information: Of the 23 conjuncts with an additional contrastive 
marker, 19 (82.6%) gave a negation of old information, whereas of the 15 conjuncts 
without such a marker, only 3 (20.0%) negated old information (χ2 = 14.60, ρ < .05). 
Thus second conjuncts with additional contrastive markers predominantly had a 
negative relation with the context. In as far as the semantic markers are concerned, 
such a relation is understandable because the semantic markers concerned are mainly 
negative elements. However, the large number of conjuncts with a syntactic marker and 
a negative relation to the context are unaccounted for. Some examples of conjuncts 
with a syntactic marker and a negative relation to the context are given in (21)-(23) 
(the syntactic markers, topicalizations, are in italics). 
(21) Door vallen twee argumenten tegen in te brengen. 
(21)' There can two arguments against be brought in. 
Two counterarguments can be put forward. 
(22) Op zijn beurt roept dit tegenvoorstel echter gemengde gevoelens op. 
(22)' In its tum calls this counterproposal however mixed feelings up. 
However, in its turn this counterproposal evokes mixed feelings. 
(23) Voor iemand die zich filosoof noemt is dit toch wel een heel merkwaardig 
standpunt. 
(23)' For someone who calL· himself a philosopher this is a very strange stand 
indeed. 
ADDITIONAL CONTRASTIVE MARKRRS IN THE SECOND CONJUNCT: EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS. 
The second conjuncts of the experimental texts were expected to be very much like the 
first conjuncts, since these conjuncts were intended to be first conjuncts in other 
versions of the texts. The main difference concerns the occurrence of extra oppositional 
elements, which, being an experimental factor, were present in half of the texts. 
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Of the 24 experimental texts 9 did not contain an additional contrastive marker, 2 
contained a syntactic marker (topicalization), 9 contained a semantic marker (8 texts 
with an extra oppositional element and 1 with a negation), and 4 texts contained both 
syntactic and semantic markers (an extra oppositional element in combination with a 
topicalized phrase). 
There are several differences with natural text second conjuncts: Extra oppositional 
elements occurred more frequently, a consequence of the experimental design. 
Disregarding these elements, it turns out that syntactic markers and negations occurred 
less frequently than in the second conjuncts of natural texts. 
A further difference is that in the experimental texts additional contrastive markers 
generally co-occurred with Pi's: Of the 13 experimental texts with an additional 
contrastive marker in the second conjunct, 12 (92.3%) had a PI in that conjunct (in the 
natural texts only 7 of the 23 second conjuncts with an additional contrastive marker, 
or 30.4%, had a PI, cf. Table 10). As in the first conjuncts of the experimental texts, it 
seems that additional contrastive markers were mainly used to topicalize Pi's. 
There were no dependency relations with any of the other factors. 
6.4.4 Restricting the validity of the information in the conjuncts: Pi's. 
PRESENCE OF Pi's IN THE FIRST CONJUNCT: NATURAL TEXTS. 
Table 12 gives a overview of the various types of Pi's that occurred in the first 
conjunct. 
Table 12 
Frequencies of Pi's in the First Conjunct of Natural Texts 
(n=38) 
Ρ 
w Fact 
2 
+ 
Opinion 
9 
+ 
+ 
Writer 
4 
+ 
Other 
23 
Note. Fact = No PI, f a c t . Opinion = No PI, opinion. Writer = 
PI r e f e r r i n g to writer-perspective. Other = PI r e f e r r i n g to 
perspective other than writer-perspective. W+/- = Information 
comes/does not come from w r i t e r ' s point of view. P+/- = PI 
present/absent. 
In the majority of cases the information in the first conjunct was embedded under a PI 
referring to a perspective other than the writer perspective, i.e. of a conversational 
partner or a possible world (23 conjuncts or 60.5%, cf. example (24)). In 4 texts 
(10.5%) there was a PI referring to the writer (an explicit writer signal like volgens mij 
(in my opinion) or an epistemic or deontic modal; cf. example (25)). In 11 texts 
(29.0%) there was no PI (Fact (example (26)) and Opinion (example (27)). If present 
the Pi's are in italics. 
(24) Als oplossing beveelt Wijninga een radicale democratisering aan. 
(24)' As a solution Wijninga recommends a radical democratization. 
(25) Afgewacht moet uiteraard worden wat daarvan terecht zal komen. 
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(25)' Awaited must of course be what of that will become. 
Naturally it remains to be seen what will become of that. 
(26) Uit onderzoek is gebleken dat bij eventuele omroepverkiezingen 60% van 
de Nederlanders hun steun zouden geven aan AVRO, TROS en Veronica 
gezamenlijk. 
(26)' Research has shown that in the case of broadcast-elections 60% of the 
Dutch would support AVRO, TROS and Veronica jointly. 
(27) De Raad van Europa heeft in het verleden zeer nuttig werk gedaan voor de 
samenwerking tussen de Europese landen. 
(27)' In the past the Council of Europe did very useful work for the cooperation 
between the European countries. 
In 27 texts (71.0%), the information in the first conjunct was embedded under a PI. In 
13 first conjuncts (34.2%) the information was given from the writer perspective 
(Opinion and Writer). 
The relation between Pi's in the first conjunct and in the second conjunct 
A comparison of the presence of Pi's in the first conjunct with that in the second 
conjunct gave the following result: 
Table 13 
Frequencies of Pi's in the First Conjunct and in the Second 
Conjunct of Natural Texts (n~38) 
First Conjunct No PI PI Present 
Second Conjunct 
No PI 10 14 
PI Present 1 13 
The data in Table 13 show that if the first conjunct had no PI, then generally the 
second conjunct had none either. This is so much as saying that if the second conjunct 
contained a PI, then the first conjunct did, too. The one exception to this rule was a 
text in which the second conjunct had a PI referring to the writer perspective. 
This finding can receive a clear interpretation. The natural texts in the corpus were 
generally asymmetric. This means that writers of the text presented their view or the 
argument they supported in the second conjunct. The current finding reflects this 
property of the texts: There were no texts in which the first conjunct presented 
unembedded information (i.e. information held to be true by the writer), and in which 
the second conjunct gave information that was presented from another person's 
perspective or an explicitly restricted writer's opinion. 
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The relation between Presence of Pi's and Presence of Qualifications in the first 
conjunct 
Table 14 
Frequencies of Pi's and Qualifications in the First Conjunct 
of Natural Texts (n-38) 
First Conjunct No PI PI Present 
No Qual i f icat ions 0 13 
Positive Qual i f icat ions 9 5 
Negative Qual i f icat ions 2 9 
If the first conjunct did not contain a PI, then it contained a qualification, generally a 
positive one (cf. zeer nuttig (very useful) in example (27)). Restricting the validity of an 
assertion by means of a PI is to a certain degree complementary to qualifying the 
assertion: A conjunct contains a PI, a qualification, or both. 
Qualifications are a means of explicitly indicating the truth or desirability of the 
information with respect to a certain perspective. There were no first conjuncts with 
neither a PI nor a qualification. One may conclude that natural texts are generally very 
explicit as regards the validity or desirability of the information in the conjunct. 
The next comparison is that between the presence or absence of Pi's and the presence 
or absence of only the positive qualifications. Of the 11 first conjuncts without a PI, 9 
(81.8%) had positive qualifications (i.e. qualifications of the type ...is waar {...is true) or 
terecht (justly)), whereas of the 27 texts with a PI, only 5 (18.5%) had positive qualifica­
tions (χ3 = 13.46, ρ < .05). 
The interpretation of this finding is that information valid in the writer perspective is 
positively evaluated, whereas embedded information is the typfe of information that can 
be evaluated negatively or can remain unevaluated. This is a demonstration of the 
Gricean dictum that speakers adhere to the things they say, unless their utterances are 
marked for an alternative interpretation (for example, by the use of Pi's). 
The relation between Presence of Pi's and Change in Perspective 
There is a relation between the presence of Pi's and the occurrence of a change in 
perspective between the conjuncts. Of the 11 texts in which the first conjunct had no 
PI, 5 (45.5%) had a change in perspective, whereas of the 27 texts with a PI in the first 
conjunct, 24 (88.9%) had a change in perspective (χ2 = 8.16, ρ < .05). 
This finding does not come' as a surprise. A change in perspective can only occur if 
there is at least one PI, in either the first or the second conjunct. It is evident that texts 
with a PI in the first conjunct more frequently have a change in perspective than texts 
with no PI in the first conjunct. In fact, the only texts with a PI in the first conjunct 
that do not have a change of perspective are texts in which both conjuncts have a PI 
referring to the same perspective. Such a situation is rare in natural texts. Below it is 
demonstrated that it occurs much more frequently in the experimental texts. 
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The relation between Presence of Pi's and Type of Contrastive Coherence Relation 
Of the 20 semantic opposition texts, 18 (90.0%) had a PI in the first conjunct, whereas 
of the 14 concessive opposition texts, only 7 (50.0%) had a PI in the first conjunct (χ2 
= 6.77, ρ < .05). 
The difference between the two types of constructions was described in Chapter 3 as 
a difference in explicitness: The structure underlying all contrastive coherence relations 
is more explicitly realized in semantic oppositions than in concessive oppositions. The 
finding reported here indicates that at least the first conjuncts of semantic oppositions 
are in conformity with that description. 
The relation between Presence of Pi's and Rhetorical Function of the Contrastive 
Coherence Relation 
In 18 of the 27 texts with a PI in the first conjunct (66.7%) the contrastive coherence 
relation functioned as a rebuttal of some sort. The contrastive coherence relation 
performed this function in only 3 of the 11 texts without a PI in the first conjunct 
(27.3%) (χ2 = 4.91, ρ < .05). 
This was to be expected.' If the contrastive coherence relation serves as a rebuttal of 
information, it is to be expected that it is a rebuttal of a statement that is given from 
some other person's point of view. 
PRESENCE OF Pi's IN THE FIRST CONJUNCT, EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS 
Pi's were generally present in the first conjuncts of the experimental texts. In five texts 
there was no PI in the first conjunct (in all these cases the main assertion of the 
conjunct was a writer's opinion). In the other 19 texts there was a PI referring to a 
perspective other than the writer perspective (i.e. a perspective corresponding to a 
(potential) conversational partner or a possible world). 
Relating this to the presence of Pi's in the second conjunct showed that in all the 
cases in which the first conjunct contained a PI, the second did, too. Of the 5 texts 
without a PI in the first conjunct, 4 did not have one in the second conjunct either. 
There is one text in which the first conjunct had no PI, while the second did. This text 
discusses the possibility of Amsterdam being a candidate for the 1992 Olympic Games. 
In the first conjunct the hypothetical status of this plan remains implicit, in the second 
conjunct it is made explicit. In a sense, then, both conjuncts are about a hypothetical 
situation, and can thus be put on a par. 
None of the comparisons with other factors yielded any significant results. 
PRESENCE OF Pi's IN THE SECOND CONJUNCT: NATURAL TEXTS 
Pi's occurred much less frequently in the second conjunct than in the first conjunct 
(Table 15). In 24 texts (63.2%) the second conjunct did not contain a PI (Fact, 
Opinion). Furthermore, in the majority of cases (32 texts or 84.2%) the information 
was given from the writer's point of view (Opinion, Writer). Thus the second conjunct 
differs considerably from the first conjunct, in which only 13 times (34.2%) the 
information was given from the writer's point of view. 
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Table 15 
Frequencies of Pi's in the First Conjunct of Natural Texts 
(n=38) 
Ρ 
w Fact 
2 
+ 
Opinion 
22 
+ 
+ 
Writer 
10 
+ 
Other 
4 
Note. For legend see Table 12. 
The relation between Presence of Pi's and Presence of Qualifications 
In contrast with the situation in the first conjunct, there was no relation between the 
presence of Pi's and the presence and type of qualifications in the second conjunct. 
The absence of such a relation is probably caused by the relative scarcity of Pi's in the 
second conjunct. 
The relation between Presence of Pi's and Type of Contrastive Coherence Relation 
In the second conjunct Pi's were slightly more frequent in semantic opposition texts 
than in concessive opposition texts: There was a PI in 8 of the 20 semantic opposition 
texts (40.0%) and in 5 of the 14 concessive opposition texts (35.7%). However, this 
difference was not significant, which is unlike the situation in the first conjunct, where 
Pi's occurred significantly more frequently in semantic oppositions than in concessive 
oppositions. 
The relation between Presence of Pi's and Change in Perspective 
There is a relation between the presence of Pi's in the first conjunct and the presence 
of changes in perspective: From the presence of Pi's one can infer a change in 
perspective. No such relation was found for the second conjunct. This finding is not 
very surprising. A change in perspective generally means a change to the writer 
perspective. This perspective can remain unmarked. 
There were no other interactions between the factor Presence of PI and the other 
factors in the analysis. 
PRESENCE OF Pi's IN TIIE SECOND CONJUNCT: EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS 
Pi's were generally present in the second conjunct of experimental texts (in 20 of the 
24 texts or 83.3%). Moreover, in only 4 texts (16.7%) the information in the second 
conjunct was given from the writer perspective. These are two respects in which the 
experimental texts differ considerably from natural texts. 
There were no second conjuncts that lacked both a PI and a qualification of the 
assertion: A conjunct had a PI, a qualification (either positive or negative), or both. 
This differs from the situation in the second conjuncts of natural texts. In the latter 
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there was no relation between the two factors. It also differs from the situation in the 
first conjuncts of the experimental texts. 
A similar remark can be made with respect to the relation between the presence of 
Pi's and changes in perspective: If there was a change in perspective between the two 
conjuncts, then there was a PI in the second conjunct. No such relation was found in 
the natural texts, since there the second conjunct was generally written from the 
writer's point of view, a perspective that can remain unmarked. The discrepancy is 
caused, of course, by the fact that the second conjuncts of the experimental texts had to 
be first conjuncts in other versions of that text. 
There were no relations between Presence of Pi's and any of the other factors in the 
analysis. 
6.4.5 Qualifying the information in the conjuncts. 
QUALIFICATIONS IN NATURAL TEXTS 
An example of a positive qualification is zeer nuttig (very useful) in (27), repeated here. 
An example of a negative qualification is alleen maar (just) in (28). 
(27) De Raad van Europa heeft in het verleden zeer nuttig werk gedaan voor de 
samenwerking tussen de Europese landen. 
(27)' In the past the Council of Europe did very useful work for the cooperation 
between the European countries. 
(28) Het is thans eigenlijk nog voornamelijk een praatclub die de betrokken 
ministers alleen maar afhoudt van het noodzakelijke werk dat zij in eigen 
land moeten verrichten. 
(28)' Actually it is at the moment mainly a debating club which just keeps the 
Secretaries of State involved from doing the necessary work they have to do 
in their own countries. 
Qualifications occurred less frequently in first conjuncts than in second conjuncts: The 
main assertion of 25 first conjuncts (65.8%) had a qualification, in the second conjuncts 
there were 31 qualifications (81.6%)). 
The cause of this difference can be traced by looking at the relation with Type of 
Contrastive Coherence Relation. The first conjuncts of semantic oppositions generally 
had fewer qualifications than the first conjuncts of concessive oppositions: Of the 14 
concessive oppositions, 13 (92.9%) had first conjuncts with a qualification, positive or 
negative, and of the 20 semantic oppositions, only 11 (55.0%) had first conjuncts with a 
qualification (χ2 = 5.68, ρ < .05). Such a difference was not found in the second 
conjuncts: 17 of the 20 semantic oppositions (85.0%) and 12 of the 14 concessive 
oppositions (85.7%) had a qualification in the second conjunct. 
One might expect that frequently in contrastive coherence relations opposite 
evaluations are given of some thing or things. That is, negative evaluations in the one 
conjunct may be expected to co-occur with positive evaluations in the other. This was 
not the case however: There was no relation between presence and type of qualifica­
tion in the one conjunct and that in the other. 
The presence of qualifications in the first conjunct is related to the relation of the 
first conjunct to the context: If the first conjunct had no qualification, then the 
information in the first conjunct was new with respect to the context. Alternatively, if 
the information in the first conjunct was old, then the conjunct had a qualification. 
Apparently only old information can be qualified. This finding relates to the fact that 
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qualifiers are factive-like: Qualifiers presuppose the truth of the propositions they 
qualify, since the qualifier is the new part of the utterance and the qualified part the 
old part (cf. Spooren, 1987). 
In second conjuncts negative qualifications were predominant: Of the 31 second 
conjuncts containing a qualification, 20 (64.5%) had a negative qualification. Together 
with the finding that first conjuncts predominantly had Pi's referring to a perspective 
other than the writer perspective, this suggests that the contrastive coherence relations 
in the natural texts frequently had a structure in which the first conjunct presented the 
position of a potential conversational partner, and the second conjunct presented a 
negative evaluation of that position. 
No other relations with the factor Presence of Qualifications were found in the natural 
texts. 
QUALIFICATIONS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS 
Qualifications generally occurred in the conjuncts of the experimental texts: There were 
only 3 first conjuncts (12.5%) and 4 second conjuncts (16.7%) without qualifications. 
A discrepancy between first and second conjuncts is that the former had more 
positive qualifications (13 positive and 8 negative qualifications), whereas in the latter 
the two types were equally distributed (10 of each type). 
There is a relationship between the types of qualifications in the two conjuncts: If 
the first conjunct had a positive qualification, then the second generally had a negative 
one, and if the first conjunct did not have a positive qualification, then the second did 
not have a negative qualification (of the 13 positive first conjunct qualifications, 9 
(69.2%) co-occurred with negative second conjunct qualification; of the 11 non-positive 
first conjunct qualifications, 10 (90.9%) co-occurred with non-negative second conjunct 
qualifications, χ2 = 8.87, ρ < .05). The arguments in an experimental text were 
supposed to have opposite, but equal argumentative weight. As a consequence a 
positive evaluation in the one conjunct was counterbalanced by a negative evaluation in 
the other. 
No other relations with the presence of qualifications were found in the experimental 
texts. 
6.4.6 Changes of perspective between the conjuncts. 
NATURAL TEXTS 
It was expected that as a rule contrastive coherence relations display a change in 
perspective between the conjuncts. This expectation was borne out: In 29 of the 38 
texts (76.3%) such a change was found. Moreover, semantic oppositions are taken to be 
more explicit with respect to the underlying contrastive structure than concessive 
oppositions. Therefore, one may expect changes in perspective to occur more frequent­
ly in semantic oppositions than in concessive oppositions. The data showed some 
indications for such a difference (18 of the 20 semantic oppositions (90.0%) and 9 of 
the 14 concessive oppositions (64.3%) had a change in perspective), but the difference 
was not significant (χ2 = 3.33, .05 < ρ < .10). 
There was a dependency relation between the factors Change in Perspective and 
Argumentative Complexity of the Conjuncts. All 10 texts with complex first conjuncts 
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had a change in perspective, and all 9 texts without a change in perspective had simple 
first conjuncts. The same tendency (the more complex the conjunct, the more probable 
that there is a change in perspective) was found in the second conjunct: Of the 27 texts 
with complex second conjuncts, 25 (92.6%) had a change in perspective, of the 11 texts 
with simple second conjuncts, only 4 (36.4%) had such a change (χ2 = 13.67, ρ < .05). 
A final relation was that between Change in Perspective and Rhetorical Function of 
the Contrastive Coherence Relation: Of the 9 texts without a change in perspective, 6 
(66.7%) were so-called transitions, i.e. a transition from an argument in favor of a 
claim to an argument against a claim (or vice versa), or a change in time. Of the 29 
texts with a change in perspective, only 6 (20.7%) were transitions (χ2 = 6.72, ρ < .05). 
A possible explanation for the finding that transitions were rare in texts with a 
change in perspective is that such a change primarily occurs in a text with a rebuttal 
function: In the second conjunct the writer rebuts an embedded assertion from the first 
conjunct. 
It is indeed the case that rebuttals were more frequent in texts with a change in 
perspective than in texts without such a change: Of the 29 texts with a change in 
perspective, 18 (62.1%) were rebuttals, of the 9 texts without a change in perspective, 3 
(33.3%) were rebuttals. However, this difference was not significant (χ2 = 2.29, .10 < ρ 
< .20). 
EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS 
Changes in perspective occurred considerably less often in experimental texts than in 
natural texts: They were found in only 12 texts (50.0%). They occurred far more 
frequently in semantic oppositions (in 10 of the 12 semantic oppositions or 83.3%) than 
in concessive oppositions (in 2 of the 12 concessive oppositions or 16.7%) (χ2 = 10.67, 
ρ < .05). It is the low number of changes in perspective in concessive oppositions in 
which the experimental texts differ from natural texts. 
6.4.7 Length of the conjuncts. 
The length of the conjuncts differed considerably in the natural texts: The mean length 
of the first conjunct was 58.1 words (lengths varied from 7 to 173 words, SD = 47.1). 
The mean length of the second conjunct was 161.2 words (lengths varied from 17 to 
1097 words, SD = 209.4). 
For each text a ratio between the conjunct lengths has been calculated (the length of 
the second conjunct divided by the length of the first conjunct): The mean ratio was 
5.06 (the minimal ratio was 0.15, the maximal ratio was 36.52, 5D = 6.97). Generally, 
then, second conjuncts were much longer than first conjuncts. In view of the fact that 
most of the texts were plainly asymmetric, in that the writer's opinion related to the 
argumentation in the second conjunct, one can say that conjunct length is used to 
indicate the writer's opinion: The conjunct favoring the writer's position is elaborated 
best. 
Experimental texts differ considerably from natural texts in this respect: The mean 
length of the first conjunct was 41.8 words (lengths varied from 14 to 80 words, SD = 
17.7), the mean length of the second conjunct was 41.2 words (lengths varied from 13 
to 69 words, SD = 13.5). The mean ratio of the two conjuncts in the experimental texts 
was 1.07 (varying from 0.64 to 1.92, SD = 0.34). The conjuncts of the experimental 
texts were generally equally long. This is a consequence of the experimental design. 
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There were other differences between natural and experimental texts. In the natural 
texts there was a difference between the length of the first conjuncts of semantic 
oppositions and those of concessive oppositions: Of the 20 semantic oppositions, 13 
(65.0%) had a first conjunct that was smaller than the median, of the 14 concessive 
oppositions, only 4 (28.6%) had such a short first conjunct (χ* = 4.37, ρ < .05). No 
such relation was found in the second conjunct of natural texts, nor in any of the 
conjuncts in the experimental texts. 
This finding seems to indicate that quoted opinions (which occurred frequently in 
first conjuncts of semantic oppositions) were not elaborated. 
Conjunct length can be taken as an indication of the complexity of the conjunct. The 
same holds for the number of (embedded) arguments. It was therefore expected that 
there was a relation between the length and the argumentative complexity of the 
conjuncts. This was indeed found in both the natural and the experimental texts. 
In the natural texts 19 of the 28 first conjuncts with simple argumentation were 
shorter than the median (67.9%), whereas none of the first conjuncts with complex 
argumentation was shorter than the median. Of the 11 second conjuncts with simple 
argumentation, 10 (90.9%) were shorter than the median, whereas only 9 of the 27 
complex second conjuncts (33.3%) were shorter than the median. 
In the experimental texts 8 of the 10 first conjuncts with simple argumentation were 
shorter than the median (80.0%) and only 4 of the 14 complex first conjuncts (28.6%) 
(χ2 = 6.17, ρ < .05). Of the 13 second conjuncts with simple argumentation, 8 (61.5%) 
were shorter than the median and only 4 of the 11 complex conjuncts (36.4%) (χ2 = 
1.51, .20 < ρ < .30). 
6.4.8 Complexity of the argumentation in the conjuncts. 
The conjuncts of the natural texts differed in the complexity of their argumentation: 28 
first conjuncts (73.7%) had simple argumentation, whereas 27 second conjuncts (71.1%) 
had complex argumentation. This is, again, a reflection of the fact that the second 
conjunct is dominant in a contrastive coherence relation: The conjunct that supports 
the writer's position has the most complex structure, i.e. is elaborated best. 
In the experimental texts the conjuncts were more or less equally structured: 10 first 
conjuncts (41.7%) and 13 second conjuncts (54.2%) had a simple argumentative 
structure. Moreover, in the experimental texts there was a relation between the 
complexity of the argumentation in the first and in the second conjunct that was not 
found in the natural texts: Of the 10 texts with simple first conjuncts, 9 (90.0%) had 
simple second conjuncts and of the 14 texts with complex first conjuncts, only 4 
(28.6%) had simple second conjuncts (χ2 = 8.87, ρ < .05). This means, of course, that 
generally the argumentative complexity was the same in both conjuncts. 
In the natural texts there was a relation between the argumentative complexity of the 
first conjunct and the rhetorical function of the contrastive coherence relation. In 18 of 
the 28 texts with simple first conjuncts (64.3%) the contrastive coherence relation had a 
rebutting function. Of the 10 texts with complex first conjuncts, only 3 (30.0%) had a 
contrastive coherence relation with a rebutting function (χ2 = 3.50, .05 < ρ < .10). It 
seems, then, that rebuttals predominately co-occur with simple first conjuncts: An 
opponent's position is not elaborated. 
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6.4.9 Relation between the information in the conjuncts and the information in the 
context. 
In the natural texts there was a great discrepancy in the relations of the conjuncts to 
their context. First conjuncts generally gave new information (33 texts or 86.8%; the 
remaining texts gave old information). Second conjuncts predominantly gave denials of 
old information (13 conjuncts (34.2%) gave new information, 3 (7.9%) gave old 
information, and 22 (57.9%) gave a denial of old information). 
There are two causes for this discrepancy: On the one hand it is the case that first 
conjuncts have less context to refer to, whereas second conjuncts have the first conjunct 
as part of their context. On the other hand it is very often the function of contrastive 
coherence relations to deny information presented in the first conjunct. 
The experimental design makes it impossible to construct a conjunct in which reference 
is made to the other conjunct, since a reversal of the conjunct order in such a text 
would lead to a bizarre result. This accounts for the fact that both conjuncts mainly 
gave new information (23 of the 24 texts). 
6.4.10 Type and rhetorical function of the contrastive coherence relation. 
In the corpus of natural texts there were 20 semantic oppositions, 14 concessive 
oppositions, and 2 denials of expectation. Two contrastive coherence relations could 
not be classified in one of these categories: They are of the type Ik ga met je mee, 
maar dan wel op zaterdag (I'll go with you, but it will have to be on Saturday) and give 
an exception or a condition of some sort.3 
Type of contrastive coherence relation is a factor in Experiment 5. Therefore, one 
half of the experimental texts consisted of semantic oppositions, while the other half 
were concessive oppositions. 
As to the rhetorical function of the contrastive coherence relation, 12 natural texts gave 
what was previously called a transition, 3 gave an 'addition to a perspective', and the 
majority, 22, gave a rebuttal of an element in a perspective. In one text the rhetorical 
function of the contrastive coherence relation was unclear. Transition is exemplified in 
(8), repeated here, addition in (29), and rebuttal in (30). 
(8) Tot nu toe is in Sovjet-standpunten altijd sprake geweest van aantallen 
lanceerinrichtingen (raketten en vliegtuigen), die in Oost en West op gelijk 
niveau zouden moeten worden gebracht. [...] 
Andropov heeft nu te kennen gegeven dat Moskou bereid is om de 
aantallen kernkoppen als maatstaf - of in ieder geval als een van de 
maatstaven - te hanteren bij het rakettenoverleg. 
(8)' In the Soviet opinions so far there have always been mentions of numbers 
of launching systems (missiles and aircraft), which ought to be put at an 
equal level in East and West. [...] 
Mr. Andropov has now given to understand that Moscow is prepared to 
use the numbers of nuclear heads as the norm - or at least as one of the 
norms - in the disarmament talks. 
(29) De Vrouwenbond FNV heeft [...] een reeks eisen opgesteld op het gebied 
van Vrouw en Gezondheidszorg. 
3
 This type of contrastive coherence relation is discussed in Jaspers (in preparation). 
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Het meest in het oog springende verlangen: de bond wil dat er een wet­
telijke regeling komt voor betaald verlof voor werkneemsters en werknemers 
bij ziekte van huisgenoten. 
In hun ijver de sociale wetgeving in vrouwvriendelijker richting om te 
buigen, hebben de betrokkenen kennelijk onvoldoende aandacht besteed aan 
de toch wel fundamentele vraag wie dat betaalde verlof moet gaan betalen. 
(29)' [...] the Women's Union FNV has drawn up a list of demands in the field 
of Woman and Public Health. 
The most prominent desire: The union wants a statutory regulation about 
paid leave for both female and male employees in the case of illness of 
housemates. 
In their zeal to bend social legislation into more woman-minded direc­
tions, the persons involved apparently did not pay sufficient attention to the 
nevertheless fundamental question who is going to foot the bill. 
(30) Het PvdA-kamerlid Ed van Thijn [...] is verbitterd over de z.i. schijnhei­
lige mensenrechtenpolitiek van het kabinet. [...] 
De heer Van Thijn weet niet waarover hij praat. 
(30)' The MP for the PvdA Mr. Ed van Thijn is embittered about what he calls 
the cabinet's hypocritical human rights' policy. [...] 
Mr. Van Thijn does not know what he is talking about. 
The great number of rebuttals can hardly be called a surprising finding for the texts in 
the corpus: The texts often reacted to or commented upon opinions expressed by 
others. These reactions or comments most often expressed disagreement with, and 
rebuttal of, those opinions. 
Nearly all experimental texts had transitions. In one text a rebuttal was found. 
6.4.11 Type of text. 
The corpus consisted of 24 editorial comments and 14 letters to the editor. The main 
differences between these two types concern the structure and function of the texts: 
Editorial comments were found to be generally more explicitly structured than letters 
to the editor, and letters to the editor were generally (rebutting) reactions to articles 
that appeared previously in the newspapers. 
A reflection of the first difference is the fact that editorial comments had considerably 
more structural realizations of the contrastive coherence relation than the letters to the 
editor: 23 out of the 24 editorial comments (95.8%) and only 8 out of the 14 letters 
(57.1%) had such a structural realization (χ* = 8.81, ρ < .05). 
The second difference is reflected in many ways. First, letters to the editor tended to 
have relatively few contrastive coherence relations functioning as transitions (10 out of 
the 24 comments (41.7%) and 2 out of the 14 letters (14.3%) were transitions, χ2 = 
3.07, .05 < ρ < .10). The reason for this is that letters more frequently had contrast 
relations that function as rebuttals (11 out of the 24 comments (45.3%) and 10 out of 
the 14 letters (71.4%) were rebuttals - however, the difference was not significant, χ3 
= 2.34, .10 < ρ < .20). 
Second, the two types differed in the presence of Pi's: All 14 first conjuncts of the 
letters to the editor had a PI, and only 13 out of the 24 first conjuncts of the comments 
(54.2%) had a PI. Similarly, only 1 out of the 14 first conjuncts of the letters to the 
editor (7.1%) was written from the writer perspective, whereas half of the first 
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conjuncts of the comments was written from the writer's point of view. In the second 
conjunct the situation was reversed: 13 out of the 14 letters to the editor (92.9%) were 
written from the writer perspective, and 18 out of the 24 comments (75.0%). 
A third reflection of this difference in function involves the relation of the second 
conjunct to the context: 11 out of the 24 comments (45.8%) and 11 out of the 14 
letters to the editor (78.6%) had second conjuncts that denied information in the 
context (χ2 = 3.89, ρ < .05). 
Finally, 8 out of the 24 comments (33.3%) and 12 out of the 14 letters (85.7%) were 
semantic oppositions (χ2 = 9.74, ρ < .05). 
All these differences indicate that letters to the editor have a more or less invariable 
structure and function: In the first conjunct an assertion is quoted, in the second 
conjunct this assertion is invalidated in one way or another. Editorial comments have 
less uniform properties. 
d 5 Survey of the Results 
This section gives a summary of the findings of the analysis of newspaper articles and 
experimental texts. The summary gives the factor involved, the finding, and the 
interpretation of the finding given in the text. The implication relation if a then b that 
is frequently mentioned in the summary is to be interpreted as "the occurrence of a is 
generally accompanied by the occurrence of b". 
Finding Interpretation 
1. Natural texts 
1.1 Factor Locality 
Few texts have a global con­
trastive coherence relation that 
is locally expressed. 
1.2 Factor Asymmetry 
Most texts are asymmetrical. 
1.3 Factor Structural Realization of the Global Contrastive Coherence Relations 
Few occurrences of maar ¡echter. Since most texts are asymmetric, maar is not the 
only way to mark the asymmetry of the texts. 
Paragraph starts co-occur with 
maarjechteT. 
First conjunct: If there is no PI, Partial complementariness of structural realization 
then there is a structural reali- and prototypical marker of the first conjunct (Pi's), 
zation. for ease of interpretation of the construction. 
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Second conjunct: If there is no 
additional contrastive marking, 
then there is a structural reali-
zation. 
First conjunct: if the conjuncts 
are connected by maar/echter, 
then there is an additional con-
trastive marker. 
First conjunct: If the text does 
not have a paragraph start or 
maar/echter, then there is a PI. 
First conjunct: If the conjunct is 
long, then there is a general 
marking by maar/echter. 
If there is no change in per-
spective, then there is a para-
graph start. 
If the text is a semantic opposi-
tion, then there is no maar/ech-
ter. 
Partial complementariness of structural realization 
and prototypical marker of the second conjunct 
(additional contrastive markers), for ease of inter-
pretation of the construction. 
In texts containing maar/echter the first conjuncts 
start with a topicalization of the PI. 
Partial complementariness of Pi's in the first con-
junct on the one hand and maar/echter and para-
graph starts on the other. 
Presence of maar/echter compensates for a distrac-
tion of the reader from the global structure by long 
first conjuncts. 
Since texts without a change in perspective create 
more interpretive difficulties, the absence of such a 
change is compensated for by a typographical mark-
ing. 
Global semantic oppositions are similar to local 
semantic oppositions, in that they occur freely with-
out maar/echter. 
1.4 Factor Additional Contrastive Marker 
Scarce in first conjuncts, abun-
dant in second conjuncts. 
First conjunct: If there is no PI, 
then there is an additional con-
trastive marker. 
Partial complementariness of Pi's and additional 
contrastive markers. 
Second conjunct: If there is an 
additional contrastive marker, 
then there is a change in per-
spective between the conjuncts. 
Second conjunct: If the addi-
tional contrastive marker is 
semantic, then the rhetorical 
function of the contrastive co-
herence relation is that of a 
rebuttal. 
Additional contrastive markers serve to indicate a 
change in perspective. 
Semantic markers are mainly negations, which fit 
the rebutting function. 
Second conjunct: If there is an 
additional contrastive marker, 
then the conjunct gives (a denial 
of) old information. 
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1.5 Factor Pi's 
Abundant in first conjuncts, 
scarce in second conjuncts. 
Second conjunct: Information is 
given from the writer perspec-
tive. 
The information a writer adheres to is presented in 
the second conjunct 
First conjunct: If the contrastive 
coherence relation is a semantic 
opposition, then the first con-
junct has a PI. 
If the first conjunct does not 
have a PI, the second does not, 
either. 
First conjunct: If there is no PI, 
then the qualification used is 
positive; otherwise it is negative. 
First conjunct: If there is a PI, 
then there is a change in per-
spective between the conjuncts. 
First conjunct: If there is a PI, 
the rhetorical function of the 
contrastive coherence relation is 
that of a rebuttal. 
Semantic oppositions are more explicit with respect 
to the structure that, by hypothesis, is to be derived 
for the interpretation of contrastive coherence rela-
tions. 
Because the texts are asymmetric, there are no texts 
in which the first conjunct gives unembedded infor-
mation and the second conjunct gives embedded 
information. 
Negatively evaluated information is embedded un-
der a PI. 
If a change in perspective occurs, the perspective 
changes from a perspective other than the writer 
perspective to the writer perspective. 
Rebutted information is information embedded 
under a PI. 
1.6 Factor Qualifications 
Qualifications are more frequent 
in second conjuncts than in first 
conjuncts. 
Second conjuncts mainly have 
negative qualifications. 
First conjunct: If the contrastive 
coherence relation is a semantic 
opposition, then there are few 
qualifications. 
First conjunct: If there is no 
qualification, then the informa-
tion in the conjunct is new with 
respect to the context. 
Information in the first conjunct is generally evalua-
ted negatively in the second conjunct. 
Only old information is evaluated. That is, qualify-
ing expressions are factive-like. 
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1.7 Factor Change in Perspective 
Abundant 
More often in semantic opposi- Semantic oppositions are explicit with respect to the 
tions than in concessive opposi- structure that, by hypothesis, is to be derived for the 
tions. interpretation of contrastive coherence relations. 
If the conjunct has complex ? 
argumentation, then there is a 
change in perspective. 
If the rhetorical function of the A change in perspective is generally a change to the 
contrastive coherence relation is writer perspective, which is especially adequate for 
not that of a transition, then rebutting information. 
there is a change in perspective. 
1.8 Factor Length of the Conjuncts 
The second conjunct is much The conjunct containing the arguments in favor of 
longer than the first conjunct. the writer's position is elaborated best. 
Semantic opposition first con- Quoted opinions, which occur predominantly in 
juncts are shorter than conces- semantic oppositions, are not elaborated. 
sive opposition first conjuncts. 
If the conjunct is short, then it Conjunct length and argumentative complexity both 
is argumentatively simple, if it is reflect conjunct complexity. 
long it is argumentatively com-
plex. 
1.9 Factor Argumentative Complexity 
Second conjuncts have more The second conjunct generally gives the writer's 
complex argumentation than opinion and is therefore elaborated best. 
first conjuncts. 
First conjuncts: If the conjunct Rebuttal involves quoted opinions. The opponent's 
has simple argumentation, then opinion is not elaborated. 
the rhetorical function of the 
contrastive coherence relation is 
that of a rebuttal. 
1.10 Factor Relation to Context 
First conjuncts give new infor- Reflection of the rhetorical function of contrastive 
mation, second conjuncts deny coherence relations: Rebuttal of quoted opinions. 
old information. 
CHAPTER 6 
Editorial comments are more explicitly structured 
than letters to the editor. 
Letters to the editor are (rebutting) reactions to 
previously published opinions. 
The same. 
The same. 
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1.11 Factor Type of Text 
Editorial comments have more 
general markings than letters to 
the editor. 
In letters to the editor the con-
trastive coherence relation more 
often has a rebutting rhetorical 
function. 
First conjuncts of letters to the 
editor have Pi's. 
In letters to the editor the infor-
mation in the second conjunct is 
presented from the writer's 
point of view, the information in 
the first conjunct is not. 
Letters to the editor more often 
have second conjuncts that deny 
old mformation than editorial 
comments. 
2. Experimental texts 
2.1 Factor Additional Contrastive Marker 
The conjuncts are very much Consequence of the experimental design. 
alike, apart from the presence 
of extra oppositional elements 
in the second conjunct. 
The same. 
If a conjunct has an additional 
contrastive marker, then it also 
has a PI. 
First conjunct: If there is no 
additional contrastive marker, 
then the conjunct has complex 
argumentation. 
2.2 Factor Pi's 
Abundant in both conjuncts. 
Information is not given from 
the writer perspective. 
Second conjunct: If there is no 
PI, then there is a qualification. 
Additional contrastive markers in the experimental 
texts are mainly topicalized Pi's. 
Consequence of the experimental design. 
Second conjuncts are explicit with respect to the 
way the information in the conjunct must be inter-
preted. 
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Second conjunct: If there is a 
change in perspective, then 
there is a PL 
2.3 Factor Qualifications 
If the first conjunct has a posi-
tive qualification, then the sec-
ond conjunct has a negative one, 
and vice versa. 
2.4 Change in Perspective 
Changes of perspective are rare 
in concessive oppositions. 
2.5 Length of the Conjuncts 
More or less equal conjunct 
lengths. 
If the conjunct is short, then it 
has simple argumentation, if it 
is long, it has complex 
argumentation. 
2.6 Argumentative Complexity 
Conjuncts have more or less 
equal argumentative complexity. 
2.7 Relation to Context 
Both conjuncts give new infor-
mation. 
6.6 Consequences for the AnafysL· of Contrastive Coherence Relations 
The purpose of the present chapter was to make an inventory of some of the proper-
ties of natural and experimental texts and to compare these. A second goal of the 
analysis was to find out whether the theory of sentential (or local) contrasts given in 
Chapter 3 can be extended to global contrasts. 
There are several differences between the natural and the experimental texts. Most of 
the natural texts were asymmetric, and in only a relatively small number of them the 
contrastive coherence relation was realized by means of maar ¡echter. Apparently, the 
asymmetry of texts can be marked otherwise than by maar. 
Several other indicators of the asymmetry have been found: 
1. The information in the first conjunct of a contrastive coherence relation was 
generally embedded under a PI, whereas the information in the second conjunct was 
Consequence of the experimental design. 
Consequence of the experimental design. 
Consequence of the experimental design. 
Conjunct length and argumentative complexity both 
reflect conjunct complexity. 
Consequence of the experimental design. 
Consequence of the experimental design. 
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given from the writer perspective. As a consequence most texts had a change from a 
perspective other than the writer perspective to the writer perspective. 
2. The second conjunct was generally much longer than the first conjunct. 
3. The argumentation in the second conjunct was more complex than that in the first 
conjunct. 
4. The second conjunct very often denied information alluded to in the first 
conjunct The contrastive coherence relation very frequently had the function of a 
rebuttal. As a consequence the second conjunct had many negations and negative 
evaluations. 
In these respects the natural texts differ from the experimental texts in the corpus. 
These findings can be used to explain the differences between Experiments 3, 6, and 7 
on the one hand and Experiments 4 and 5 on the other. In Experiment 3 the subjects 
compared four versions of a global contrastive coherence relation (differing, among 
others, in the absence or presence of maar) and gave their opinion of the argumenta-
tive tendency of the text. The results indicated that judgments of text versions with 
maar were extremer than judgments of versions without maar. In Experiment 6 the 
subjects judged the argumentative tendency of one version of a local contrastive 
coherence relation. The results showed an effect of the presence of maar and of the 
presence of a PI in the conjuncts: Judgments of versions with maar were extremer and 
this effect was stronger in versions without Pi's than in versions with a PI. In Experi-
ment 7 the subjects judged the argumentative tendency of one version of a text 
containing a global contrastive coherence relation. The versions differed, among other 
things, in the presence or absence of a salient contrast marker. The information in the 
conjuncts was not embedded under a PI. The results showed that the judgments of text 
versions containing an explicit marker of the contrastive coherence relation were 
extremer than the judgments of text versions without such a marker. 
In Experiments 4 and 5 the subjects judged the argumentative tendency of one 
version of a text containing a global contrastive coherence relation. The information in 
the conjuncts was embedded under an explicit PI. The versions differed, among other 
things, in the presence or absence of maar as an explicit marker of the contrastive 
coherence relation. The results indicated that there was no effect of the presence or 
absence of the explicit marker. 
The findings of these experiments and of the analysis of the texts in the corpus both 
indicate that one single maar is not enough to indicate the asymmetric properties of a 
global contrastive coherence relation in a more or less normal reading situation. Such 
being the case, the results of Experiment 3 (in which different versions of a text were 
compared) can be accounted for by the fact that in this experiment the subjects were 
focused on the presence or absence of maar. 
An alternative explanation for the results of the text experiments that were reported in 
Chapter 5 can be rejected on the basis of the present analysis: It is not the case that 
only those global contrastive coherence relations display asymmetry that have a local 
realization of the contrast. 
There are several properties of global contrastive coherence relations that support the 
analysis of Chapter 3. The conjuncts in a contrastive coherence relation are generally 
marked for the contrastive interpretation: In the first conjunct marking is generally 
done by a PI, in the second conjunct by an additional contrastive marker. That these 
markings have a function in the contrastive interpretation is indicated, for instance, by 
the relation between the presence of additional contrastive markers in the second 
conjunct and the presence of a change in perspective between the conjuncts: The 
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additional contrastive markers function to indicate the presence of such a change in 
perspective. 
In semantic oppositions the first conjuncts more frequently have a PI than in 
concessive oppositions. Semantic oppositions more often have a change in perspective 
between the conjuncts than concessive oppositions. These findings are in line with the 
analysis of semantic oppositions as being more explicit with respect to the structure 
underlying contrastive coherence relations. Moreover, semantic oppositions less 
frequently have maar/echter than concessive oppositions. Global semantic oppositions 
are like local semantic oppositions, in that they can occur freely without maar/echter. 
A final finding related to the analysis of Chapter 3 is that there are no texts in 
which the first conjunct does not have a PI and the second does: The analysis of 
Chapter 3 implies that if two contrasting opinions are expressed, one of which repre-
senting the writer's opinion, then the information representing the writer's opinion is 
given in the second conjunct. 
The global contrastive coherence relations found in the corpus are generally of a form 
in which the first conjunct presents a quoted opinion and the second conjunct presents 
a negative evaluation of that opinion. This 'superstructure' accounts for many of the 
properties of the texts. 
1. First conjuncts generally have a PI, and give information that is generally not 
valid in the writer perspective. The second conjunct generally gives information valid in 
the writer perspective and it frequently contains a negative qualification. 
2. The first conjunct generally gives new information, and the second conjunct 
generally gives a denial of old information. 
3. The rhetorical function of the contrastive coherence relation is generally that of a 
rebuttal. 
4. The second conjunct has more complex argumentation, especially if the rhetorical 
function of the contrastive coherence relation is that of a rebuttal, and it is longer than 
the first conjunct. 
The fact that the texts in the corpus have these properties is of course due to the 
argumentative nature of the texts. The global contrastive coherence relation seems very 
appropriate as a structure for argumentation. This calls for a description of the 
argumentative properties of global contrastive coherence relations in terms of the way 
the information is related to the writer's point of view. Such a description was presen-
ted in Chapter 3. 
This list does not include all the findings of the analysis of natural texts, but the ones 
mentioned here are the ones related directly to the main topic of this thesis. In 
conclusion, it seems that the findings are generally in line with the analysis of Chapter 
3. 

7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In recent years the borders between the study of discourse and sentence linguistics 
have become vaguer. It has been acknowledged that an adequate description of 
numerous semantic phenomena must take into account the effect of the context on 
sentence interpretation. This has led to a framework known as discourse semantics and 
to the formulation of several elegant proposals for the analysis of numerous semantic 
phenomena that had not been given a proper treatment in traditional semantic 
paradigms. And on the part of the students of discourse there is a growing interest to 
give formal accounts of the representations which a reader makes of a discourse and of 
the way in which these representations are created. 
These developments seem to point in one direction: In principle there is no 
difference between the two disciplines except for the point of departure: sentences 
versus discourses. In practice the association of discourse studies and sentence linguis-
tics is not so easily accomplished, because semantics concentrates mainly on truth-
conditional phenomena of a local nature, whereas the study of discourse is characteris-
tically interdisciplinary, ranging through such areas as argumentation theory and 
rhetoric, semantics and pragmatics, psycholinguistics and artificial intelligence. Never-
theless, there is a distinct drift towards a unification and that is why discourse seman-
tics can be considered as a major contribution in the endeavor to bridge the gap 
between linguistics and the study of natural texts. 
This study conforms to this trend. It investigates the linguistic properties of one of the 
coherence relations found in discourse, the global contrastive coherence relation. The 
basis for this investigation is the literature on /?uf-coordinations. Some of this literature 
is reviewed in Chapter 2. This review has led to the conclusion that in an adequate 
theory of the interpretation of contrastive coherence relations conjunctions must be 
given an operational meaning. Furthermore, the interpretation of contrastive coherence 
relations is determined to a large extent by the context in which the contrastive 
coherence relation occurs. Therefore, the interpretation of a contrastive coherence 
relation cannot be described as a simple function of the semantic interpretation of the 
conjuncts. Another criterion for an adequate analysis of contrastive coherence relations 
is that it must account for the argumentative behavior of these relations. Finally, 
several types of contrastive coherence relations have been distinguished, which an 
adequate analysis of contrastive coherence relations must account for. 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of contrastive coherence relations that aims at satisfying 
these criteria. In the analysis the concept of perspectives was crucial: Bui-coordinations 
(more generally, contrastive coherence relations) were taken to be coordinations of 
perspectives containing conflicting information. The perspectives are signalled by the 
(sometimes abstract) perspective indicating elements (Pi's). 
Different types of birt-coordinations were characterized in terms of the way the 
general scheme of two Pi's dominating two conflicting propositions or propositional 
formulae, was related to the surface information. In semantic oppositions this contras-
tive structure is realized fairly explicitly, in denials of expectation it takes an inference 
based on the first conjunct to establish the contrastive structure, and in concessive 
oppositions it is least explicit, in that there an inference based on both conjuncts is 
required. Semantic oppositions were set apart from the other two types of constructions 
by the claim that the former inherit the contradiction required for an adequate contrast 
from the context, whereas the latter display a more direct contradiction. This charac-
teristic was phrased as follows: Semantic oppositions are about two entities in the 
context, denials of expectation and concessive oppositions are about one entity. 
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The content of the conflicting propositions in the two perspectives depends on the 
discourse representation realized up to the moment of interpreting the contrastive 
coherence relation. As a consequence one and the same surface realization of a 
contrastive coherence relation can be given different interpretations, depending on the 
context. 
Although this thesis did not fully specify the steps leading from the surface realiza­
tion to the underlying contrastive structure, it was suggested that the conjunction but 
may best be viewed as an instruction to set up such a structure. Thus the claim that the 
conjunction but presupposes a contrast of some sort, a claim frequently mentioned in 
the literature, but which had nevertheless remained vague, was made more explicit. 
Information embedded in a perspective can become valid in a higher perspective, a 
process which has been called percolation. It was claimed that such explicit contrastive 
markers as but have a specific effect on the representation of the discourse: If the 
contrastive coherence relation is explicitly marked, then the information embedded 
under PI2 tends to percolate to the highest perspective in the discourse representation, 
the writer perspective. In this respect but differs from an element like and, which, in a 
contrastive context, does not give any indication as to what proposition will percolate. 
This conjecture was labeled the Asymmetry Hypothesis. 
Such an analysis of contrastive coherence relations suggests a natural relation 
between the argumentative and the referential content of a discourse, thus satisfying 
one of the conditions mentioned in Chapter 2 for an appropriate analysis of contrastive 
coherence relations. 
Chapter 4 discussed some experimental evidence in favor of the Asymmetry Hypothe­
sis. In Experiment 1 subjects judged the argumentative tendency of semantic opposi­
tions that were conjoined by maar (but) or by en (and), by choosing between three 
continuation sentences. The continuation sentences either related to the two conjuncts 
of the contrastive coherence relation or were neutral. The results indicated that 
marking by maar led to a higher number of choices for continuation sentences related 
to the second conjunct than marking by en. 
Experiment 2 investigated the relation between the content of the conjuncts and the 
structure of the contrastive coherence relation. Subjects judged the argumentative 
tendency of concessive oppositions by choosing between continuation sentences 
(positive, negative or neutral). The conjuncts were positive, negative or neutral 
arguments. The concessive oppositions varied in the combination and order of the 
arguments and in the conjunction relating the conjuncts (maar от en). The judgments of 
the subjects proved to be determined systematically by the structural properties of the 
constructions. In the second part of the experiment the neutral arguments were again 
presented to the subjects, but now in isolation. Even these judgments showed a distinct 
determination by the structural properties of the original context, thus demonstrating 
the persistence of the contextual effect. 
In Chapter 5, attention was shifted from local to global contrastive coherence relations. 
A series of experiments was discussed in which the effect was investigated of the 
presence or absence of an explicit contrastive marker on the interpretation of global 
contrasts. 
In Experiment 3 the subjects judged differences in the writer's opinion of an 
argumentative text containing a contrastive coherence relation by comparing different 
versions of that text. The text versions differed in the presence or absence of maar and 
in the order of the conjuncts. The results indicated that the judgments were systemati­
cally determined by these two factors: In general the writer's opinion was judged to be 
related to the second conjunct of the contrastive coherence relation, and stronger so if 
the contrast was explicitly marked. This effect was not so strong in a task where the 
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subjects judged only one version of these texts (Experiment 4), and was completely 
absent in a larger experiment (Experiment 5) in which more factors were taken into 
account. The latter experiment did show an effect of the type of contrastive coherence 
relation: In semantic oppositions the order of the conjuncts has less effect on the 
interpretation than in concessive oppositions. This result matches the analysis of 
Chapter 3, which claimed that semantic oppositions are about two entities in the 
domain of discussion and concessive oppositions about one. Experiment 6 demonstra-
ted that the Asymmetry Effect of local contrastive coherence relations depends on the 
presence of explicit Pi's: The effect is smaller if the conjuncts contain an explicit PI 
than if there are no explicit Pi's. Experiment 7 showed that global contrastive coher-
ence relations in which the conjuncts do not contain a PI are asymmetric if the contrast 
is marked by a more salient contrastive marker, viz. a contrastive sentence. 
These results indicate that the linguistic realization determines the interpretation of 
both local and global contrastive coherence relations. There is a difference between the 
two: The Asymmetry Effect is stronger in local contrasts. Another factor determining 
the interpretation of contrastive constructions is the presence of Pi's: Contrastive 
coherence relations with explicit Pi's display less asymmetry. 
These findings were the basis for an analysis of a corpus of natural and experimental 
texts, which was reported in Chapter 6. The results of the analysis indicate that there 
are many ways to indicate the asymmetry of global contrastive coherence relations. One 
is a difference in the length of the conjuncts: As a rule the second conjunct is much 
longer than the first and it is argumentatively more complex. Another is a specific 
structuring of the conjuncts: The information in first conjuncts is generally embedded 
under an explicit PI referring to a perspective other than the writer perspective, 
whereas the information in the second conjunct is generally given from the writer 
perspective. Moreover, the second conjunct generally denies information that is related 
to the first conjunct. These findings are in agreement with the experiments, in that they 
suggest that the presence or absence of maar is not enough to determine the inter-
pretation of global contrastive coherence relations, and that there are other factors 
involved, like the presence of explicit Pi's. 
There are several properties of global contrastive coherence relations that support 
the analysis of Chapter 3. The conjuncts in a contrastive coherence relation are 
generally marked for the contrastive interpretation. It was assumed that these markings 
play a role in deriving the contrastive interpretation. A further finding was that in 
semantic oppositions the first conjuncts more frequently have a PI than in concessive 
oppositions. Semantic oppositions more often have a change in perspective between the 
conjuncts than concessive oppositions. These findings are in line with the analysis of 
semantic oppositions as being more explicit with respect to the structure underlying 
contrastive coherence relations. Moreover, semantic oppositions less frequently have 
maar/echter than concessive oppositions. Global semantic oppositions are like local 
semantic oppositions, in that they can occur freely without maar/echter. A final finding 
related to the analysis of Chapter 3 is that there are no texts in which the first conjunct 
does not have a PI and the second does: The analysis of Chapter 3 implies that if two 
contrasting opinions are expressed, one of which representing the writer's opinion, then 
the information representing the writer's opinion is given in the second conjunct. 
In conclusion, it seems that there is much evidence in favor of the proposed analysis of 
contrastive coherence relations as a specific configuration of the discourse represen-
tation. This configuration accounts for all the contrastive coherence relations analyzed. 
The same configuration is found in local and global contrastive coherence relations. 
Furthermore it seems that the conjunction but, or, for that matter, other explicit 
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contrastive markers, can be characterized as initiating a procedure that operates on this 
configuration. Thus the research reported in this thesis strongly suggests that (global) 
contrastive coherence relations truly constitute a natural kind. The argumentative effect 
of the contrast marker on the representation of the discourse depends on the salience 
of the marker, the presence of Pi's and presumably the size of the related discourse 
units. 
Since the analysis was not stated in terms of the semantic representation of the 
conjuncte but in terms of the way in which that representation relates to the more 
general discourse representation, it does not run into some of the problems which a 
sentential analysis of Ьмг-coordinations encounters: The discourse representation is fed 
not only by linguistic information but also by information provided by the context, such 
as deictic elements. As a consequence there is no need for an extra apparatus to 
account for 'incomplete' buf-coordinations of the type mentioned in Chapter 1, 
repeated here as (1). 
(1) (Context: After three warnings that he should clean up and go to bed 
mother gets angry and drags John out of the room.) 
John:But I nearly finished my game. 
John constructs a discourse representation in which there are two perspectives, one 
corresponding to his mother's wishes and one corresponding to his own. These domains 
contain conflicting information: "John must/need not go to bed". 
The analysis also presented some suggestions about the relation between the inform­
ational and the argumentative representation of texts. Argumentation was characterized 
in terms of the percolation of information from embedded perspectives to the writer 
perspective. It may prove worthwhile to pursue this line of research in order to find out 
whether other aspects of argumentation can be characterized in terms of operations on 
discourse representations. 
The analysis of contrastive coherence relations defended in this thesis is in at least 
three points antagonistic to the characterization of relational propositions (i.e. coher­
ence relations) in Mann and Thompson (1986, 1987). In the current view coherence 
relations are not taken to be the elementary relations between discourse units: They 
are based on more elementary concepts like coordination and discourse perspectives.1 
These elementary concepts were not postulated ad hoc, but are independently motiva­
ted for the analysis of other phenomena. What is specific to the contrastive coherence 
relation is the notion of incompatibility. 
A second point of difference is that the two contrastive coherence relations distin­
guished by Mann and Thompson, viz. thesis-antithesis and concession are here 
considered to be instantiations of one and the same relation. 
A final point of difference is that linguistic markers that indicate the coherence 
relation are not merely elements that function to delimit the class of possible coher­
ence relations. Contrary to Mann's and Thompson's view, they can have a specific 
effect on the discourse representation: The interpretation of explicitly marked contrast­
ive coherence relations differs from the interpretation of 'implicit' contrastive coher­
ence relations. 
In the present view, coherence relations are considered to be a spin-off of other, more 
basic, processes. This view has interesting consequences. Recently some first attempts 
1
 See Sanders, Spooren and Noordman (1989) for similar claims regarding all coherence 
relations. 
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have been made to distinguish between categories of coherence relations by specifying 
the conditions that have to be fulfilled for a particular relation to apply (cf., for 
instance, Hobbs, 1985). The present study may contribute to a sophisticated and 
explanatory categorization. 
For example, Hoey (1986) distinguishes between two major classes of relations, 
logical sequence relations and matching relations. According to Hoey the primary 
organizing principle of the former is the sequencing of the described events (basic to 
such relations as TEMPORAL SEQUENCE, CONDITION, CAUSALITY, etc.). The 
primary organizing principle of matching relations is the 'common topic' of the related 
parts (basic to such relations as CONTRAST, PARALLEL, etc.). 
The analysis of contrastive coherence relations in the present study suggests that 
'common topic' must not be viewed as an independent constraint on the acceptability 
of a contrastive coherence relation: The fact that the related conjuncts in a contrastive 
coherence relation must share a common topic is a consequence of the requirement 
that, if there is to be a contrastive coherence relation, there is a specific configuration 
in the discourse representation. In this configuration there are two discourse perspec-
tives containing contradictory propositions. Two propositions can only be contradictory 
if they have at least one argument in common. Therefore the propositions share a 
common topic. 
The question whether other properties of coherence relations can be characterized 
in the same vein is left for future research. 
The analysis of contrastive coherence relation presented here is a description of a 
product of the interpretation process. The experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 5 
were conducted to investigate established interpretations rather than the way in which 
these interpretations come about. Yet the analysis also has some implications for the 
process of interpretation. For example, a sentence like (2) is ambiguous between a 
denial of expectation reading and a concessive opposition reading. 
(2) John is a pacifist, but he carries a gun. 
The context can disambiguate the sentence: In context (3) it is a denial of expectation, 
in context (4) it is a concessive opposition. 
(3) A: Did you know that John carries a gun? 
B: Yes, it is odd, isn't it, he is a pacifist, but he carries a gun. 
(4) A: Is John a dangerous guy? 
B: Well, he is a pacifist, but he carries a gun. 
According to the analysis, the two readings differ in the number of inferences needed 
to derive the contrastive interpretation. In the denial of expectation reading one 
inference, based on the first conjunct, may suffice. In the concessive opposition reading 
the reader will have to make at least two inferences, each based on one of the 
conjuncts. On the assumption that it takes time to draw inferences, the theory predicts 
that reading times for the concessive opposition reading are longer than those for the 
denial of expectation reading. 
Questions like these suggest a promising line of research. They suggest furthermore 
that the analysis of coherence relations deserves a place at the core of the study of 
discourse. 
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLE OF A TEXT ANALYSIS 
Volkskrant, May 18, 1983 
Original text: 
Schoolverlaters 
(1) In de Volkskrant van 6 mei wordt in het artikel 
"Werkeloosheid verschuift onder schoolverlaters" de 
indruk gewekt dat de bevindingen van het ministerie 
van Sociale Zaken cijfers van het Centraal Planbureau 
zouden relativeren (2) Het ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken spreekt over de schoolverlaters en stelt dat het 
aandeel kwartair opgeleiden (welzijnswerk en verple­
ging) onder hen nagenoeg constant zal blijven (3) Op 
hbo-niveau zal dit aandeel zelfs afnemen door de sterk 
dalende uitstroom uit de pedagogische academies 
(4) Het Centraal Planbureau spreekt evenwel over 
de arbeidsreserve (dat is de gehele niet werkende 
bevolking tussen 14 en 65 jaar) en stelt dat het aandeel 
van de kwartair opgeleiden daarin zal blijven stijgen 
(5) Beide stellingen spreken elkaar niet tegen (6) De 
samenstelling van de categorie schoolverlaters wordt 
bepaald door de recente ontwikkelingen in de keuze 
van de diverse opleidingen 
(7) De samenstelling van de arbeidsreserve wordt 
echter grotendeels bepaald door de ontwikkelingen in 
het onderwijs gedurende de laatste tientallen jaren, en 
dus ook door de penode waarin de kwartaire opleidin­
gen nog een zeer bescheiden omvang hadden 
(8) Dit betekent dus dat de uitstroom uit de ar­
beidsreserve (sterfte, pensionering) nauwelijks kwartair 
is opgeleid, terwijl de instroom (dat zijn de schoool-
verlaters) een aanzienlijk hoger kwartair aandeel heeft 
(9) Daardoor kan zelfs op langere termijn het aandeel 
kwartair opgeleiden m de arbeidsreserve blijven stij­
gen, ook al daalt het aandeel van de kwartair op­
geleiden m de categone schoolverlaters 
Centraal Planbureau, J G Veldhuis 
DEN HAAG 
School-leavers 
(1) In the Volkskrant of 6 May, in the article 
"Unemployment shifts among school-leavers", the 
impression is created that the findings of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment put the figures of 
the Central Planning Bureau m the right perspective 
(2) Talking about school-leavers, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs states that the share of people trained for the 
public sector (social work and nursing) will practically 
remain stable (3) At the HBO-level this portion will 
even become smaller, due to the fast decreasing flow-
out of the teacher training colleges 
(4) However, the Central Planning Bureau is talking 
about the labor reserves (the entire population of un­
employed people between 14 and 65 years) and states 
that the number of people trained for the public sector 
among them will increase (5) These statements are 
not contradictory (6) The composition of the category 
of school-leavers is determined by recent developments 
in the choice for particular types of schooling 
(7) The composition of the labor reserves, however, 
is mostly determined by the developments m education 
over the past decades, and therefore also by the period 
during which the training colleges for the public sector 
were very modest 
(8) So this means that the outflow from the labor 
reserves (death, retirement) is hardly trained for this 
sector, whereas the intlow (the school-leavers) has a 
considerably higher proportion of such trainees (9) 
That is why even in the long run the proportion of 
people trained for the public sector in the labor reser­
ves can increase, even though the proportion of people 
trained for the public sector decreases in the category 
of school-leavers 
Central Planning Bureau, J G Veldhuis 
The Hague 
Annotated text: 
[5T In de Volkskrant van 6 mei 5T] [5P [20, wordt in het artikel "Werkeloosheid 
verschuift onder schoolverlaters" [2T de indruk gewekt 2T] 20] [IO dat de bevindin­
gen van het ministerie van Sociale Zaken cijfers van het Centraal Planbureau [20W 
zouden] relativeren ΙΟ] 5P] 
[20 Het ministerie van Sociale Zaken spreekt 20] [IO over de schoolverlaters IO] 
en [20 stelt 20] [10 dat [lOW het aandeel kwartair opgeleiden (welzijnswerk en 
verpleging) onder hen nagenoeg constant [20W zal 20W] blijven lOW] IO]. 
[IO [5T Op hbo-niveau 5T] [20W zal 20W] [lOW dit aandeel [2T zelfs 2T] 
afnemen [6R door 6R] de sterk dalende uitstroom uit de pedagogische academies 
lOW] IO]. 
[Paragraph] 
[20 Het Centraal Planbureau spreekt 20] [ЗА evenwel ЗА] [IO over de 
arbeidsreserve (dat is de gehele niet werkende bevolking tussen 14 en 65 jaar) IO] 
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en [20 stelt 20] [IO [lOW dat het aandeel van de kwartair opgeleiden daarin 
[20W zal 20W] blijven stijgen lOW] IO]. 
5. [1W Beide stellingen spreken elkaar [2T niet 2T] tegen 1W]. 
6. [5P,1N De samenstelling van de categorie schoolverlaters wordt bepaald door de 
recente ontwikkelingen in de keuze van de diverse opleidingen 5P,1N]. 
[Paragraph] 
7. [5P,1N De samenstelling van de arbeidsreserve wordt [ЗА echter ЗА] [2T groten­
deels 2Ύ] bepaald door de ontwikkelingen in het onderwijs gedurende de laatste 
tientallen jaren, en [6C dus 6C] [6C ook 6C] door de periode waarin de kwartaire 
opleidingen nog een [2V zeer bescheiden 2V\ omvang hadden 5P,1N]. 
[Paragraph] 
8. [6S Dit betekent 6S] [6C dus 6C] [IN dat de uitstroom uit de arbeidsreserve [6S 
(sterfte, pensionering) 6S] [2T nauwelijks 2T] kwartair is opgeleid, [ЗА terwijl ЗА] de 
instroom [6S (dat zijn de schooolverlaters) 6C] een [2V aanzienlijk hoger 2V] 
kwartair aandeel heeft IN]. 
9. [6C,5T Daardoor 6CF5T] [20W kan 20W] [5T [2T zelfs 2T] op langere termijn 5T] 
[lOW het aandeel kwartair opgeleiden in de arbeidsreserve blijven stijgen lOW], 
[3A,20W ook al 3A,20W] [lOW daalt het aandeel van de kwartair opgeleiden in de 
categorie schoolverlaters lOW]. 
Legend: 
IN: non-embedded assertion 
1W: assertion given from the writer's perspective 
IO: assertion embedded under a PI referring to a (potential) conversational partner 
lOW: assertion embedded under a PI referring to another world 
20: PI referring to a (potential) conversational partner 
20W: PI referring to another possible world 
2T: qualification relating to the truth of an assertion 
2V: qualification relating to the evaluation of an assertion 
ЗА: adversative element 
ST: topicalized phrase 
5P: passive phrase 
6R: marker of reason/cause 
6C: marker of consequence 
6S: marker of specificity 
Text structure: 
Sentence 1. gives an introduction to the topic of discussion, sentences 2.-8. give the 
argumentation, sentence 9. gives the conclusion with respect to the topic of discussion. 
The relevant contrast relation is a semantic opposition. The first conjunct is sentence 1. 
The second conjunct is sentences 2.-8. The main assertion of the second conjunct is 
sentence 8. The (implicit) claim the argumentation is about is: 'The Volkskrant is 
mistaken'. Sentence 9. gives the conclusion with respect to this claim. The first conjunct 
gives new information, the second conjunct denies old information (namely the 
information in the first conjunct). The rhetorical function of the contrast relation is that 
of a correction. 
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Volks­
krant 
D, Mm of SAE states 
share of people trained 
for public sector 
remains constant 
of people trained for 
public sector will 
increase 
MoSAE and 
CPB contradia 
each other 
W 
if MoSAE says that share of people 
trained for the public sector will 
remain constant and СРВ says that 
share of people trained for pubbc 
sector will increase they contradict 
each other 
Writer D, Mm of SAE talks about school-
leavers and states that share 
of people trained for the public 
sector will remain constant 
D 2 СРВ talks about labor reserves 
and states that share of 
people trained for the public 
sector will increase 
MoSAE and СРВ 
do not contra­
dict each other 
W 
if MoSAE talks about school-leavers 
and СРВ talks about labor reserves, 
they cannot contradict each other 
• С Volkskrant 
is wrong 
W 
If Volkskrant says X 
and I can prove that 
-X, then the Volks­
krant is wrong 
В 
If P, claims that X 
and P2 proves that 
-X, then P, is wrong 
The writer's intermediate warrant ("If the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
and the Central Planning Bureau talk about different groups of people, then their 
claims cannot contradict each other") is supported by some further argumentation that 
can be summarized as follows: 
The composition of the category of school-leavers leads to a high proportion of people 
trained for the public sector in the inflow of the labor reserve, whereas the composition 
of the category labor reserve leads to a low proportion of outflow of people trained for 
the public sector in the outflow of the labor reserve. Therefore, the increase vs. 
decrease of the number of people trained for the public sector need not be in conflict. 

SAMENVATTING 
van Some Aspects of the Form and Interpretation of Global Contrastive Coherence 
Relations. 
Teksten onderscheiden zich van verzamelingen losse zinnen doordat ze samenhang 
vertonen. Tekstsamenhang kan op twee manieren bewerkstelligd worden: door referen-
tiële continuïteit (herhaalde verwijzing naar dezelfde entiteit) of doordat de zinnen in 
de tekst samenhangend verbonden zijn. De relaties die tussen de zinnen van een 
samenhangende tekst kunnen bestaan worden wel aangeduid als coherentierelaties. In 
deze studie wordt één van deze coherentierelaties, te weten de tegenstellingsrelatie, 
onderzocht. 
Tegenstellingsrelaties komen zowel locaal (tussen zinnen) als globaal (tussen 
tekstdelen) voor. Hier gaat het vooral om de eigenschappen van de globale tegenstel-
lingsrelatie. Niettemin is het uitgangspunt van het onderzoek de literatuur over maar-
verbindingen, d.i. locale relaties, omdat maar opgevat kan worden als de prototypische 
markering van de tegenstellingsrelatie. De relevante literatuur wordt besproken in 
hoofdstuk 2. Die bespreking leidt tot een formulering van een aantal criteria voor een 
adequate beschrijving van de linguïstische eigenschappen van coherentierelaties in het 
algemeen en de tegenstellingsrelatie in het bijzonder. 
Een eerste criterium is dat aan conjuncties een operationele betekenis moet worden 
toegekend: een conjunctie moet niet zozeer beschreven worden in termen van waar-
heidscondities als wel in termen van het effect dat de interpretatie van de conjunctie 
heeft op de representatie van de linguïstische informatie. Een volgend criterium is dat 
de analyse in overeenstemming moet zijn met de argumentatieve eigenschappen van de 
tegenstellingsrelatie. Ook moet zo'n beschrijving in overeenstemming te brengen zijn 
met het feit dat de context een grote invloed uitoefent op de interpretatie van de 
tegenstellingsrelatie. Dat impliceert onder andere dat de interpretatie van de tegenstel-
lingsrelatie niet beschreven kan worden als een eenvoudige functie van de interpretatie 
van de samenstellende delen. Daarmee hangt samen dat de analyse rekenschap moet 
geven van de verschillende soorten tegenstellingsrelaties. Er worden drie hoofdtypen 
onderscheiden: semantische opposities als Jan L· klein, maar Piet L· groot, ontkenningen 
van verwachting als Jan ts klein, maar hij speelt basketbal en concessieve opposities als 
Jan L· klein, maar hij is rijk. Semantische opposities kenmerken zich o.a. doordat ze een 
parafrase met en toestaan; ontkenningen van verwachting kunnen met hoewel gepara-
fraseerd worden; aan het eerste conjunct van een concessieve oppositie kan weliswaar 
worden toegevoegd. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een analyse van (locale) tegenstellingsrelaties gepresenteerd die 
er naar streeft aan deze criteria te voldoen. Een centraal concept in de analyse is de 
notie 'discourse perspectief, een cognitief middel om de geldigheid van informatie in te 
perken. Inperking geschiedt door inbedding onder elementen als zogenaamde Verbs of 
saying', modale werkwoorden en tijd- en plaatsaanduidende elementen. Deze elemen-
ten worden perspectief-aanduidende elementen genoemd. Het effect van perspective-
ring is dat informatie niet langer ongekwalificeerd geldig is. Perspectieven zijn 
hiërarchisch geordend, met aan de top het schrijver- of spreker-perspectief, dat wil 
zeggen het perspectief dat correspondeert met de informatie die de schrijver/spreker 
voor geldig houdt. Informatie die ingebed is in een lager perspectief kan doorgelaten 
worden naar een hoger perspectief. Dit proces wordt aangeduid met de term 
'percolatie'. 
Moor-verbindingen (tegenstellingsrelaties in het algemeen) worden opgevat als 
coördinaties van perspectieven die incompatibele informatie bevatten. De relevante 
perspectief-aanduidende elementen blijven soms abstract. 
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De drie soorten /naar-verbindingen kunnen gekarakteriseerd worden in termen van 
de relatie tussen dit contrastieve schema en de informatie die expliciet wordt uit-
gedrukt in de maar-verbinding. Semantische opposities zijn het meest expliciet, in 
ontkenningen van verwachting is ten minste een inferentie op grond van het eerste 
conjunct vereist om het contrastieve schema af te leiden en concessieve opposities 
gelden als het meest impliciet omdat zij een inferentie vereisen op grond van beide 
conjuncten. Een verder onderscheid is dat semantische opposities over twee entiteiten 
in het discussiedomein gaan en daarom de vereiste incompatibiliteit van de geperspec-
tiveerde informatie moeten erven van de context, terwijl de beide andere typen over 
één entiteit gaan en de geperspectiveerde informatie in deze gevallen daarom meer 
direct incompatibel is. 
De precíese inhoud van de incompatibele proposities in de verbonden perspectieven 
is afhankelijk van de situatie in de discourse representatie zoals die tot op het moment 
van interpretatie van de tegenstellingsrelatie is geconstrueerd. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat 
eenzelfde oppervlaktevorm tot verschillende interpretaties kan leiden, afhankelijk van 
de context. Daarom is het los van de context waarin de oppervlaktevorm voorkomt niet 
mogelijk om te zeggen om wat voor type tegenstellingsrelatie het gaat. 
Deze studie gaat niet in op de precíese stappen die leiden van de oppervlaktevorm 
tot de onderliggende representatie. Wel wordt er voorgesteld om de interpretatie van 
voegwoorden zoals maar op te vatten als een instructie om een contrastieve structuur 
op te zetten. Zo kan de bewering dat maar een contrast uitdrukt, een bewering die 
vaak gedaan wordt in de literatuur, maar niettemin steeds vaag is gebleven, expliciet 
gemaakt worden. 
Voor alle waar-verbindingen wordt de asymmetrie hypothese geformuleerd: als de 
tegenstellingsrelatie gemarkeerd wordt door middel van expliciete contrastieve 
markeerders zoals moor, zal de informatie in het discourse domein dat correspondeert 
met het tweede conjunct perecieren naar het hogere perspectief, doorgaans dat van de 
spreker/schrijver. Als de tegenstellingsrelatie niet expliciet gemarkeerd is, wordt er 
verondersteld dat er geen percolatie plaatsvindt. Op deze wijze is er een verband tot 
stand gebracht tussen de taalkundige en argumentatieve eigenschappen van maar-
verbindingen. 
In de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 wordt verslag gedaan van een aantal experimenten waarin 
empirische evidentie is gezocht voor verschillende aspecten van de voorgestelde 
analyse. In hoofdstuk 4 gaat het daarbij om experimenten waarin locale tegenstellings-
relaties onderzocht worden. 
In experiment 1 beoordeelden proefpersonen de argumentatieve strekking van locale 
tegenstellingsrelatïes. Het ging in dit geval met name om semantische opposities, die 
gepresenteerd werden als antwoorden op een vraag in de context. Om het effect van de 
asymmetrie van maar-verbindingen te kunnen onderscheiden van een eventueel effect 
van de volgorde van de conjuncten, waren de conjuncten in de tegenstellingsrelatie 
verbonden met moor of met en. Om de twee factoren 'aanwezigheid van тоог" en 
Volgorde van de conjuncten' niet te laten beïnvloeden door de inhoud van de gebruikte 
conjuncten, werd ook de volgorde van de conjuncten gevarieerd. De oordelen beston-
den eruit dat proefpersonen kozen tussen drie vervolgzinnen, die aansloten bij de 
verbonden conjuncten of neutraal waren. In overeenstemming met de Asymmetrie-
hypothese wezen de resultaten uit dat markering met moor vaker leidde tot keuzes 
voor de vervolgzin die aansloot bij het tweede conjunct dan markering met en. 
In experiment 2 werd het verband tussen de inhoud van de delen en de structuur 
van de locale tegeastellingsrelatie onderzocht. Proefpersonen beoordeelden de 
argumentatieve strekking van concessieve opposities, die gepresenteerd werden als 
antwoord op een vraag in de context. Evenals in experiment 1 werden de oordelen 
uitgesproken door te kiezen voor verschillende vervolgzinnen (positief, negatief of 
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neutraal). De conjuncten in de tegenstellingsrelatie waren positieve, negatieve of 
neutrale argumenten. De concessieve opposities verschilden in de gebruikte combinatie 
en volgorde van de argumenten en in de conjunctie die de argumenten verbond (maar 
of en). De resultaten gaven aan dat de oordelen systematisch beïnvloed werden door 
deze eigenschappen van de concessieve opposities. In het tweede deel van het experi-
ment werden de neutrale argumenten uit het eerste deel opnieuw gepresenteerd, maar 
nu als afzonderlijk antwoord op de contextuele vraag. Ook in dit geval beoordeelden 
de proefpersonen de argumentatieve strekking van deze argumenten door uit een 
positieve, negatieve of neutrale vervolgzin te kiezen. Zelfs deze oordelen werden op 
een systematische manier beïnvloed door de structurele en inhoudelijke eigenschappen 
van de constructie waarin de neutrale argumenten oorspronkelijk waren aangeboden. 
In hoofdstuk 5 komen globale tegenstellingsrelaties aan de orde. Er wordt een aantal 
experimenten gerapporteerd waarin het effect van de aan- of afwezigheid van een 
expliciete contrastieve markeerder op het asymmetrische karakter van de globale 
tegenstellingsrelatie is onderzocht. 
In experiment 3 beoordeelden de proefpersonen de verschillen inzake de mening 
van de schrijver van een argumentatieve tekst die een tegenstellingsrelatie bevat door 
verschillende versies van zo'n tekst te vergelijken. De versies verschilden wat betreft de 
aan- of afwezigheid van maar en wat betreft de volgorde van de conjuncten. De 
resultaten gaven aan dat de oordelen systematisch werden bepaald door deze twee 
factoren. In het algemeen werd de mening van de schrijver geïdentificeerd met het 
tweede conjunct en dit gold nog sterker als de tegenstelling expliciet gemarkeerd was. 
Het effect van de expliciete markering op de interpretatie van de tegenstellingsrelatie 
bleek niet zo sterk te zijn in een experiment waarin de proefpersonen slechts één 
versie van de teksten uit experiment 3 voorgelegd kregen (experiment 4) en was 
volledig afwezig in experiment 5 waarin meer factoren in ogenschouw werden geno-
men. In dit laatste experiment bleek wel het effect van het type van de tegenstellings-
relatie: in semantische opposities heeft de volgorde van de conjuncten minder effect 
dan in concessieve opposities. Dit resultaat komt overeen met de analyse van hoofdstuk 
3 dat semantische opposities over twee entiteiten in het discussiedomein gaan en 
concessieve opposities over één entiteit. Met experiment 6 werd aangetoond dat het 
asymmetrie-effect in locale tegenstellingsrelaties afhankelijk is van de aanwezigheid van 
expliciete perspectiefaanduidende elementen: het effect is geringer als de conjuncten 
zo'n element bevatten dan als zulke elementen ontbreken. Experiment 7 liet zien dat 
globale tegenstellingsrelaties waarin de conjuncten geen perspectiefaanduidend element 
bevatten asymmetrisch zijn als de tegenstelling gemarkeerd wordt door een meer in het 
oog springende markeerder, te weten een tegenstellende zin. 
Deze resultaten geven aan dat de linguïstische realisering de interpretatie van zowel 
locale als globale tegenstellingsrelaties bepaalt. Tussen de twee bestaat een verschil: 
het Asymmetrie-effect is groter in locale tegenstellingsrelaties. Een andere factor die 
de interpretatie van contrastieve constructies bepaalt is de aanwezigheid van expliciete 
perspectiefaanduidende elementen: tegenstellingsrelaties met zulke elementen zijn 
minder asymmetrisch. 
Deze bevindingen waren aanleiding voor het uitvoeren van een analyse van een corpus 
van natuurlijke teksten uit kranten en de teksten die in de experimenten gebruikt zijn. 
Over deze analyse wordt in hoofdstuk 6 gerapporteerd. De resultaten van de analyse 
laten zien dat er verschillende manieren zijn waarop de asymmetrie van globale tegen-
stellingsrelaties in natuurlijke teksten gemarkeerd kan worden. Zo is het tweede 
conjunct van een asymmetrische tegenstellingsrelatie doorgaans langer dan het eerste 
conjunct en vertoont het complexere argumentatie. Een andere markeringswijze is de 
structuur van de conjuncten: de informatie in het eerste conjunct is doorgaans gegeven 
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vanuit een ander perspectief dan dat van de schrijver van de tekst, terwijl de informatie 
in het tweede conjunct doorgaans vanuit het schrijver-perspectief gegeven wordt. 
Bovendien wordt in het tweede conjunct doorgaans informatie ontkend die gerelateerd 
is aan het eerste conjunct. Deze bevindingen stemmen overeen met de experimenten in 
zoverre dat ze suggereren dat de aan- of afwezigheid van een enkel maar niet genoeg 
lijkt om de asymmetrie van een globale tegenstellingsrelatie te bepalen en dat ook 
andere factoren, zoals de aanwezigheid van perspectiefaanduidende elementen, een rol 
spelen. 
Voorts leverde de tekstanalyse verschillende gegevens op die direct relevant zijn 
voor de analyse van hoofdstuk 3. In het algemeen zijn de conjuncten van de tegen-
stellingsrelatie gemarkeerd voor de contrastieve interpretatie. Aangenomen wordt dat 
die markeringen een rol spelen bij het afleiden van de contrastieve interpretatie. Uit 
de analyse bleek voorts dat in semantische opposities vaker een wisseling in perspectief 
plaats vindt dan in concessieve opposities, wat er toe kan bijdragen dat semantische 
opposities explicieter zijn wat betreft de onderliggende contrastieve structuur. Ook 
hebben semantische opposities minder vaak maar/echter als signaal voor de tegen-
stellingsrelatie: kennelijk kunnen globale semantische opposities, net als locale, vrijelijk 
voorkomen zonder dit element. Een laatste relevante bevinding is dat in het algemeen 
het eerste conjunct van de geanalyseerde teksten een perspectiefaanduidend element 
bevat dat naar een ander perspectief dan dat van de schrijver verwijst en het tweede 
niet: deze bevinding strookt met de asymmetriehypothese, die dicteert dat als regel de 
opinie die overeenkomt met de schrijver van de tekst in het tweede conjunct geplaatst 
wordt. 
De conclusie is dat het inderdaad mogelijk lijkt om de linguïstische eigenschappen van 
tegenstellingsrelaties te beschrijven als een specifieke configuratie in de tekstrepresen-
tatie. Die configuratie speelt een rol bij alle geanalyseerde typen tegenstellingsrelaties, 
zowel op locaal als op globaal niveau. Bovendien lijkt het erop dat expliciete con-
trastmarkeerders gekarakteriseerd kunnen worden als elementen die een procedure 
starten die op deze configuratie werkt. Het argumentatieve effect van de contrast-
markeerder op de tekstrepresentatie hangt af van de opvallendheid van de markeerder 
en van de lengte van verbonden tekstdelen. 
Dit onderzoek suggereert dat coherentierelaties geanalyseerd kunnen en moeten 
worden in meer elementaire en onafhankelijk gemotiveerde begrippen, zoals coördina-
tie en perspectief. Het bestaan van coherentierelaties wordt dus opgevat als een neven-
effect van andere, meer basale processen. Daarmee wordt het voorstelbaar hoe 
verschillende coherentierelaties samenhangen en hoe een meer procedureel model van 
het interpreteren van coherentierelaties er uit zou kunnen zien. De conclusie luidt dat 
de analyse van coherentierelaties een veelbelovende lijn van onderzoek vormt voor de 
tekstwetenschap en dat deze studie een pleidooi is voor het toekennen van een 
centrale plaats aan het onderzoek naar coherentierelaties in de tekstwetenschap. 
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